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Executivesummary
This reportpresentsa na nalysiso fn ational ands upranational organic
farmingp olicynetworks in Europe.T he aimo fthe national level analysis
is toe xamine the differentstructureso fp olicymaking and howt hese
depend on the country-specificc onditions.T he aim of the EUl evel
analysisi stwofold: firstly,the political structure of organicf arming is
examined in the context of the CommonAgricultural Policy(CAP);
secondly,the research investigates the attitudes of EUl evel policy
makers towards organicf arminga nd their acceptance of specific organic
farming policyinstruments.
Thec ountries included in the research areAustria, Switzerland, the
CzechR epublic, Germany,Denmark, England, Estonia, Hungary,I taly,
Polanda nd Slovenia.Although developing under the umbrella of a
common agriculturalp olicy,wef ind the organic sector and the related
policiesa tdifferentstageso fd evelopmentin differentcountries.
Network analyses were conducted in the eleven countries tor eveal the
political structures of organic farming. The resultso fthese analyses are
used as ab asis for ac ross-countrycomparison, from which conclusions
are drawnr egarding organic farmingp olicyin Europe. The types of
organic farming policynetworksi dentified can be differentiated for old
and newEUm ember states but notaccordingtothe differentsizes of the
countries’organic sector. The network analysis assessed the potential of
organic farming organizations toi nfluence the policyprocess. In the
context of general farming policy,o rganic farming organizations havea
fairlyw eak influence whereas the agriculturalm inistries haveah igh
influence on bothp olicydomains in all countries.
Att he EUl evel, organic farming as ap olicydomain is ar ecent
development,a nd arose when the CAPb ecame more sensitiveto
environmental issues. Quantitativea nd qualitativem ethods are applied
toe xplore whether this increasing consideration of environmental
aspectsh ad anyinfluence on the developmentof an organic farming
policynetwork. Abovea ll, wec onclude thatan etwork of organic farming
policyhas noty etbeen established att he EUl evel, and organica nd
general farming policyare perceived as twod ifferentpolicydomains.
While the IFOAMEUGroupi sr ecognized as the representativef or
organic farming issues att he EUl evel, ithas al imited influencei n
general farming policy.Environmental and consumer interestgroups are
nothighlyinvolved in organicf arming policyand the mostimportant
general farmers’u nion,the Committee of ProfessionalAgricultural
Organisationsi nthe EuropeanU nion (COPA), also carries out limited
activity in supportof organic farming. Nevertheless, based on their
attitudes towards organic farming, EUp olicyactors can be grouped into
“supporters”,“open”actors, “hesitant” actors, and “critical”actors.
Organic farming organizations were placed in the “supporters”group
while mostenvironmental organizations were assigned tothe “open
towards organic farming”group. The differentDirectorates-General of
the EuropeanCommission were notfound toh aveac ommon position
towards organic farming. COPAcould notbe grouped in the same way,
duetoi tsl ack of responses about itsa ttitude towards organic farming.ii
The consequences of the political structure for the further development
of organicf arming policycan onlybe understood in the broader context.
The politicals ituationo fo rganic farming in Europe variesa tt he macro
level ando rganic farming organizations face differentchallenges. The
further developmentof organic farmingp olicyis restricted in general by
the limited interestof general farming policyactors, and byt he organic
farmingo rganizations’lacko fr esources. Organic farmingp olicyactors
can drawu ps trategies too vercome thisl imitationa nd seek suitable
partnersi nthe policyprocess. Three aspectsa re identified whicha re
relevantin this context:
i) the centrality of the potentialp artner,i .e. itsr eputation and
position in the network
ii) the potential partner’si nterestin the policyissueunder debate
iii) the extentt owhich this actor has formulated ac lear position
towards the issueiii
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1Introduction
1.1 Background
Organicf arming is rooted in as ocial movementt hatemerged out of
opposition tom ainstreamf arming.R atherthane ngagingi np ublic
protestagainstan establishedp olicy,i topposedthe predominantw ayof
farmingb ydemonstrating an alternative. The conceptof organicf arming
has been developed byproducers andi nterested individualss ince the
1920sa nd sustainedb yconsumersthrough specialistmarkets,
particularlysincethe 1970s. Peoplewitha ne nvironmental concern have
supported theo rganic movementas partof an environmentallyfriendly
life style. In consequence, the organic movementu nites ap lurality of
perspectives.
In recenty ears, this organic movementhas increasinglybecome af ocus
of policyinterestin Europe. European Union countriesn owsupport
organic farming through agri-environmental programmes and action
plans,a mong otheri nstruments. These policyinterventions aim atboth
supporting consumerc hoice through developmentof the marketfor
organic fooda nd encouraging the provision of public goods through
supportfor organic landm anagement(Lampkin &S tolze2006).I n
addition, withthe Regulation( EEC)N o2092/91 the state, i.e. the EU,
provides the legal frameworkf or organic production, processing,
labelling, inspectiona nd certification andthusd efines whatorganic
farming is (Dabbert2 001).I nc onsequence, the conceptof organic
farming is nowincreasinglyshaped byactorso utsidethe organic
movement.
The emerging policyfieldo fo rganicf arming mett he established fieldo f
general agricultural policyw hich hadb een functioning in ar elatively
closedp olicyarena uptothen. Policyactorsthatrepresented as ocial
movementw ithi tsp luralistinterestswere something newin this policy
area. Understandably,these cultural differences, togetherwiththe
question of ownership of the “organic idea”,e voked ac onfrontation
betweeno rganic and established mainstream agriculture and the various
representatives.
Whilstgaining political importance, actors in the organic farming policy
field havetof ace atwofold, somewhatcontradictorychallenge: On the
one hand theyconceiveo fo rganic farming policyas an alternative, an
antipode totraditional general agricultural policy.But on the other hand
organicf arming is stronglyregulated byt he statea nd highlydependent
upon the super-ordinatea griculturalp olicyarena (Lampkin &S tolze
2006).O rganic representatives –t hough based in as ocialm ovement–
thush avetoe ngage withg eneral farmingp olicyactors.
Organic farmingh as notdeveloped equallyin the variousc ountries of
Europe. Although evolvingunder the shared roof of the Common
AgriculturalP olicy(CAP), countries havetravelled the patho f
institutionalo rganicf arming developmentu nevenlyso far, resulting in
differentshares of organic farming within the overall agricultural sector2
(Michelsen etal. 2001). Itis therefore interesting toc omparethe political
structures of organic farming in differentcountries. National-level
agricultural policyin the EUi ss tronglydetermined byt he CAP, of which
organicf armingp olicyis as ub-domain. For this reason,wea lso address
the political structure of organic farming att he EUl evel.
Againstt hatbackdrop this book addresses questions about the structure
of organic farmingp olicy.W ho has power and howis the decision-
making process organized? Which institutions arei nvolved and is the
plurality of the social movementreflected in the political structure? A
further aim of this reportis tos tudyt he relationship between the organic
and the general farmingp olicyfield.
The national-level analyseswere undertaken in old (AT, DK, DE,I T, UK)
and new(CZ, EE,H U, PL, SI) member states, as well as in CH. The
distinction betweeno ld and newEUm ember states refers tothe major
differences in the countries’socio-economic histories. Furthermore,
countries can be distinguished byt heir organic sector’ss tage of
development.Austria( AT),Denmark( DK) and Switzerland (CH) are
included as representatives of those countries witham ore developed
organic sector, whereas the United Kingdom (UK) and Italy(IT)a re
included as examples of countries withal ess developed organics ector.
Finally,Germany(DE)i si ncluded as the largestorganic marketin
Europe. Bycontrast,i nthe Centrala nd EasternEuropean (CEE)
countries the organic sector is still atan earlystage and relativelysmall.
Att he EUl evel, the reportpresentsa no verviewof the actorsi nvolved in
organic farming policymaking and showsh owt heycollaborate. Alliances
arei dentified andwea sk howt he twop olicydomains of organic and
general farmingi nteract.I na ddition tothis structuralp erspective, we
examinethe attitudes of EU-level policymakers towards organic
farming, their knowledgea bout itand their acceptance of specific organic
farmingp olicyinstrumentsa nd strategies.
The book is structured as follows. After ad escription of the policy
environmentof organic farminga tboththe EUa nd the nationall evel, we
presentt he methodologyand theoretical background applied. In chapter
3w ec omparethe eleven national networks of organic farming policyand
discuss them byfocussing on the role of the organic sector.Chapter 4
focuses on the EUl evel. Actorsi nvolved in organic farmingp olicy
making are described and wei nvestigatetheir position in and
interactions withthe CAPi nc hapters4 .1 and 4.2.Chapter 4.3t hen
addresses the acceptance of variousp olicyinstrumentsthatcould be
implemented as partof an encompassingo rganic farming policystrategy.
Finally,c hapter 5d rawsc onclusions about the political structure of
organic farmingi nEurope, and itsi mplications for the activity of organic
farming policyactors.
1.2The politicalenvironmentoforganicfarmingi nEurope
Compared tothe long historyof the European Common Agricultural
Policy,o rganic farmingp olicydeveloped onlyrecentlyas as ub-issueo f3
this field. For about 50y ears, the CAPd eveloped as trong frameworkf or
everyagriculturalp olicyissuei nthe EU.1
To better understand the options andc onstraintsf or policyactors in
organic farming policy,i tis helpfultounderstand the characteristicso f
the policystructures and the context theyoperatei n.
1.2.1 Europeanagriculturalp olicymaking
Europeana griculturalp olicymaking followswhatis knowna sthe
consultation procedure. This procedure precedes consultation of the
European Parliament(EP), and does notneed the parliaments’consent.
The twom aini nstitutions involved in this process arethe European
Commission( COMM)a nd the Council of Agricultural Ministers( CoAM).
The COMM proposes certain legislation and the CoAMtakes the final
decision regarding legislation. The roles of these organizations are
detailedi nthe European Treaties and will notbe discussedh ere.
Therefore, decisions regarding the CAPa re made byam ulti-level system
of government:the national ministries of agriculture are partof the
intergovernmental system of the CoAM, forming as upranational system
together withthe COMM and the European Parliament(European
Commission 2003).
EUp olicy,h owever, is notonlyap roductof interaction betweenthese
European institutions (for ourp urposeswea re limiting the term
“European institution”t othe three institutions of EUp olicyand
administration described above). Italso involves civil society.
Institutions withtheirwelld efined role are confronted withi nterest
groups thatlobbyatt he twol evelso fg overnment:n ational and EUl evel.
Alongside the European institutions,wef ind bothn ational interest
groups and supranational interestgroups in the form of peak
organizations representingd ifferentinterests. However, itw ould be too
simple toa ssume thatsupranationalg roups lobbyatt he EUl evel and
national interestgroups onlyw ork att he national level and thuso nlyt ry
toi nfluence EUp olicyin an indirectw ayv ia the intergovernmental
route. In agricultural policy,e ven though supranationalp eak
organizations willp rimarilyt argetEuropean institutions, theyalso target
national governments( mainlybyt argeting an ational government’s
permanentrepresentation att he EU) (Pappi &H enning 1999).W ea lso
findan umber of national interestgroups thatarea ctiven otonlyat
national level but also att he EUl evel. Nationalf armers’organizations
often havea no fficei nBrussels as ab asis for lobbying. Pappi and
Henning (1999)i dentified three principal strategies of national interest-
groupl obbying: The firstis the directnationals trategyw here interest
groups seek toa ccess the intergovernmental Europeans ystem through
their owng overnmentso rp ermanentrepresentatives att he EU. The
secondi sthe indirectsupranationals trategyt hatw orks through the
1T he developmentof the CAPi si nturn influenced byw orldwide institutionsl ike the WTO and other
international agreements.4
European peak organization.Finally,n ational interestgroups can lobby
the supranational EUi nstitutions directly,i ndependentlyfrom their peak
organizations. This multilayer structure of possible interest-group
lobbying getse ven more complexw henwec onsider that,within the
COMM, variousDirectorates-General (DGs) are often responsible for one
policyissue, and boundariesb etweenthem aren otclearlydefined
(Peters2001).
Peters( 2001) argues that,i ng eneral, the fragmented policyprocess,b oth
atEUl evel and betweenthe EUa nd the national level opens upvarious
opportunitiesf or interestgroups toi nfluence decision-making.T he
nature of the EUi nstitutions as an “adolescentbureaucracy”,a sh ep uts
it,a ssiststhe possibilitiesf or interestgroups toa pproach the decision-
makers in differentw ays. The resultis ac omplexstructure withvarious
possibilities for interestgroups tol obby.M azeyand Richardson (2001)
see ap ositivep ointin favouro fi nterest-groupl obbying in ac omplex
structure of policymaking. Theysuggestt hat,i nac omplexenvironment,
boththe Commission and the interestgroups havea ni nterestin forming
stable policycommunities and networks,b ecause as table situation is
preferred toa nuncertain situation. Being am embero fas table policy
community creates further opportunity structuresf or interestgroups.
Withr egardtothe CAP, differentauthorsb elievethatinterestgroups
havel ess influence and the institutions haveaf ar greater influence. After
discussing boththe institutional framework and the interest-group
framework, Kay(2000)c oncludes that“ the mostimportantmechanism
behind CAPr eformsi sthe interaction of EUi nstitutions and member
stateg overnments”.H eg ives three reasonsf or this assessment.First,the
mostimportantfarm interestgroup, the Committee of Professional
Agricultural Organisationsi nthe European Union (COPA)h ad little
influence on the CAPr eforms in the 1980sa nd 1990se ven though ithad
been represented in an umber of bodies involved in the policyprocess.
The COMM and the CoAMp roved tob em orei nfluentiali ntermso f
policyoutcomes. Second, atan ational level, farmers’organizations
competewithm inistries and lobbygroups from other policyareas on the
distributiono fthe nationalb udgetand the focuso fn ationalp olicy.
Third, even if such nationali nterestgroups ares uccessfula tt he national
level, theydo nothavea nyinfluence on the discussiong oing on in the
CoAMwhich followsi tso wnr ules. In the Council, all member states have
tof indac ompromise, but mostlyt heyare notw illing tom ovef ar from
their initial positions. Daugbjerg (1999) states thatinstitutions havea
high influence whereas interestgroups havear elativelylowinfluence.
Pappia nd Henning’s( 1999) network analysiso nthe organization of
influence on the CAPs upportsthis statementw ithr egard tothe EUl evel.
Theyconclude thatfor the Commission contactswithinthe political
sector, i.e. witho theri nstitutions, are of higheri mportance than contacts
withthe EUf armers’lobby.Afurthera rgumentfor the limited power of
interestgroups in the CAPi sg iven byt heir ownc haracteristics. Even
though interestgroups are described as moref lexible and less
constrained in their lobbyinga ctivities than national states, theyare
characterized as fairlyslowpolicyactors (Mazey&R ichardson 2001).
Complexinternal decision making processes and al ack of resources limit5
their ability totake partin European policyprocesses (Mazey&
Richardson 2001).W ec onclude that,a lthough in theoryan adolescent
bureaucracysuch as the EUo pens upl obbying optionsf or interest
groups, in the case of the CAPthe strongi nvolvementof national
governmentsl imitsthe possibilities for civil society organizations to
achievetheirg oals.
The network approach has proved tob eausefultool tom akethe
complexstructure of EUa griculturalp olicyprocess moretangible and to
help understandthe role ando ptions of interest-groupi nvolvement.
Firstw ewill presentt he formal structuresf or interest-group
participationp rovided byt he EUi nstitutions andthen moveo nto
presentingr esultsf roma na nalysiso fthe informal networka sc ompleted
byHenning andW ald( 2000).
Interestgroups becomei nvolved in the formald ecision-making process
of the CAPthrough 31AgriculturalAdvisoryCommittees. These are 30
AdvisoryGroups thatfocuso nthe differentcommoditieso ro n
environmental,r urald evelopmentandh ealthi ssues (European
Commission2004a), andthe “Green Groupo fthe Eight” comprising
eightinterestgroups focussing on environmental issues. The advisory
committees meetseveral times ayear andc onsultt he COMMd uring the
decision-making phase of the policyprocess.W henac ommittee adoptsa
proposal unanimouslyitmayinstructt he COMMtoc ommunicatethe
proposal tothe CoAM. The COMMi sn otbound tothe resultso fthe
advisorycommittees, but itsetsg reatv alueo nthem andr eportstothe
committee membersh owithastaken accountof their views( European
Commission 2004a). Committee members representv ariouss ocio-
economic interests: agricultural producers and agricultural cooperatives,
the agricultural and food-manufacturing industries, the agricultural
productsa nd foodstuffstrade,f armworkers and workers in the food
industry,c onsumers ande nvironmentalists. Agriculturalp roducersa nd
agricultural cooperatives (primarilyrepresented byCOPA)h olda round
50%o fthe seatsi ne ach of the AdvisoryGroups (exceptin the “Green
Groupo fthe Eight”)whichi se videnceo ftheir potential influence in the
decision-making process. Currently117 interestgroups are registered
(European Commission 2004b) and hold as eatin atleastone
Agricultural AdvisoryCommittee.
Figure 1-1 illustrates the prominentpositiono fCOPAin the formal
agricultural policynetwork of the EU, and showsthatinterestgroups of
workers (the European Federation of Trade Unions in the Food,
Agriculture and Tourism sectors and allied branches, EFFAT),
consumers (the European Consumers’Organization, BEUC)a nd
environmentalists( e.g. the European Environmental Bureau,EEB,the
World Wildlife Fund, WWFand Birdlife International, BIRDLIFE)a re
represented in an umbero fAdvisoryGroups.I nterestgroups of the
agricultural productsa nd foodstuffs trade (Eurocommerce,
EUROCOMM, the Committee of Cereals, Feedstuff,O ilseeds, Oliveo il,
Oils and Fatsa nd AgrisupplyTrade byt he EU, COCERAL, and the
European Livestocka nd MeatTrading Union, UECBV) and the agri-
industry(the Confederation of the Food and Drink Industries of the EU,
CIAA,the International Butchers’Confederation, CIBC,a nd the6
Association of the Chocolate, Biscuitsa nd ConfectionaryIndustries of
the EU, CAOBISCO) are members of fewer advisorycommittees; this
maybe duetotheir focuso ns pecific commodities. The same is truef or
the large number of interestgroups thatare represented onlyon those
one or twoa dvisorycommittees thataddress their specific interests.
Figure1-1:Membershipo fi nterest groupsinAgriculturalAdvisory
Committees,2005
Note: the chartshowso nlyinterestgroups which are members of atleastfivea dvisory
committees
Source: European Commission (2004b)
These advisorycommittees haveac onsultativef unction in the policy
process; however, ithas beena rgued thatinterestgroups haveal imited
influence in this process. The member organizations of the advisory
committees often valuethe possibility for information exchange with
other stakeholdersh igher than the directinfluence capability in the
policyprocess. Hence, interestgroups use formals tructurestoc ultivate
their informaln etworks. Such networks were examined byHenning and
Wald (2000)withr egard tothe McSharryreform of EUa gricultural
policyin 1992.I nthe courseo fthe NACAP( NetworkAnalysis of the
Common AgriculturalP olicy)p rojectt heyinterviewed 124p olicyactors–
statei nstitutions and interestgroups att he national and supranational
(EU) levels. Henninga nd Wald (2000)a nalysed their position in the
networko nthe basis of informatione xchange, political support,p ersonal
relations, exchange of political favours and sending of petitions. One
resultof this networka nalysis was thatEUi nstitutions areb etter
integrated intothe system of informatione xchange than interestgroups.
Thiss upportsthe viewso fDaugbjerg( 1999)a nd Kay(2000). The
networka nalysisf urtheri dentified the importance of differentgroups of
lobbyorganizations. Henning andW ald( 2000)c onclude thatnational
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organizations of the agricultural tradea nd the agri-industry,a swell as
some supranational organizations of the agri-industry,p layam inor role
in the CAPn etwork. Other supranationali nterestgroups from the agri-
industry,a nd national interestgroups of agricultural producers, are
better integrated in the system.T he mostinfluential interestgroupi sthe
European umbrella organization of agricultural producers, COPA.I t
should be pointed out thatHenning and Wald (2000)d id notconsider
interestgroups of environmentalistsi ntheir analysis as theyw eren ot
seena si mportantactors; the consumers’organization BEUCwas
groupeda so ne of an umber of poorlyintegrated interestgroups.
To conclude,the general agriculturalp olicynetwork of the EUi s
dominated byt he legislativei nstitutions, the Commission and the
Council of Agricultural Ministers. TheEuropean Parliamentis involved
in the consultation procedure. Interestgroups havevariousp ossibilities
for influencing agricultural policyon the national and supranational
levels.H owever,their importance in the policy-making process remains
limited. The European peak organization of agriculturalp roducers,
COPA,p laysah ighlyinfluentialr oler elativetoo ther interestgroups.
Still, COPA’so verall impacton policyoutcomes is debatable.
1.2.2The developmentofEUorganicfarmingpolicyinthe broaderpolicy
context
General agricultural policy,withi tsn etwork of policyactors, formsthe
frameworkf or organic farmingp olicy.O rganic farmingp olicyhas
developed as as ub-issueo fEUp olicyfrom1 988o nwards. In 1988 the
Council adopted an extensification programme as Regulation( EEC)N o
4115/88 thatprovidedthe basis forthe firstlarge-scale support
programme for organic farming in the EU( Lampkin etal. 1999). Itw as
followed in 1992byt he Regulation( EEC)N o2092/91 on organic
productiono fa gricultural products( European Commission 2000b).
Upcoming issues werec ontinuouslyadded,i np articular in 1999 when
the Council extended the scope of the regulationtoo rganic livestock
production. Building on thisl egal definitiono fo rganic farming, the first
regulation specificallymentioning organic farming was regulation (EEC)
No 2078/92(nowreplaced by1257/99), which provided opportunities
for financials upportof organic production from 1994 onwards.
The official recognition of organic farming att he EUl evel should be
considered in the broaderp olicycontext of the McSharryreform in 1992,
which represented ac lear change in the orientation of the CAP. Att his
time, the technical progress allowingf or intensifyinga gricultural
production and the marketsupportpolicyhad resulted in surplus
production of manycommodities and detrimental effectso nthe
environment.I nthisc ontext,o rganic farming was seen as awayof both
relieving the marketand helping toc onservethe environment.Att he
same time, consumers were increasinglydemanding productswith
individual characteristics, such as controlled geographical origin or
special quality (EuropeanCommission 2000b). Organic productsc ould
thusb ep laced in the niche marketof quality products. However, in spite
of the increasing demand for organic products, there was no clear8
definition of whatconstituted an organic productand howitw as tob e
labelled. Regulation (EEC)N o2092/91 addressed these issues. In 1999,
the Austrian Governmentand the Commission held ac onference on the
prospectso fo rganic farming for the 21 st centuryand the ideao fa
European actionp lan for organic farming was raised.Aconference
organized byt he Danish governmentin Copenhagen in May2 001
elaborated thisi deaf urthera nd ledtothe CoAMi nvitingthe COMMi n
June 2001toc onsideraEuropeanAction Plan for Organic Food and
Farming. The COMM –notinvolved in the Danish conference –
publishedap aper analysing the possibilities for such an action plan in
2002.I n2003,a no nlinec onsultation of the European Commission
followed, as well as ah earing of the EuropeanP arliament.T he
consultation process culminated in ah earing of the Commission in
January2 004a nd finallyled top ublicationo fthe EuropeanActionP lan
for Organic Food andFarmingi nJ une of the sameyear (European
Commission 2004c).
Then eworientationo fthe CAPn otonlyhad consequences for the
contentof policies, but also for the structure of policymaking,
particularlyt he participation of civil society organizations. Until the early
1990s, agricultural policyinstitutions took accountof interestgroups
representing producers, industry,trade and consumers. The newfocuso f
agricultural policyon the link between farminga nd environment
facilitated the inclusiono fan ewinterestgroup: the environmentalists.
The viewso fthis groupo fl obbyistswere increasinglyt aken intoa ccount
byt he EU. Subsequentlynewinterestgroups arose, in particular,the
IFOAMEUg roup( IFOAMEU) as the European branch of the
International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements. IFOAMEU
was foundedi n1 992and has maintained an office in Brussels since
2003.
Although theyhad been setu pb yv ariousCommissiond ecisionss ince
1962,i n1 998 the provisions relatingtothe Agricultural Advisory
Committeeswerec onsolidated in as ingle decision (European
Commission 1998). This is the firstt imethatan AdvisoryGroupo n
OrganicFarming is mentioned. In 2004, the Commission decided to
renewt he advisorystructure once again as ar esponse tothe CAP
reformso f1 999a nd 2003,a swell as toEUe nlargement(European
Commission 2000a). Onlyt hen were environmentalistinterestgroups
explicitlymentioned as ad istinctsocio-economic groupwhereas in the
preceding legislatived ocumentstheyhad been subsumed under the
groupo f“others”(Menendez-Vallina 2005). Thisd evelopmentof the
advisorystructure pointstoag rowing importance of environmental
groups in the lastfewy ears. Currently,e nvironmental interestgroups are
represented on ac onsiderable number of advisorycommittees, but
mostlyhold onlyone totwos eatso ne ach of them. In af ewcases they
hold am ore significantposition, such as the AdvisoryGroupo n
Agriculture and Environmentand the AdvisoryGroupo nR ural
Development(European Commission 2004a).9
1.2.3OrganicfarmingpolicyinEuropeancountries
Europeanl egislation is the basis for national level organic farming
policies. Att hisl evel,o rganic farming has increasinglybeen introduced
as ap olicyinstrument(Dabbertetal.2004). We will nowt ake ac loser
look att he political structures thatdeveloped.
The firstnational organic farming schemes appeared in the late1 980s. In
some countriess uch as ATtheyw ere based solelyon national law,i n
others such as DE,FRa nd LU theyw ere based on the European
extensificationp rogramme, Regulation (EEC)N o4 115/88 (Lampkin et
al. 1999). From1 994 on, organic farming was supported in many
European countriesthrough Regulation (EEC)N o2078/92.Asa
consequence, actorsf rom the organic sector increasinglyhad toi nteract
withp ublic and privatep olicyactors of agricultural policy(Stolze2003)
and institutions involved in organic farming policydeveloped. Moschitz
etal. (2004) describeda nd analysed the developmentof these political
institutions from1 997 to2003 in eleven European countries. Following
the structure of their report,wewills umupthe institutional
developmentof organic farming in three countrygroups.
Countriesw ithalarge shareoforganicfarming
Common toc ountries withalarge share of organic farming is thatt he
major changeso fa gricultural policyw hich influencedo rganic farming
took place in the earlyninetiesa nd thus, seenf rom today’sp erspective,
the policyenvironmentfor organic farming can be considered as fairly
stable. Organic farming is broadlyaccepted bygeneral agricultural
policy,a nd recentlypolicyissues notexclusivelylinked too rganic
farming haveg ainedi mportance in the political debate. The debatea bout
the introduction of geneticallymodified organisms (GMO)i nto
agriculture is mentioned as an issuethatassembleso rganic farming
policyactorsa nd environmental groups, but discussion focussed purely
on organic farming policyis rare. Having said that,i nAT, during the
time of network interviews, an ewu mbrella organization of organic
farming associations was developing. Whatw ere the three main organic
farming organizations are nowu nited under the name of BIO AUSTRIA.
Overall, Moschitz etal. (2004) conclude thatorganic farming has found
itswayintom ainstream agricultural policyin the countries withal arge
share of organic farming.T he organic sector is highlyaccepted as a
strong movementin DKa nd CH, whereas in ATthe sector is still fighting
for full recognitionb yall policyactors.
Countriesw ithanaverage shareoforganicfarming
In countries witha na verage shareo fo rganic farming( DE,ENG,I T) the
political situation of organic farmingh as been changing in recenty ears.
Considering the period from2000 to2003 in Germanyand England, the
stateb ecame morea nd more involved and actionp lans werep ublished.
In Germanyt he mostimportantchangestook place when there was a
change of agricultural minister in the winter of 2000/2001a nd
agricultural policyfocussed on organicf armings pecifically;a nd, in
England, an organic actionp lan was published in 2002 after ap eriod of10
discussions within aworking groupwhich had been setu pb yt he
Departmentof Environment,Food andR uralAffairs (DEFRA). In both
cases, changes in public policyopened upp ossibilities for privatea ctors
tob ecome involved in organic farming policymaking. In England there
was as trong emphasis on marketdevelopment.I nI talyt he political
situationo fo rganic farming is fairlycomplexw ithr esponsibilities
dispersed over the differentregions and the central government
(Moschitz etal. 2004). Anational organic action plan has been recently
approved byt he national governmentand accepted byt he regional
governments, but noty etimplemented.
The newEUmembers tates
For all CEE countries the accession process tothe European Union has
beenas trong incentivetoa doptorganic farming policy.M ostof the
legislation concerning organic farming has thusb een put in place during
the pre-accession period, from 1997. When the countriesf inallyacceded
tothe EUi n2004, no major changes had tob eundertakentoi mplement
the EUr egulations on organic farming policy(Hrabalovae tal. 2005).
Manypolicychanges havethusb eentriggered byan external impulse,
withthe national states (i.e. the publica dministration) as an
intermediary.I tis reported thatt he political structures for organic
farming are changing rapidly.Att he time of writing this report,a ll the
CEE countriess tudied exceptfor Poland are preparing or implementing
an ational actionp lan on organic farming. In the CzechR epublic the
organic farming organization PRO-BIO hasb eenp laying an activer ole in
shaping the organic farming policysince the early1990sa nd the organic
sector is one of the mostdeveloped compared tothe othera ccession
countries. In Hungaryt he organic sector has historicallybeeno riented
towards exportso thatmarketactorsa re fairlyimportant.U ntil the
accession in 2004the Polishg overnmentand administrationh ad not
been veryactivei no rganic farming policyand thusthe accessionl ed to
some importantchangesi no rganic farming legislation. Expertsa ssess
thatt he Polish public administration wills tep upi tsa ctivity in the
organic sector in the future.11
2Methodologyandtheoreticalbackground
This chapter firstlyintroducesthe theoretical background and the main
conceptso fn etwork analysis. The second partof the chapter describes
approachesa dopted in the project.
2.1 Theoreticalbackgroundofthe networkapproach
The notiono fp olicynetworks developed in the social sciences in the
1970sa nd 80sa sar esponse tothe contemporarydevelopmentof the
public process (Kenis &S chneider 1991). Insteado fl ooking atpolicy
making as ah ierarchical process or dividing policyprocesses intotwo
types, pluralism versusc orporatism, network analysisc onsiders the
multitude of actors influencing ap olicyprocess. From there on, the
network approach was broadenedf urthera nd is nowapplied withtwo
differentmeanings( Schneider1 992). Firstly,i tis used in am ore
metaphorical manner toc haracterizea na ctions ystem thatlacksac lear
hierarchyof decision making. Secondly,ap olicynetwork formally
describes anypattern of interrelationship amonga ctors. In ours tudyw e
use the latter,m oren eutrala pplication of the term. We will use Van
Waarden’s( 1992)n otiono fp olicynetworka sag enericterm to
characterizep ublic-privater elations.
Variousa uthors (see Kenis &S chneider 1991;J ordan&S chubert1992;
VanW aarden 1992;W assermann&Faust1999) assertt hatt he network
perspectiveo pensupapromising possibility tod escribe and explain
complexrelationships between actors in politics and society.I tlaysa
sound basis for structural analysis of public and privatea ctor
configurations (Schneider 1992)a nd provides an ew,p owerfulo ption to
answer standard social science questions. Wasserman and Faust(1999)
stress thatt he policynetwork perspectived eveloped as an integral partof
advances in social theory,e mpirical research and formal mathematics
and statistics so thatt he method is well grounded in application and
theory.T heypointout thatt he unitof analysis–from the network
perspective–is no longer the individual (or an individual organization,
respectively), but the entity consistingo fas etof actors and the setof
links betweenthem. Underlying principleso fthe network approach are:
i) Actorsa nd actions in an etwork are interdependentu ponr ather
than independentfrom eacho ther
ii)L inkages between actors are channels for the transfer of material
or immaterial resources (e.g. money,p ersonnel, information,
political support)
iii) Network structures mayopen upo pportunitieso rb ec onstraining
for the actors involved
iv)S tructure (social, economico rp olitical) is al astingp attern of
relations amonga ctors
Networksc an thusb es een as institutionalized exchange relationships
(Van Waarden 1992). Network analysis provides the researcher witha12
number of objectivem easures describing networks in differentcontexts,
such as differentcountries, andthusl aysthe basis for further
investigation on patterns of relationship (Windhoff-Héritier 1993).
Windhoff-Héritier (1993)a rgues thatnetwork analysisg oes beyond
formali nstitutional decision making as itcombines differentexplanatory
approaches from differentt heoretical backgrounds, and attemptsto
explain the emergence of political decisionswithin the context of
interacting public and privatea ctors.
Thatcher (1998) showed thatnetwork analysisi sused in three different
roles thatare often bound togetherr ather than being clearly
distinguished. Firstly,n etwork analysisi nvolves ad escription of linkages
and interactions amongstactors involved in policymaking. Resultsa re
used tog eneraten etwork categoriesa nd tod evelop atypologyof
networks. For ac omparison of networks between countries (as in our
case), such ad escription of the national networks is as tarting point.A
second application of network analysisi stotake itas avariable that
depends on differentfactors, such as the institutional environmentand
the ideas and strategies of the actors involved. The developmentof
networks is affected byt he existing institutions of agricultural policyas
well as the role organic farming playsf or general agriculturalp olicy,a nd
the characteristics of the actors involved will influence howt heyw ork
togetheri np olicymaking. Thethirdr olethatnetworka nalysisc an take
is exactlyt he oppositep erspective: an etworki ss een as an independent
variable, as an intervening factor thataffects( selected) aspectso f
networka ctor behavioura nd policyoutcome. In this case, the initial
distributiono fr esources is taken as given. This wayof applyingn etwork
analysis is usefultoa rrivea thypotheses on howt he networkp osition
affectsthe strategies of the organic farming sector or the role organic
farming playsf or ac ountry’sp olicy.
The firstrole of network analysis identified byThatcher (1998) is
descriptivea nd does notaffectconclusions on the function of policy
networksi nthe policyprocess. Thatcher’ss econd and third roles
introduce circular linkages which makes itdifficultt ok eep cause and
effectstrictlyseparated. We will starthere bylooking atfactors
influencing the developmentof policynetworks befores howing how
feedback processes in establishedn etworkswork back on them. Kenis
(1991) pointed out thatt he developmentof networks depends on various
factorss othatitis challenging tof ormulateac lear theory.T herei sn o
simple linear causal model thatexplainsthe developmentof networks.
He identifies as ingleg enerale xplanatoryt heoryof the institutional
structure of the nation-state. Kenis( 1991)s tresses the importance of a
mutual meetingg round of the statea nd privatep olicynetworks. The
stateh as tod evelop ad ecentralized, cooperative, policydecision-making
structure.T henp rivaten etworks can contributetothe policyprocess.
Given these preconditions,therea re variousf actorsthatinfluence how
policynetworks develop. Firstly,the formal institutional framework
affectsthe nature andi mpactof policynetworks (Thatcher 1998).
Regarding ourf ocuso fr esearch, the main institutional impetusm ay
come from the transformationp rocess in the CEE countries. Institutional13
preconditions varybetweenc ountries thathaveb een members of the EU
for al ong time and those thathavea cceded tothe EUo nlyrecently.
Furthermore,the accessionp rocess has pushed institutions in these
countriestoc hange and itis often judged as one of the driving forces for
policychange (e.g. Moschitz etal. 2004). Even without such am ajor
change as the transformation from ac ommunistt oacapitalistsystem,
newinstitutions can be established and open upo ptions for interest
groups toj oin in networks. Secondly,c hanges in the economic and
technological characteristics of policyw ill influence the developmentof
networks. Withr egard too rganic farmingthe role of the markethas tob e
taken intoc onsideration. Differentactors will be involved in the
networks and the importance of policyas ad riving force will differ
according tothe influence of the market.T hatcher (1998) assertsthat
ideas, values and knowledge also influence the developmentof policy
networks. On the states ide, changes in politicalo rientation influence the
opportunitiesf or interestgroups tob ecome activei nan etwork or for
newnetworks tob ee stablished.I fo rganic farming gains in importance
for ag overnment,( e.g. as am odel for sustainablea griculture)the
influence of organic sector actorsa nd the generalf armings ector actors
in the policyprocessa nd participationi nn etworks willc hange. On the
non-governmental side, the culture andi deologyof the interestgroups
determine theira ctivep articipationi np olicynetworks.For example, an
organicf arming informationd isseminationo rganizationm aynotbe
willingtop articipatei napolicynetwork.O rganizations withas trong
desire top articipatei np olicymaking mightbe constrained byal ack of
resources or capacity.T oc onclude,m anyfactorswill influence how
organicf arming policynetworks develop and itw ill notbe easyt od educe
universallyv alid conclusions.
We nowdiscuss the role of policynetworks as an independentv ariable
which influencesp olicyoutcomesa nd actor behaviour. Policyoutcome in
ourc ase is noteasilyidentified.T he studysurveyed eleven national
networks on organic farming. To keepthe influence of EUp olicy
comparable, itw as decided tof ocuso nasimilartimep eriodtoa nalyse
the national networks: winter 2003/04. Itw as notpossibletof ocuso na
clearlydefinedp olicyprocess, e.g. the developmentof an organic
farming regulation. In consequence, existing policies on organic farming
are regardedi ntheir entirety as the outcome of long-lasting policy
making byt he network described, but this is onlyan approximate
measurement.T he share of organicf arming in ac ountrycannotbe seen
as ad irectoutcome of policy,a sthere are manyotherc onfounding
factors (see Bichlere tal. 2005a; Bichlere tal. 2005b). Thatcher( 1998)
argues thatt he type of policynetwork influencesthe nature of policy
change.P luralistor state-directed networks are more likelyt op roduce
radical changea nd paradigm shifts, whereas corporatistnetworks cause
paradigm shiftsthrough cumulativec hange. In addition, policynetworks
influence the behaviouro fthe actors involved.Actors pursues trategies
thatresultin newpolitical and economic forces, which in turn determine
their power in the policynetwork. If an organics ector actor in one
countrybecame involved in the policyprocess once,i tcould endeavour
too penupthe network too thera ctors. Through participationi no ne
process,a na ctor willh avethe opportunity tob ecome increasingly14
involved in further policymakingp rocesses and thuss trengthen its
position in the network.
So far, weh aveo utlined the theoretical conceptof policynetwork
analysis and the differentw aysi nwhich itis used. Ithas been shownthat
characteristics of the actors involved bothi nfluence the developmentof a
networka nd, att he same time, are themselves affected byt he network
structure. We will nowt ake ac loserl ooka tt he role civil society groups
can playin ap olicyprocess.
Ideologyand ideas of organic sector organizationsn otonlyinfluence the
networks tructure theyw ork in. Theyare one determiningf actor for their
access tod ecision-makingd omainsa nd for the ability of organizationsto
influence policyoutcomes. Casey(2004) argues the importance of the
number of organizationsthatare partof as ocial movementand the
nature of these organizations. Transferred too rganic farming policy,the
question is whatrole environmental or consumer organizationsp layin
policymaking. Itis furthermore of interesthowt heyarea ccepted byt he
other policyactors involved, e.g. byt he general farming organizations
and the state. Onlyw hen those organizationsa re open too rganic sector
organizationswill organic sector organizations havethe possibility to
bring forwardtheir pointso fview.Furthermore, there are internal
factors thatdetermine the political influence of organic sector
organizations. One is the self-perception of organic sector groups.
Besides having an impacton their willingness toj oin policynetworks,
this will also influence their ambitions in shaping policyoutcomes.
Another point(and often an importantlimiting factor) for non-
governmental interestgroups is their limited resources.T his may
constrain their level of activity andtheir political power regardless of
their willingness top articipatei nthe policyprocess. This is truef or
manyorganic farming organizationsthat–in contrastt om ostgeneral
farming organizations–havef ewer members and therefore haveo nly
limited financial resources. Casey(2004) identifies af inal factor
determiningthe access of interestgroups tod ecision-making processes,
this being their proximity tothe centre of the network. Again the
complexinteraction between differentinfluencingf actors is made
obviousi nthis link between characteristics and networks of policy
actors.
Withthe discussiono fthe differentroles of networksa nd the various
characteristics of network actorsi nvolved, the internal forces of the
organic sector and their interaction witho ther policyactorsh as been
highlighted. Casey(2004) widens thisp erspectivea nd refers totwo
framework conditions thatinfluencethe ability of non-governmental
organizations toi nfluence policy:
The firstframework conditioni sthe importance of the policyissuei n
question –in ourc ase, organic farming –forp olicyin general, and
specificallyfor agricultural policy.I thasb een argued before thatt he
organic farmingp olicynetworkc an increasethe importance of organic
farming policyin the broaderc ontext.I ncreased importancei nthe
broader context,f or itsp art,i nfluences the politicalo ptions of the
organic sector.T hisd emonstrates the complexity of cause ande ffect15
relationships, as discussed previouslyin relation tothe theoretical
considerations of networks and interest-groupi nfluence.
The second framework condition of interest-groupi nfluence is the socio-
economic environmentin ac ountry.T his factor has alreadybeen drawn
on for explainingthe developmentof policynetworks. One can easily
understandthatbesides influencing policystructuresthe different
historical developmentof socio-economic conditionsh as ad irectimpact
on the influence exerted byinterestgroups on as ystem.For example, in
ad irectdemocracybuiltu pon plebiscite( such as Switzerland),i nterest
groups playad ifferentrole in policymaking than in indirectdemocracies
builtu ponp arliamentaryprocesses.
Againthe interactions betweens ocio-economic conditions, network
developmentand the influencing options of interestgroups make it
difficultt oa rrivea tclear conclusions. We haveo utlined these
interactions toa ddress the complexity as the basis for the interpretation
of the network analysis results.
2.2Mainconcepts andmeasuresappliedinn etworkanalysis
Thiss ectiong ives an overviewover selected conceptso fn etworka nalysis
and howt heyhaveb een applied in the project.T he conceptsa pplied in
this studyareb ased on an umber of well knownr eferences on network
analysis,s uch as Wassermann &Faust(1999), Scott (2000), Jansen
(2003)a nd Freeman (1978/79).
Anetworka sweuse itis formallydefined as as etof actors( or nodes)
andas etof relationships( or ties,e dges) connectingthem.P rior toa n
analysis one has tod ecide which actorso rn odes toi nclude in the
network. In ourc ase, the nodes in the networks are institutions and
organizations involved in organic farmingp olicymaking in their country.
In general, relationships in an etworkc an be either undirected links
between twoa ctorso ra rcsthatleadf romo ne actor as as ourceto
another as receiver (e.g. of information). Thisd istinction is importantfor
botha nalysisa nd interpretation of network data, as will be shownb elow.
In ourn etwork analysis wei nvestigated the collaboration and contacts
between the network actorso ni ssues of organic farming policy.I tw as
specified whether this was ac lose or loose connection –ourn etwork
analysis then focussed on close interaction.I tw as seen as meaningful
whether or notas tatementon collaborationo rc ontactfrom one actor
(the source) was returned byanother (the target). For example, itcan be
the case thatah igh number of actors approach one actor, but this actor
onlyrecalls af ewof them, because he or she (the target)d oes notattach
the same importance toa ll actors.
Summing up, the network analysis in thisr esearch is based on as etof
actors which are linked withe ach otherb yt he directed relation of close
interaction. Itis ad irected graph.
In the following, measuresthatare used toa nalyse the structure and
characteristics of networks are introduced.16
Density
The density of an etwork is defined as the proportion of arcs (directed
links) present.I tis calculated as the numbero fa rcs L, dividedb yt he
possible number of arcs n(n-1), where ni sthe number of nodes in the
network. In ad irected graph (as in ourc ase) the density ∆ is:
∆ =L /n(n-1).
The density of an etwork gives an idea of howmuch interaction takes
place between actors within an etwork.I tv aries between avalueo fzero
and one; ad ensity valueo fzero indicates no links betweenthe actors and
avalueo fo ne the maximump ossiblel inks betweenthe actors. In this
analysis the density is presented as ap ercentage value, where 100%
would then signifyt hatall actors are interacting withe ach other
reciprocally.T he density of an etwork depends on itss ize. The fewer
actors in an etwork, the higher the probability is thatt heyw ill knowand
interactw ithe ach other. In al arge network the maximumo f1 00%i s
unlikely.H owever,i no urs tudy,the number of actorsi sr elativelysmall
(varyingb etween 13and 26),s othiss hould notbias the results.
In ourc ase,n etwork density can also be interpreted as am easure for the
importance the actors attach too rganic farming policy.Actors thatare
notconnected tothe network are calledi solates. In ourc ase,i solates are
actors who did notstatethatt heyinteracted closelyw itho thera ctors and
withwhom no other actor claimed close interaction.
Degree Centrality
Degree centrality C D is al ocal network measure of the level of activity of
an actor withi tsi mmediaten eighbours. In ad irected graph itis
necessaryt oc onsidertwoc asesd epending on the direction of the arcs
betweentwoa ctors.
The in-degree,d I, of an ode n i indicates the number of arcs terminating at
this node. Itdescribesthe number of actorsthatname this specifica ctor
as atargetof directinteraction. Thus, wec an interpretitas an indicator
of the actor’sp restige( degree-prestige). Them oreo ther actorsf romthe
network nameaspecifico ne as targetof immediatei nteraction, the
higheri tsp restige.
The out-degree, d o, of an oden i is the number of arcs originating from
this node. Itinforms about the number of actors withwhich one specific
actor states directinteraction and can thusb es een as am easure of how
pro-activea na ctor is in an etwork.
If an actor’si n-degreei sm uch higher than itso ut-degree wec an
interpretitas quitep assivei nthe network. Itmaybe ap restigiousa ctor,
but does notactively(on itso wni nitiative) participatei nthe policy
process.
For comparison between networks of differentsizethese measures are
standardized toC’ D bydividing the absolutevalues byt he possible
maximumvalueo fthe degree which is n-1:17
C’ D (ni)=d (ni)/n-1
where ds hould be read as d I or d o,respectively.
Betweenness Centrality
Betweennessc entrality C B is ag lobal network measure of the position of
an actor in the context of the wholen etwork, i.e. itdescribes the potential
of an actor forb eing an informationb roker in the network and informs
about itso veralla ctivity level. Ana ctor is central if itliesb etweeno ther
actors on their shortestlink (the so-called geodesic), i.e., if these two
actors wantt oi nteractw ithe ach other theyhavetop ass via the central
actor. Alarge betweenness centrality of an actor signifies thatitis
betweenm anypairs of actors on their geodesics.
Again, this measure is standardized toe nable cross network comparison.
For ad irected graph the standardized measure of betweenness centrality
C’ B is:
C’ B (ni)=C B (ni)/[(g-1)(g-2)]
WithC B (ni)=Σ g jk(ni)/g jk
where g jk is the number of geodesics linking the twoa ctors ja nd k.
Reputation
Organizations and institutions are also of importance if theyare regarded
as importantbymanyother actors. This is called reputational power.I tis
am ore general measure than the betweenness centrality and nota
network measure in itss trictsense. Reputation in this context is based
on the overall assessmentof the interviewed actors whereas betweenness
centrality resultsf rom statementso ni nteraction made byt he actors and,
hence,i sm ore specific.
In ourc ase,wea sked about the reputation of actors for organicf arming
policy,a swella sf or general farmingp olicy.T he reputational scoreo fa n
actor is indicated as proportion of interviewees who named thisa ctor as
influentialf or the policyin question.
Cliques
Acliquei sd efined as ac ompletelyconnected subgroupi nan etwork. In a
directed graph,thism eans thatmembers of ac liquem utuallyinteract
withe acho ther. In oura nalysis, am inimumn umber of 3actorsp er
cliquewas prescribed, i.e. atriad.
Then umber of cliques showsh owmanysubgroups there are that
interactw ithe ach other closely.S uch subgroups can be importantin a
policyprocess. Itis interesting tol ook att he actors thatare member of
more than one cliquea stheymayplayan outstanding rolef or the
informationf lowin an etwork. Such actors are fairlyactivei napolicy
network.18
Blockmodelling
Blockmodelling is awayof simplifyings tructures, e.g. in an etwork.
Actors withas imilar relational profile are groupedi ntoo ne block and
the relationb etween these blocksc an then be analysed (Burt1991;
Henning2000). In ours urveyw ec hose nott oc reateb locks according to
the networko fi nteraction, but toe xplore the possible existence of clear
blocks of opinionstowards organic farming policy.T herefore, the
blockmodelling procedure is based on the question“Withwhom do you
shareo pinionstowards organic farmingp olicyand withwhom do you
haved ivergingo pinionso nthis issue?”.T he aim was toh ighlightopinion
blocks thatmightbe as ourceo fc onflict(or cooperation) in the network.
2.3The comparativeapproachton ationaln etworkanalysis
The goal of the national level partof ours tudyis twofold. On the one
hand, wewantt od escribe and analyse the differentorganic farming
policynetworksi nan umber of European states. On the other hand, we
are searching for patterns of organic farming policymaking in Europe
and therefore need toc omparethe differentnetworks.
For the comparatives trategyapplied toc ompare networks in eleven
countries wep erceiven ations botha sunitso fa nalysis, and as the
context of analysis. Anation is seen as as etof social, economic and
political institutions thatrelatetop olicymaking. The nation is the
subjectof analysis( explaining specific characteristics) and att he same
time itis one elementin ab igger system (Knoke 1996). In the case of this
project,the challenge for the research layin the factt hatw ef ace
differenthistorical-political, socio-economica nd cultural backgrounds in
each country.
Network interviewswere carried out bylocal researchers and could
therefore be conducted in the nativel anguage. Acommon network
questionnaire was produceda nd translated intothe nativel anguages. To
ensure thatt he researchers conductingthe network interviewsi ne ach
countryhad ac ommon understanding of the process, detailed guidelines
were developed. Asi tis crucial ton etwork analysis toi dentifyt he
appropriateb oundaries of an etwork, these guidelines included a
detailed prescription of howt oc hoose the policyactors tob e
interviewed. We applied ac ombination of the reputational and positional
approaches (Sciarini1 996) toi dentifypotential interviewees. First,
invitation listsf or parliamentaryhearings on issues of organic farming
(or anycomparable event)were consulted and al istof politicallyactive
organizations was produced.R esearchersthend iscussed the listw ithk ey
personsa nd identifiedthe mostimportantactors in the domaino f
organicf armingp olicy.O thera ctors werea dded if necessary.T he final
listalsoi ncludedthose institutions thatare importantin the policy
processf roma ni nstitutionalp ointof view.O verall, in each countryal ist
of about 20 policyactorsh ad tob ep roducedi nthiswayin order tok eep
the network sizei nacertainr ange and thusk eepn etwork analysis
resultsc omparable, although some of themd ependo nthe sizeo fthe19
network. In addition, the guidelines contained instructions on howt o
conductt he interviewsa nd howt he informationo btained should be
recorded. Spread sheetswere provided in which the interviewers could
record the resultsi nam anner thatcould be easilyprocessed.
All interviewswere carried out in the winter of 2003/04i no rder to
minimizep otential influence from varying external political situations.
Interviewees came from statei nstitutions, representing the relevant
ministries and/or itsd epartments, as well as from the privates ector
including general and organic farming organizations, environmental and
consumer interestgroups, marketorganizationsa nd supermarketchains
and other politicallyimportantactors. Interviewstook about one hour
and focussed on the networkq uestion “Withwhom do youw orktogether
or stayin regular contactin ordertoe xchange yourviewso no rganic
farming policy?”(see Annex7.1 for the full questionnaire). After
conducting the interviews, the national researchers submitted the
interviewresultstothe network analyst.Acentral analysis of the data
ensuredac ommon routineo fa nalysisa nd reducedthe possible
measurementerrors.
Network analysiswas carried out withU CINETs oftware (Borgattie tal.
1999). This computer programme canc alculatethe differentnetwork
measures described in the previouss ection of this chapter.V isualization
of the policynetworks was done withV isones oftware (Brandes &
Wagner 2003), which has af unctionality for graphicalr epresentation of
actor and network characteristics. Netdraw(Borgatti2002)was used for
illustratingthe EUl evel networks. For modelling the blockso fo pinion,
the softwarea pplication STRUCTURE(Burt1991) was used.
STRUCTUREbases blockmodellingo nh ierarchical clustering (based on
the Warda lgorithm)o fthe actors and leaves itt othe scientistt otestt he
assignmentso fa ctors tob locks.
2.4QualitativeandquantitativeapproachusedforEUlevel
analysis
The research atEuropean level had twoa ims. First,i tw as concerned
withthe network of organic farming policy,i .e. which policyactorsa re
there, howare theyconnected too ne anothera nd whatis their
relationship witha ctors from the general farming network?S econd, the
research aimed atexploring the acceptance of organic farming policyby
those who havea ni nfluence on it.T hese twog oals were pursued in
separates urveysthatw ill be described in the following section.
To address the organic farming policynetwork, firstof all the network
boundaries havetob ed efined.I dentifying those actors who playar ole in
organic farming policymaking att he EUl evel is more complext hana t
the nationall evel. Asa rgued in chapter 1.2,the structure of policy
making is notso straightforward and, in general, onec an discern two
distinctivewayso fp olicymaking: as upra-national pathf ollowed by
interestgroups thatare organized on aEuropean level and an inter-
national pathwhere member states arethe EUl evel actors. In the latter
case, nationali nterestgroups tryt ol obbyt heir nationalg overnmentso n20
their decisions and thusi ndirectlyinfluence EUp olicy.Asr egards the
CAP, which shapes the frameworkc onditions for organic farming policy,
one can notice al arge number of diverse interestgroups atbothEUa nd
national level which are acting on the European stage.
Given the constraintsd escribed abovef or exploring European level
policy,wec hose aq ualitativea pproach toe xplorethe organic farming
policynetwork. Asf or the nationall evel, ac ombination of reputational
andp ositional approach( Sciarini1 996) was chosen toi dentifyt he policy
actorsr elevantfor the network.T he questionnairef or the national policy
networksh ad also included aq uestion on the mostimportantactorsa t
the EUl evel so wec ould make use of the judgementof around 200
national actors from eleven countries. Then, the attendee listof the
Commission’sJ anuary2 004h earing on the “EuropeanAction Plan for
Organic Fooda nd Farming”w as used toi dentifyparticipating
organizations. Expertsthatarek nowledgeable about the European
organic farming policyw erea sked tog ivetheiro pinion on the most
importantactorsf or EUo rganic farming policy.O thera ctorswere
included accordingtotheir institutionallyprescribed roles in policy
making. This processr esulted in al istof 20 actors tob ei nterviewed on
the network for organic farming policyatEUl evel. After some of them
turned out tob eunwilling tor espond too urr equest,1 7f ace-to-face
interviewswere carried out during autumn 2004. For af ull listof actors
interviewed,p leaser efer toAnnex7.3.T he interviewsf ollowed a
structuredq uestionnairei ncluding closed and open questions that
allowed additional informationg iven byt he interviewees. Interviews
weretaper ecorded tof acilitateaf reer conversation.Duetothe limited
numbero fa ctorsthatare activelyinvolved in organic farmingp olicyat
European level, af ull network analysisa sundertakena tt he national
level was notfeasible. Ther esultso fEUl evel analysisa re presented in
chapter 4.
Thes econd aimo fthe EUl evel research was toe xplorethe acceptance of
organicf armingp olicy.I tw as aimeda tab roadera udience and thus
conducted in form of aweb-based survey.I na ddition tothe actorsthat
had been interviewed about the organic farmingp olicynetwork, other
actorswithap otentiallyhigh influence on the CAPwere included in this
survey.I ntheir research, Henning andW ald( 2000)c ategorized al arge
number of CAPa ctorsa tt he EUl evel, also includingn ationali nterest
groups (i.e. farmers’u nions) which often runtheir owno ffices in
Brussels. Organizations and institutions thatt heyhad assessed as
“important” were included in the listof interviewees. Organizations that
had been mentioned as influential during the national or EUn etwork
interviewsc omplemented the listt om akeatotal of 138a ctors of which
123 werea ctuallysurveyed2 .
2Some e-mails sentshowed permanentdeliveryerrors, and three addressees declined tor espond as
theydid notfeel theyw ere the rightcontactperson. After deletingthese actors from the list,1 23
remained.21
Aweb-based questionnaire was developed including mostlyclosed
questions and submitted tothe interviewees. After twor eminders,the
mostimportantactors thathad notresponded so far were contacted by
phone. In some cases, an electronic version of the questionnaire readyt o
printout was sentand then faxed back byt he respondents. This
approach achieved ar esponse rateo f35%, i.e. 43responses.
In the main partof the web-based surveyt he interviewees were firstly
asked toa ssess if certain policyinstrumentsa nd strategies would
promoteo rganic farmingi nEurope and secondly,toi ndicatewhether or
nott heyw ould acceptt hese instruments. Furtherq uestions aimed at
revealing the policyactors’knowledge about and attitudes towards
organic farming. In addition, wea sked for their opinions if the
introduction of GMO intog eneral agricultural practiceh ad anyrelevance
for organic farming.
The statistical programme SPSS was used for further analysis. Various
uni- and bivariatea nalyses were completed.22
3Organicfarmingpolicynetworksin
elevenEuropeancountries
Because (socio-economic) frameworkc onditionsvaryin the countries
surveyed, wee xpectt hatdifferentorganicf arming policynetworks have
developed throughout Europe. Thef ollowingc omparisono fthe resultso f
national level3 network analysisa ims atv erifying this hypothesis. In the
eleven countries included in ourr esearch (AT, CH, CZ, DE,DK, EE,H U,
IT, PL, SI, ENG)i nterviewswiththe relevantactors of organic farming
policyw erec onducted during the winter of 2003/04.
3.1 Comparativeanalysisofthe networkactors
We startt he comparison of organic farming policynetworks byfocusing
on the actors involved in each country.W etherebydescribe the different
typeso fa ctorsa nd their attitudestowards organic farming and analyse
their reputationalp ower foro rganicf arming policy.
3.1.1 Actors involvedino rganicfarmingpolicyinEurope
Actors included in the surveyare those stakeholders thatare politically
activei no rganicf arming policy.T his means thateither theyare
importantfrom an institutional pointof viewor theyare influential
interestgroups.T oa void overestimationo fthose actors thatare
primarilyfocussing on organic farmingi ssues,r esearchers in the eleven
countriesa lsoc onsidered policyactors relevantt og eneral farming policy
making.
On average (the figure presented is the median4 ), the number of actors
belonging toan ationalo rganic farming policynetwork in the countries
studiedi s1 7. The number varies between1 3in the CzechR epublic and
26a ctors in Austria which weree stimated as influentialo no rganic
farmingp olicymaking.R elativelysmall networks (belowaverages ize)
are found in the CZ, EE and IT, networks of mediums izea re found in
HU,P La nd SI whereas wef indl argern etworks in AT, CH, DK, DE and
ENG.T he networks contain statei nstitutions, non-governmental
organizations (interestgroups)a nd otherp rivateo rp arastatal5
organizations. The following chart(Figure 3-1) showsthe share of each
actor type in the countries.
3In some countries,i np articular in DE and IT,the regional level playsa ni mportantrolei na gricultural
policymaking and networks of organic farmingm ighthaved eveloped att his level. All the same, dueto
resource constraintsi tw as notpossibletoi nclude thisl evel in ourr esearch. The resultsp resented here
focuso nthe national level, admitting thatt his showso nlypartof the reality of the organic farming
policystructure in countries,s uch as DE and IT.
4T he median is used here, as outlier values would increase the mean so thatt his measure would not
reflectw here the majority of datap ointsl ie.
5Ano rganizationo wnedo rc ontrolledwhollyor partlybyt he government.23
Privateo rganizationsi ncluded organic and general farming
organizations, as well as environmental and consumers’interestgroups,
retailers and their organizationso rp rivater esearch institutes. The state
is represented byt he ministryin charge of agriculture6 (and often here,
the departmentfor organic farming), and in some countries byt he
ministryof environmentand differentsubordinated administrative
bodies. Other actorsi nclude e.g. political parties and parastatal
institutions.
Figure3-1:Typesofactors inthe organicfarmingpolicynetworks
Source: ownd ata( national actorinterviews,winter2 003/04)
During the interviews, the interviewees were asked toc lassifyt heir
institution or organization in one of three groups according totheir main
policyorientation: predominantlyoriented towards mainstream
agriculture, predominantlyoriented towards organic farming, or
undefinedo rb alanced, respectively,withr egardtothe twod ifferent
farming systems. National expertso no rganic farming policyv erified the
self-assessmentor revised the classification as appropriate. In the study
countries, the share of each groupi nthe organic farmingp olicynetwork
varies quites ubstantially,a sc an be seen from Figure 3-2.
6I nthe following,i tis referredtoa s“agriculturalm inistry” even though,i nd ifferentcountries,this
name mightnotbe fullyaccurate.
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Figure3-2:Orientation oforganicfarmingpolicynetworkactors towards
farmingsystems
Source: ownd ata( national actorinterviews,winter2 003/04)
Interestingly,i nDenmarkthere are no actors thatw ere classified as
oriented predominantlyt owards mainstream farming. Itis assumed that
all Danish actors haveac ommonunderstandingo fo rganic farminga nd
itsi mportance in the agriculturalp olicydomain. In all countries except
for Hungary,a ctorso riented towards organic farming makeupthe
minority of all actorsi nvolved in organic farmingp olicymaking. In six
out of eleven countries (CH, AT, EE,ENG,P L, SI)the number of
“mainstream”actorse xceeds the number of “organic”actors.
This simple description of actors illustrates the structural environmentof
the organic farmingp olicynetworks in these countries. Itdoes not,
however, tell much about the power andi nfluence of the differentactors
or groups of actors in the network. Thevariousm easureso fp ower and
networkc haracteristicswhich haveb een introduced in the methodology
chapter and are presented beloware morem eaningful.
3
.1.2Reputationalp oweroforganicfarmingpolicyactors
Interviewees were asked toi ndicatethoseo rganizations or institutions
thatt heyfound the mostinfluential for organic and general farming
policy.T he number of interviewees naming one specifica ctor is an
indicator for the power of the named actor.First,wep resentt he most
powerfula ctorsf or organic farming policybefore contrastingthem with
those thatw ere named as influentialf or generalf arming policy.T able3-1
showsthe mostpowerfula ctors in eachc ountry.Afull listof reputational
power of actorsi ne ach countrycan be found in Annex7.2.
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Table3-1:Reputationalp owerfororganicfarmingpolicy*
Typeofactor
Country
Ministry/
departmentin
charge of
organic
farming
Organic
farming
organization
General
farming
organization
Other
state
institutions
Other
typesof
actors
Austria 100% 88% 23% 419% 042%
Denmark 76% 88% 35% 682% 03 5%
Switzerland 73% 95% 23% 0% 07 3%
Germany 93% 82% 36% 446% 06 4%
Italy 56% 63% 50% 31% 019%
England 95% 95% 25% 02 0% 02 5%
CzechRepublic 100% 100% 0% 85% 092%
Estonia 93% 87% 7% 047% 080%
Hungary 59% 82% 6% 041% 059%
Poland 94% 47% 18% 1841% 618%
Slovenia 76% 94% 6% 018% 07 1%
Mediano verall
countries 93% 88% 23% notcalculated notcalculated
*indicated as the percentage of interviewees naming as pecific actor as one of the fivem ostimportantfor
organic farmingp olicy
Source:o wnd ata( based on national actorinterviews,winter2 003/04)
Table 3-1 presentsthe share of interviewees thatnamed as pecifica ctor
as one of the fivem ostimportantforo rganic farming policyin their
country.I fm ore than one actor belongstothe actor type (indicated in
the column headings),weo nlygivethe reputationals core of the highest-
scoringa ctor within this type. Ourm ain focusl ies on the role of the state
and the organic and general farmingo rganizations. To completethe
picture of the power distribution in the countries, the lastt woc olumns
showt he range of scores for other actor types.W hen interpreting the
table, onlyscores above5 0%f or one actor indicateareasonable level of
power in organic farming policy(Kriesi 1980). The lastrowshowsthe
median of all countryscores.
In all countries, the agricultural ministryis oneo fthe mostpowerful
policyactorsf or organic farming policy,which is notsurprising given its
institutionalr ole. Togetherwith( atleastone) organicf arming
organizationi tdominates thisp olicyfield. General farming
organizations,i ng eneral,d on otenjoyaveryhigh reputationf or organic
farmingp olicyin anyof the countries.Ane xception is Italyw here power
is equallydistributed over the differentt ypeso fa ctors.I np art,the
federal organizationo fthe statei sr esponsiblef or thisr elativelylow
power of the national Italiana griculturalm inistry;d ecisionsa re taken in26
constantnegotiations betweenthe national and the regional ministries.
When looking atPoland, one notices the extraordinarylowv aluef or the
organic farming organization.T he agriculturalm inistryplaysa n
overriding role for organic farming policymaking or, seenf roma nother
angle, organic farmingo rganizations so far haven otdeveloped a
significantinfluencei nthe policy-making process. Asf ar as the new
member states are concerned, the reputation of general farming
organizations for organic farming policyis belowt he European median
in all of these countries whereas itis equal too ra bovethe median value
in all old EUm ember states and Switzerland.
From the lastt woc olumns wec an see thatin seven countries other
organizations and institutions than those discussed abovea re influencing
organic farmingp olicy(for detailsp lease refer toAnnex7.2). In
Denmark the Standing Committee on Food, Agriculture and Fisheries of
the Parliament(FUD)i so fp articulari mportance withas core for its
reputationalp ower of 82%. In addition, the OrganicFood Council (OFC)
has some influence, withascore of 53%. The OFC is an advisory
committee tothe agricultural minister on organic farming matters and
comprisesawide range of interestsi na griculture and foodp roduction.
Overall,threes tatea ctors havea ni mportantinfluence on organic
farming policyin Denmark. In Switzerland wef ind one of the twob ig
retailer chains, COOP, in ap owerfulp osition for organic farming policy
making (reaching as core of 73%).T his highlightsthe importance of the
marketplayersf or organic farming in thisc ountry.Furthermore,s ome
power is attached toFIBL–t he Research Instituteo fO rganic
Agriculture (59%). Intervieweesi nGermanyreported the Greenp arty as
an influential actor in organicf arming policy(64%), since itw as
responsible for the Germana gricultural ministryduring the survey
period. In the Czech Republic mostof the actors named the inspection
organizationK EZa so ne of the mostimportantactorsf or organic
farming policy(92%). KEZworks closelyw iththe organic farming
organization PRO-BIO and was an importantpartner for the latter
during the elaboration of the Czech Action Plan for Organic Farming.
Alsothe environmental ministryw as engagedi nthe developmentof this
action plan, which is reflected byitss trong position for organicf arming
policymaking (85%). In Estoniaah igh shareo fi nterviewees found that
the Centre for Ecological Engineering (CEET) was veryimportantfor
organic farmingp olicy(80%). TheCEETn otonlyhas beenveryactivei n
training and advice, but also maintained contactw iththe agricultural
ministryso thatitis wellr ecognized all over the organic farmingp olicy
sector (Moschitz etal. 2004).T he fairlyhigh reputationi nH ungaryof
the certificationb odyBiokontrol( 59%) is expected duetothe orientation
of the Hungarian organic farming sector totheir exportmarket
(Moschitz etal. 2004). This requiresawelle stablished certification
system and placesthe certification organization in ap owerfulp osition.
In Slovenia, the top ranked“othertype of actor”is the Chambero f
Agriculture (71%)whichi sp owerfuli na gricultural policyfor
institutional reasons.
We will nowt urn tothe reputational power of actors for general farming
policyshowni nT able 3-2.Afull record of reputational power forg eneral27
farming policyis given in Annex7.2.For interpretation of the figures,
please see the explanations for Table 3-1.
Table3-2:Reputationalp owerforgeneralfarmingpolicy*
Typeofactor
Country
Ministry/
departmentin
charge of
organic
farming
Organic
farming
organization
General
farming
organization
Other
state
institutions
Other
typesof
actors
Austria 100% 8% 92% 8% 092%
Denmark 100% 12% 65% 082% 088%
Switzerland 95% 14% 95% 0% 56 4%
Germany 96% 11% 100% 06 4% 07 5%
Italy 69% 0% 100% 0% 094%
England 95% 5% 70% 56 5% 015%
Czech
Republic 100% 0% 100% 15% 06 9%
Estonia 93% 0% 73% 02 7%. 07 3%
Hungary 82% 12% 59% 012% 06 %
Poland 94% 12% 24% 1259% 62 9%
Slovenia 88% 6% 41% 03 5% 082%
Mediano ver
all countries 95% 8% 73% notcalculated notcalculated
*indicated as the percentage of interviewees naming as pecific actor as one of the fivem ostimportantfor
generalf armingp olicy
Source:o wnd ata( based on national actorinterviews,winter2 003/04)
Asf or organic farmingp olicy,the agriculturalm inistryis the most
powerfula ctor forg eneralf arming policy(exceptin Italy). In mostof the
countries, atleastone general farming organization holds af air amount
of power in the agricultural policy-making processwhereas organic
farming organizations playam arginal role. Interestingly,i nP oland and
Slovenia the general farming organizations are notassigned ah igh
reputation for influencing policy.I nI taly,the ministryis reported to
haves ome power, but all threen ational farmers’u nions are more
influential. Asa rgued before,the federal nature of the statei sp artly
responsible for this relativelylowpower of the nationala gricultural
ministry.Additional actors exertpower in the general farming policy
network. However, theyw ill notbe discussed here as ourf ocusl ies on
the role of organic farming organizations.28
3.2Comparativeanalysisoforganicfarmingpolicynetworks
The comparison of organic farming policynetworks focuses on the
density of networksa nd the centrality measuresf or the differentnetwork
actors.
3.2.1 Density andsizeoforganicfarmingpolicynetworksinEurope
Then etworkd ensity indicates howmuch interactiontakes place in a
networka nd is thuso ne of the basic featurestod escribe a( organic
farming) policynetwork. Table 3-3showsthe countryv alues in order of
increasingd ensity.
Table3-3:The densityoforganicfarmingpolicynetworksinEurope
Country Density
Estonia 7.9%
Slovenia 9.6%
Switzerland 11.7%
Hungary 15.8%
CzechRepublic 17.3%
Poland 17.7%
Italy 21.7%
Germany 23.9%
Austria 24.9%
England 31.1%
Denmark 45.6%
Mediano verall countries 17.7%
Source:o wnd ata( national actorinterviews,winter2 003/04) based on
results of networka nalysisw ithU CINETsoftware
Them edian valuef or the studied countriesi sad ensity of 17.7%, i.e.
typically,l essthano ne fiftho fa ll possible links between network actors
is established. However, there is awide range of densities between the
differentcountries starting from 7.9% in Estonia to4 5.6%i nDenmark.
NewEUm ember states all haveabelowaverage or average network
density.Fromthe other countries, onlyin Switzerland is the network
belowaverage density.I na ll the oldEUm ember states,the density is
abovethe median.
Thef ollowingT able 3-4 explores the relation between sizea nd density of
the surveyed networks.T he countries are classified intol oose,a verage
and dense on the density scale,a nd small, average andl arge in relation
tothe median sizeo fa ll networks.29
Table3-4: Sizeandd ensityoforganicfarmingpolicynetworksinEurope
Density
Size Loose Average Dense
Small EE CZ IT
Average SI,HU PL
Large CH DK,ENG,DE,AT
Source: ownd ata( nationala ctorinterviews,winter2 003/04) based on
results of networka nalysisw ithU CINETsoftware
Table 3-4 showsthatt he sizeo fthe network does notlimitt he
interaction between actors. The total number of actors in the networks
analysed is small enough toa llowfor contactsb etween all of them
individually.S ized id notinfluence the density of the networks. The new
EUm ember states are all situated in the upper leftpartof the table,
signifyingr ather small and loose networks. Mostof the other countries
showlarge and dense networks of organic farming policy.Exceptions are
IT withas mall and dense network, and CHwhere the network is large
but loose. To sumup, in those countries where the organic sector is more
established (as described byMoschitz etal. 2004) therea re morea ctors
involved in organic farmingp olicymaking and these actors are more
closelyconnected toe ach other thani nc ountries wherethe sector is still
developing.
3.2.2Centrality ofactors inthe organicfarmingpolicynetwork
Table 3-5 showsf or each countryw hatt ype of actor is in the mostcentral
position in the organic farmingp olicynetwork. Theb etweenness
centrality measure is applied here as an indicator for the overall level of
activity of an actor in an etwork. Actorsa re differentiated accordingto
type anda ttitude towards organic farming: predominantlyoriented
towards organic farming, predominantlyoriented towards mainstream
farminga nd athirdc ategoryof actorswhichd on othaveac learp osition
towards oneo rthe otherf ormo fl andm anagement,o rwhich havee qual
regard for both.
In sixout of the eleven countries (CH, CZ, DK, AT, DE,I T),o rganic
farmingo rganizations takethe centralp ositioni nthe network. Theyare
the mostactivei nthe networkc ontext andh avethe highestpotentialto
controla nd broker the flowof information.I nDE,the central position is
taken byt woo rganic farmingo rganizationsthataren earlyequally
importantfor the network. In AT, DE andI T, therea re other actorsthat
sharethe centralp ositionwiththem.T he presence of the other actors
restrictsthe power of each individual centrala ctor;the networki sn ot
dominated byone organization or institution.I ntwoc ases (DE andI T)
this second centrala ctor takes ab alanced position on the organic versus
mainstream scale so that,o verall, the influence of the organicf arming
organizations is still considerable (assumingthat“ balanced”actorsa re
equallyopen too rganic farming issues). In AT, the mainstream oriented30
ministrylimitsthe political influence of the organic farming
organization,a nd conflictbetween these actors has been reported.
Table3-5: Centralactort ypesino rganicfarmingpolicynetworksinEurope
Most centraltypeofactor Countries
Organicfarmingorganization CH,CZ,DK,AT*, DE*, IT**
Ministry,
predominantlymainstreamo riented AT*, ENG
Ministry,
undefined/balanced HU,DE*, SI*
Others tateorparastatalactors,
predominantlymainstreamo riented EE,PL,SI*
Otherparastatalactors,
undefined/balanced IT**
*twoa ctors in the centre
** no actor preciselyin the centre, but twoa ctors close tothe centre
Source: ownd ata( national actorinterviews,winter2 003/04) based on
results of networka nalysisw ithU CINETsoftware
Altogether, the agricultural ministriesp layac entral rolei nf iven ational
networks (AT, ENG,H U, DE,S I).T hisi nstitutioni sc lassified as
principallyoriented towards mainstream farmingi nATa nd ENG,a nd as
balancedi nthe otherthreec ountries.I nS I, the centralp osition of the
ministryis joinedb yap arastatal institution,the agricultural chamber,
which is oriented towards mainstream farming.T hus, organicf arming
policyin this countryis highlyinfluencedb ynon-organic actors.
In EE and PL otheri nstitutions oriented towards mainstream agriculture
playan importantrole in organic farming policy.H owever, the sizea nd
density of the Estonian network are so small thatitis difficultt o
interpretnetwork analysisf igures.I nP L, the mostcentrala ctor is the
agricultural chamber thatis saidtob ethe onlygeneral farming
organizationthatis interested in organic farming. Organic farming
organizations remain in the peripheryand do notplayan importantrole
in this network, thusc onfirming the resultso fthe analysis of the actors’
reputation.
Among other issues, this studyis particularlyinterested in the role of
organic farmingo rganizations in the policy-making process. Ass een in
Table 3-5 the countries studiedvaryw ithr espectt othe type of
organizationthatt akes the centralr olei nthe network. To further explore
the differentroles thatorganic farming organizations andthe
agriculturalm inistries,the twos cores for betweenness centrality were
mapped. Figure 3-3displaysthe betweenness centrality scores of the31
agricultural ministryand those of the mostcentral organic farming
organization.
Figure3-3:Centralityofagriculturalm inistriesandorganicfarming
organizationsinEuropeano rganicfarmingpolicynetworks
Source: ownd ata( national actorinterviews,winter2 003/04) based on
results of networka nalysisw ithU CINETsoftware
Mostof the actors can be grouped according tothe differentroles of the
organic farmingo rganizations and the ministry.I nFigure 3-3w ef ind
fourd ifferentt ypeso fn etworks based on the roles of organic farming
organizations and the agricultural ministry.T he lower rightquadrant
contains networks in which organic farming organizations ared ominant
whereasthe ministryplaysar elativelyminor role or none atall. The
upper leftquadrantgroups networks in which the ministrydominates
the network and organic farming organizations are more in the
periphery.I nc ountries of the upperr ightquadrantt he mostcentral
position is taken bybothtypeso fa ctors –t he ministryand (atleastone)
organic farming organizationp reventt he other from dominatingthe
network. In the cases of EE and PL where athirdp arty holds the most
centralp osition in the network the mappingi llustrates thatneither the
organic farming organizations nor the ministryplaysas ignificantrole.
Countries can be grouped intotwom ain clustersa ccording tothe roleo f
the organic farming organization. In mostof the newmember states
studied, these organizations do notplayt he dominantrole in the
network.I nthe other countries the organic farming organizations are
activelyinvolved in policymaking. In AT, DE and IT organic farming
organizations hold the highestv alueo fb etweenness centrality,withthe
ministryhaving ar elativelyhigh valueo fb etweenness centrality.I nthese
countries statea nd privatea ctorsa re of similari mportance for organic
farmingp olicy.W ec an also groupENGintothis groupo fh ighly
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importantorganic farming organizations, but the ministryis dominant
here. This dominance of the agricultural ministryis clear in SI where the
organic farming organization is found in the peripheryof the policy
network. In the CZ, DKa nd CHthe ministryis of minor importance for
organic farming policy.I tsa ctivity is limited and itremains passive
whereas organic farming organizations havear elativelyhigher
importance.
3.3Relationshipbetweenthe organicfarmingandgeneralfarming
domain
Organic farmingp olicyis as ub-domaino fa gricultural policy.O rganic
farming developmentis thusa lso influenced bydecisions taken on this
level.S owhatdoesn etwork analysistell usa bout the relationship
betweenthe mainstream and the organic farming sector?
First,wel ook att he differentscores for reputational power.
Summarising Table 3-1 and Table 3-2,wec an see thatorganic farming
organizations are powerfulo nlyfor organic farmingp olicy,whereas
general farmingo rganizations influenceb othp olicyfields atleastt o
some extent.T he agriculturalm inistries are importantfor botho fthe
policyfields, which is easilyexplainedb yt heir institutional role in the
politicals ystem. Table 3-6 presentsa no verviewof the average
reputational power of organic farming and mainstream organizations.
Table3-6:Comparison ofreputationalp owerofd ifferentactort ypesfor
generalandorganicfarmingpolicy(indicated bythe shareof
intervieweesnamingaspecificactorasoneofthe fivemost
importantinthispolicydomain)
Policyfield
Ministry/department
incharge oforganic
farming
Organic
farming
organization
General
farming
organization
Organicfarmingpolicy 93%88%23%
Generalfarmingpolicy 95% 8% 73%
Source: ownd ata( national actorinterviews,winter2 003/04)
From ac ross-countryperspective, weo bserved ar elativelyw eakp osition
for organic farming in the generala griculturalp olicydomain.Although
general farmingo rganizationsa re nott oo powerfuli nthe organic
farming policydomain,theydo exertmore influencethano rganic
farming organizations in the general farming policydomain.
Intervieweesi na ll countries clearlydistinguish betweenthe twop olicy
domainsa nd assign differentpower structures tothem. If power is
unequallydistributed thism aycause conflictbetweena ctors which will
be discussed below.33
To reveal differentopinionso no rganic farming policyab lockmodelling
procedure was applied. The idea behind blockmodelling is tos implify
network structures bygrouping those actors togetherthatshowas imilar
structure of relations( Burt1991;H enning2000). Blockswere created
based on the differentopinions of actors about organic farming policy.
The interviewees were asked tos tatewithwhich actors theyshared the
same opinion on organic farming policyand withwhich theydid not.I n
this way,i tw as aimed atfindingc learlydistinguishable camps (in a
political sense) withr egard too rganicf arming thatcould be described on
the basis of the network characteristics of the actors involved.7
In countries withar elativelystrong position of the organic sector (except
for Italy), or dense networks,an umbero fb locks were identified. In AT,
CH, DK, DE,ENGand CZd ifferentgroups of opinion existw ithr egards
too rganic farming policyt hatcan form ab asis for debatea bout this
policyissue. Although the structure of conflictremained vague, in these
countries, ab lock containing the mostimportantactors from the organic
sector could be distinguished from ab lock of mostlymainstream actors.
In addition, other blocks were identified, such as environmental
organizations or other organizations withab roader focusthan
agriculture.
In all these cases, the “organic”blocks contained centrallyin the network
located organic sector organizations. This means thatt hese blocks are
also the mostactivei nthe networko fo rganic farmingp olicy.O pposing
actors playap eripheral role in the networksa nd are notv eryactive.
Therefore, even though conflictsm ightexistbetween differentactors,
these conflictsa re currentlynotconducted through ap olitical debatei n
which all parties take part.Actors criticaltowards organic farming are
notengaged in organic farming policymaking. The structure of conflict
doesn otmeett he structure of activity.Ane xceptioni sAustria, where
three blocks are polarising the network actors. The organic farming
organizations, the agricultural ministryand ap arastatal institution
publiclyagree and disagree on organicf arming policyissues.All these
actors occupyac entralp osition in the network. One reason for this
apparentconflictis that,a tt he time of the interviews, there was an
ongoing debateo nthe developmentof the organic sector including the
merger of the three large organic farming organizations tof orm one
umbrella organization. The Austrian blockmodelling resultsa lso support
the statementt hatt he organic sector in this countryis stillf ighting for
full recognition (Moschitz etal. 2004).
In countries where the networko fo rganic farming policyis loose and
organic farming organizations do notplayac entral role (EE,H U, PL and
SI), the blockmodellinga pproach did notidentifyanyblocks thatcould
be soundlyexplained. National expertsc ommented thatpolicyactorsa re
notinterested in organic farming. Therefore, theydo nothavea no pinion
7T he straightforwardq uestiona bout whether an actor agrees or disagrees on organicf arming policycan
be biased whena ctorsh esitatetos tatetheir disagreementsi nf rontof athirdp erson -the interviewer.
Keeping this in mind, the resultsp resented here should be interpreted withs ome caution. Nevertheless,
wethink thatt he resultsc an contributetothe overall picture of the political situation of organicf arming
in Europe, although blockmodelling didn otlead toc lear resultsi na ll countries.34
about organic farming policyissues and theyoften do notknoww ho are
the stakeholders involved –indifferenceo ri gnorance is the reason
unclear political opinions. In IT,the blockmodelling approach did not
produce ac lear opinion structure either. In this case, itis more difficult
toe xplain such ar esultand am ored etailed investigationwould be
needed, but this is beyond the scope of this study.
From the blockmodelling resultswec an conclude that,c urrently,o rganic
farming policyis notan activelydebated policyissuei na nyof the
countries studied. Either mostof the agriculturalp olicymakers are
indifferentt owards thisi ssueo ro pinionsa re cleara nd aren ott ob e
debated.
3.4Mainfindingsfrom the comparativeanalysisofEuropean
organicfarmingpolicynetworks
The compositiono fo rganic farmingp olicynetworks in Europe varies
from countryt oc ountryin regard tothe distribution of differentactor
type shares (state, privateo rp arastatal). However,i nm ostof the
countries, excluding PL and SI, the majority of actors are private
organizations. Concerning the actors’attitude, onlyam inority of actors
is considered as predominantlyoriented towards organic farmingi na ll
countries exceptHU.
Duetoi tsi nstitutional role itis notsurprising thatin all countries the
agricultural ministryis oneo fthe mostpowerfulp olicyactorsi no rganic
farmingi ntermso fr eputational power. Also organic farming
organizationse njoyah igh reputationi na ll countries excludingP L,
whereas general farmingo rganizationsa re notv erypowerfuli no rganic
farming policy(withthe exceptiono fI T).
Thec omparativea nalysis showed thatt he differentframeworks of old
andn ewEUm ember states havea ni mpacton the organic farming policy
networks. The organic sector is younger in the newmember states and
policynetworksa re notas well established as in the old member states
where networksa re larger and denser. This agrees withc onclusions from
the surveyof the institutional developmentof organic farmingc ompleted
byMoschitz etal. (2004). For the oldEUm ember states, Moschitz etal.
(2004) stated ab roader acceptance of organic farmingb yt he different
stakeholder groups, as well as ad eveloped market(i.e. marketactors
become involved in shaping the organic farmings ector).
Regarding betweenness centrality as am easure for the overall activity of
an actor,the analysis revealed thatin all old EUm ember states, in CH
and in CZo rganic farmingo rganizations playt he mostcentral role in
organic farming policynetworks. This dominantrole is shared withthe
agriculturalm inistryin ENG,AT, DE and IT. Bycontrast,i nS Ithe
agricultural ministryis alone in the centre. In EE,H Ua nd PL other
actorsa re centrali nthe organic farming policynetwork whereas organic
farming organizations and ministries playal ess importantrole.35
In all countries analysed, organic farming organizationsl ack reputational
power withr egard tog eneral farmingp olicy.T he organica nd the general
farmingd omains ares tillc learlyseparated frome ach other.Currently,
organic farmingi sn otan issueo fd ebateo nthe countries’political
agenda.36
4The structureandacceptanceoforganic
farmingpolicyatt he levelo fthe
EuropeanUnion
Organic farming policyatt he EUl evel is embeddedi nthe policy
framework of organic farminga sp resented in chapter 1.2.2.T his chapter
presentsthe relevantactorsi nvolved in the policyprocess, their attitudes
and policypreferences, as well as the network of the mostengaged
organic farmingp olicyactors. Bothd irectpolicymaking att he EUl evel
and indirectlyv ia the nation level are considered. These findings are
based on ar esearcha ddressingEUi nstitutionsa nd interestgroups
working att he EUl evel, as well as nationali nstitutions and interest
groups representingn ational interests. In chapter 4.1 wec haracterizethe
actorsi nvolved in organic farmingp olicyand discuss their knowledge
about and attitude too rganic farming. In chapter 4.2w ewilltake a
network perspectivef or analysing the interrelations between them.
Chapter 4.3focuses on the contentso fp olicyand presentsp ossible
strategies and instrumentso fo rganic farming policyt hathaveb een
tested for their acceptanceb yt he actors involved.
4.1 Description ofactors involvedinEuropeano rganicfarming
policymaking
The description of actors involved in organic farmingp olicyatt he
European level focuseso nthosea ctorsthatresponded toaweb-based
surveyaiming atexploring the level of acceptance of differentpolicy
instruments( see chapter 2.4). On the basis of these 43responses (a
response rateo f35%), actorsa re characterized. First,wed escribe
characteristics such as workingl evel, type of organization and time span
of their activity att he EUl evel. Secondly,wep resentt heir political
attitude towards organic farminga nd related issues. Thesea ttitudinal
features comprise the actors’perception and knowledge of organic
farming, as well as their position towards the introduction of GMO into
general agriculturalp ractice. Bothc haracterizationswill be used in the
further chapters tod escribe anda nalyse the policynetworksa nd the
acceptance of organic farming policyinstrumentsa nd strategies.
4.1.1 Characteristicsofthe actors involvedinEuropeano rganicfarming
policymaking
Table 4-1 showsthatabout 60%( 26) of the respondentstothe web
surveyare actorsa tt he EUl evel against40%( 17)a re nationall evel
organizations andi nstitutions.37
Table4 -1:Overviewofthe responseratesinthe differentactorcategories
addressed inthe web-based survey 8
Numberof
questionnaires
sentout
Numberof
responses
Response
rate
EUleveltotal 7926 33%
EUCommission 18 8 44%
EUP arliament 700 %
Farmersinterest group 4 2 50%
Organicfarmingorganization 2150%
Agri-industry organization 10 2 20%
Commercialo rganization 91 11%
Labour union 2 1 50%
Consumerinterest group 3133%
Environmentalinterest group 10 5 50%
Others 145 36%
Nationall eveltotal 44 17 39%
Permanentr epresentation 201050%
Nationalfarmersinterest group 18 5 28%
Nationalo rganicfarmingorganization 5240%
Others 1 0 0%
Total 123 433 5%
Source: ownd ata( EU-level web-based survey,spring 2005)
Strikingly,the share of national institutions which answeredthe web-
baseds urveyis relativelyhigherthan one mightexpectfrom the
distributiono fa ctorsa ddressed.I nf act,5 0%o fthe permanent
representations of the EUm ember states contacted respondedtothe
survey(AT, CZ, DK, EE,H U, LU, SE,S I, SK,U K).I ndeed, national
representations make upthe largestgroupo fr espondents. Theyare
followed bydifferentinstitutions of the EuropeanCommission( 8).N one
of the addressed partieso fthe EuropeanP arliamentresponded tothe
survey.Bycontrast,the groupo ff armers’u nions is presentw itha
considerable number of respondents( altogether 7),a nd af airlyhigh
number of national farmers’interestgroups answered (5). Att he EU
level, several environmental groups participated in the web-baseds urvey
of organic farming policy(5), while othertypeso fo rganizations such as
8W heni nterpretingthe figureso ne hastoc onsiderthatsome institutions ando rganizations thatw ere
foreseen forthe surveyhad tob ewithdrawnd uetop ermanentdeliveryfailureso fthe e-mailsthatcould
notbe resolved.T herefore,f or example, although therea re 25p ermanentrepresentations of EU
member states atBrussels,o nly2 0w eref inallyincluded in the survey.Astothe national farmers’
unions, onlyt hose which runtheir owno fficesi nBrussels werec onsidered, which reducedthe number
of national farmers’interestgroups to1 8.38
groups representing consumers’interestsa nd the agri-industry
responded toasmaller extent.
The figures should be treated withs ome caution. The total number of
organizationsi ne ach actor type is notequal for all the types, e.g.
consumers’interestsa re represented byt woo rganizations att he EUl evel
whereas manymore agri-industryorganizations exist.O nlyone organic
farming organization is relevantatt he EUl evel (IFOAMEU).
The return rateo fq uestionnaires in awritten surveydepends on whether
the interviewee’sa ttention could be attracted byt he topic in question,
the number and type of contacts, the lengtho fthe questionnaire, the way
in which the interviewee is addressed, the institution thatis conducting
the survey,i ncentives given and confidentiality granted (Hippler 1988).
In ourc ase, no incentives were given tothe addressees of the survey.
However, the means of communicating withthemb ye-maila nd
providing aweb-based questionnaire is common in the European policy
environment.Furthermore, the policyactors were reminded twice about
responding. Thus, the main factors influencing the return ratea re likely
tob ethe time constraintsa nd their interestin the topic of organic
farming. Consequently,wec an interprett he number of organizations
and institutions thatfilledi nthe online questionnaire as an indication of
their interestin organic farmingp olicy,a swell as their (time)r esources
available. Seen fromthis angle, wes uggestt hatpermanent
representations of the member states area ni mportantgroupo fa ctors
interested in the policyprocess. TheEuropean Commissionwithi ts
variousDirectorates-General (DG)i sh ighlyinterested, as well. Fromthe
side of interestgroups,the farmers’u nions showed their interestatboth
the EUa nd the nationall evel, and environmental groups arei nvolved to
somee xtentatt he EUl evel. Thes ole organic farmingo rganization att he
EUl evel is notsupported tothe same extentbyitsn ational counterparts
as the European farmers’u nion (COPA); this is duetothe lack of
national (organic farming) representationsi nBrussels. Moreover,
organicf arming organizations areg enerallysmallerthan general farming
organizations (altogethertheyrepresentabout 2%o ff armers in the EU
whilethe greatmajority of farmersi sm embero fag eneral farming
organization) and thusd on othavethe same resourcestor espond to
surveys.
European farmers’interestgroups and those representing closely
connected issues such as agri-industryand consumers’interestsh avea
fairlylong tradition of lobbying att he EU. In fact,a ll these groups have
beena ctives ince the verybeginning of the European Community,thatis
the late1 950stoe arly1960s. Recently,m ore and more national farmers’
unions (in particular those of the newEUm embers tates)h aves etu p
officesi nBrussels toe nhance lobbying for their case att he Community
level.I nc ontrast,e nvironmental interestgroups did notbecome active
until the mid 1970s, and onlyt oasignificantextentin the late1 990s
(European Commission 2004b). Lobbygroups for organic farming only
began too peratea tt he EUl evel in 1990(byt hatt ime,this was being
done bysome national organizations) and the IFOAMEUGroupwas
onlyinstituted in 2000,withi tso wnBrussels office from 2003 onward–39
although ithad previouslyexisted in some other form throughout the
1990sa si tcontinuouslyengaged withthe EUr egulation. We can thus
observear elativelyy oung groupo fo rganizations lobbying for
environmental issues and an even younger organic farming scene, both
meeting an interest-groups tructure (off armers and consumers) thatcan
look back on al ong tradition of policylobbying.
4.1.2Attitudest owardsorganicfarmingofthe actors involvedin
Europeano rganicfarmingpolicymaking
From the pointof viewof af urtherd evelopmentof organic farmingi tis
particularlyinteresting which actorss upportorganic farminga nd which
do not.T od escribe the policyactors’attitudes too rganicf arming,as cale
of organicf arming supportw as developed on which the actors could then
be placeda ccording toas upportindexcalculated for eacho fthem.9
Table4 -2showswhich itemswereusedtod evelop the scale of organic
farming support.
Table4 -2:Measurementfort he organicfarmingsupport index
Itemson the scale
Positivestatements about organicfarming
Item-to-totalcorrelation
Increasei nbiodiversity 0.79
Groundwaterprotection 0.70
Contribution toanimalwelfare 0.74
Reduction ofe nergyu se 0.67
Increasei nfoodquality 0.87
Contribution top ublichealth 0.88
Nop roblemforfoodsecurity 0.71
Roleoforganicfarmingi nthe CAP 0.79
Cronbach coefficient α =0.93
Source:o wnd ata( EU-level web-based survey,spring2005)
The single supportindexfore acha ctor was calculated as the average
scoreo fthe eightitemsused toc reatethe scale. The values ranged from
one tof ourwitho ne indicatingthe mostreserved attitude and fourthe
mostpositivea ttitude too rganicf arming.W henp lacing the policyactors
on the scale of supportaccording totheir supportindexone can observe
thatw hile there seems tob eab ias in the directiono fap ositivea ttitude
9T he calculationwas done byar eliability analysis( Cronbach1 951). Nine itemsd irectlylinkedto
attitudestowards organicf arming were included in the questionnaire and accompanied byt wo
statementso nthe importance of organicf arming for the respondent’so wno rganization or institution
and the CAPi ng eneral. Reliability analysis reducedthis total of eleven itemstoan umbero fs even
attitude itemsa nd one concerning the role of organic farming for the CAP. The Cronbach coefficient α
was used toe stimatethe constructreliability of the scale.40
towards organic farming, the whole span of possibles cores is taken.T his
bias is explainable byt he factt hataddressees of the questionnairewho
are more open too rganic farming willp robablyhaver esponded more
frequently.T hose who do nothavea ni nterestin organicf arming or have
am ore negativea ttitude towards it,i nm anycases, will nothave
responded tothe web-based survey.
To make the supportindexmore tangible weh aves ingled out four
regions on the scale( AtoD)e acha ssemblingan umber of actors. These
regions were defined in parallel tothe choicesthe interviewees hadf or
statingtheir attitude towards organicf arming.T wop ositivea nd two
negativeo ptions wereg iven.Ascore of twoi ndicates thatan interviewee
gaven egatives tatementsa bout all itemsr elatingtoo rganic farming
whereas as core abovethree indicates thatt he actor was positivea bout
alli tems. The category“ positive”w as subdivided intotwor egions( Aand
B)i no rder tod istinguishthose actorsthatmadethe mostpositive
statementsf or allo rn earlyallo rganic farming itemsf romthose who
were critical about atleastsomeo fthem.T he “negative”categoryw as
subdivided in ag roupo fi nterviewees thatarec learlycritical about
organicf arming andag roupthatmightstills ee some positivep oints
about organic farming.T able4 -3describes these “regions”and shows
howactorsa re assigned tothem.
Table4 -3:Positionson the scaleoforganicfarmingsupport
Position on the support scale
Organic
farming
support index
AOrganicfarmingsupporters
CPE,PR CZ,SA,ECOVAST,EPHA,FIAO,PR AT,PR HU,BIRDLIFE,IFOAM
EU,PR SK,EEA,AGRI.F.4,CZ-CZAC,EuroCoop
3.54.0
BOpentoo rganicfarming
EEB,AGRI.F.3,EFFAT,Eurogroup,PR LU,PR SI,EURO-TOQUES,BE-BB,LV-
LZF,AER,AGRI.C.2,IUCN,JRC.D.8,PR DK,AGRI.A.1,AGRI.H.1,SE-LRF
3.03 .4
CHesitantabout organicfarming
Euromontana,PR EE,FVE,PR UK,PR SE
>2.02 .9
DC riticaltoo rganicfarming
TRADE.G.3,UK-NFU,FEFAC,TRADE.G.2,CELCAA
1.02 .0
Source: ownd ata( EU-level web-based survey,spring2005)
The grouping of the organizations and institutions too ne of the positions
on the supportscalei llustrates the currentposition att he timeo fthe
survey(summer 2005) and cannotbe taken as af ixed classification of
the actors. Some actors mighthavea nswered in as trategic wayso the
indexcalculated cannotbe translated directlyintoam easurementof
observed actionf or organicf arming.I tis, nevertheless, an assessmentof
the actors’potentialtob ecomei nvolved in organic farming policy.T he
Europeanf armers’u nion COPAcould notposition itself towards organic41
farming atall and thusthe mostpowerfula griculturali nterestgroup
cannotbe placed on the scale of organic farming support.
Atestfor whether the attitude towards organic farming has anyinfluence
on the knowledge of EUr egulations concerning organic farming policy
gavean egativer esult.N os ignificantcorrelation is observed between the
organic farming supportindexand knowledge about the Regulation
(EEC)N o2092/91 or the EUAction Plan for Organic Food and Farming.
Thed egree towhichr espondentsk nowabout the European CAP
(represented here byt he Luxembourg Agreementof June 2003and the
newRuralDevelopmentRegulation)s imilarlydoes notcorrelate
significantlyw iththeir attitude towards organic farming.
Nevertheless, there is ac orrelation betweenthe actors’knowledge of the
documentsr egardingo rganic farming and between those regardingthe
CAPi ng eneral. Knowledge about the Regulation( EEC)N o2092/91
regulationc orrelates stronglyw iththe actors’knowledge about the
European Action Plan for OrganicFood and Farming (Spearman-Rho:
0.73)a nd knowledge about the Luxembourg Agreementsc orrelates
moderatelyw ithk nowledge about the RuralDevelopmentRegulation
(Spearman-Rho: 0.66). Bothc orrelations are highlysignificant.
Table 4-4 groups the actors according totheir knowledge of organic and
general farming regulations.
Bothn ational organic farmingo rganizations (the British Soil
Association,S A,a nd the Federationo fI talian Organic Agriculture, FIAO)
haveagood insightintoo rganic farmingp olicybut lackk nowledgeo fthe
general farming policyframework, whereas IFOAMEUa sthe EU
organicf armingr epresentativeh as ag oodk nowledgeo fb othp olicy
fields. This is alsothe casef or COPA.I nterestingly,the environmental
groups all statetoh aveaf airlygoodk nowledgea bout the CAPi ng eneral,
but lack knowledgea bout organic farming regulations or the European
Action Plan for Organic Fooda nd Farming. Asr egards the knowledgeo f
the EuropeanCommission’sDirectorate-General of Agriculture (DG
AGRI), wef ind ah igh knowledge of general farming legislation whereas
knowledge about the organic farming policyframework varies. Those
unitsi nc harge of horizontal aspectso fr urald evelopment(AGRI.F)a nd
legislation( AGRI.H)k nowmorea bout this specific regulatory
framework than other unitso fthis Directorate-General. DG TRADE
representatives are less familiar withthe CAPl egislation.42
Table4 -4: Actors knowledge oforganicandg eneralfarminglegislation
Knowledge oforganicfarmingpolicy
Low High
Low
CZ-CZAC
EPHA
EURO-TOQUES
EUROCOOP
Euromontana
FEFAC
FVE
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JRC.D.8
PR EE
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High
AER
AGRI.A.1
AGRI.C.2
BIRDLIFE
CPE
ECOVAST
EEA
EEB
Eurogroup
LV-LZF
AGRI.F.3
AGRI.F.4
AGRI.H.1
BE-BB
CELCAA
COPA
EFFAT
IFOAMEU
PR AT
PR HU
PR SE
UK-NFU
Source: ownd ata( EU-level web-based survey,spring 2005)
One could arguethatw iththe Regulations (EEC)N o2092/91 and No
2078/92,a swell as withthe European Action Plan for Organic Food and
Farming organicf arming is noww ell anchored in European legislation.
In viewof the furtherd evelopmentof organic farming policyw ea re
interested in howpolicyactors perceivethe future of organic farming.
Figure 4-1 indicates immediatec hallenges for organic farming as
identified byt he respondents.
Mostof the interviewees named the furtherd evelopmentof the organic
food marketas one of the mostimportantchallengeso rganic farming has
toa cceptin the coming years. The questiono fc o-existence of agriculture
using GMO and maintaining GMO-free statusi sa nother major
challenge, followed closelybyt he need tof urther harmonizeo rganic
standards. Trade liberalizationa nd decliningf armi ncome aren otseen
as major challengesf or organic farming.43
Figure4 -1:Respondents assessmentofthe most importantchallengesfor
organicfarmingi nthe EUinthe next3 -5 years
Source: ownd ata( EU-level web-based survey,spring 2005)
4.1.3Summarisingthe description ofEUorganicfarmingpolicyactors
Permanentrepresentations of the members tates,a swell as variousunits
of Directorates-General AGRI and TRADE are stronglyrepresented in
ours urvey.Farmers’u nions tookp artbothf rom the EUa nd the national
level whereas onlyEUl evel environmental groups respondedtothe
questionnaire.O rganic farming organizations are represented byt he one
EU-level and twon ational organizations. The twol atter groups of
organizations appearedo nlyrecently(in the late1 990s) att he EUl evel,
where theyencountereda ni nterest-groups tructure of farmers’and
consumers’organizations withal ongtraditiono fp olicylobbying.
The interviewed actors wereg roupedi ntof ourg roups according totheir
attitudestoo rganic farming. Organic farming organizations are placedi n
the groupo f“organic farming supporters”,together withaf ew
environmental organizations. However,m ostof the environmental
organizations are membero fthe secondg roupwhich is denominated as
“open too rganicf arming”.T he majority of DG AGRI unitsa re also
placed here. Bycontrast,DG TRADE unitsa re assigned tothe groupo f
actorsthatare critical towards organicf arming –ag roupa lso
comprising representatives of the agro-industryand an ational farmers’
union.
This attitude,n evertheless, doesn otinfluence the knowledge of the
actors about the organic or generalf arming policy.O rganic farming
organizations haveah igh knowledgea bout organicf arming policy,b ut
are less familiar withg eneral farmingp olicy.T he oppositeh oldstruef or
environmental organizations which are more knowledgeable on general
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farming policyissues than on issues of organic farming policy.W hile
bothI FOAMEUa nd COPAhaveah igh level of knowledgei nb othp olicy
fields, the differentDGsa nd theirunitsa re split.DG Trade unitsa re less
familiar withg eneral farming policyt hanDG AGRI units. WithinDG
AGRI, onlyt hoseunitsd ealing withh orizontal aspectso fr ural
developmentand legislation are highlyacquainted witho rganic farming
policy.
Policyactors feel thatorganic farming has toa ddress internal
development(marketdevelopment,h armonization of standards) rather
than trends in general agricultural policy.T he mostimportantexternal
factor thatorganic farming has toa ddress is the introduction of GMOs
intoa gricultural practice. Although am ajority of stakeholders (31) fear a
negativei nfluence on organic farming from the implementationo fthis
newt echnology,this viewis notu ndisputed.S ome interviewees (6)
expectap ositivei nfluence, and about the same number (5) think that
this would haven oe ffecton organic farming. Thus, furtherd ebateo n
this issuec an be expected in future.
4.2Interrelationsbetweenactors involvedinEuropeano rganic
farmingpolicymaking
The EUp olity provides as tructure of consultativeb odies as af ormal
meanso fi nterestgroup–institutioni nteractionwhich has alreadybeen
described in chapter 1.2.T hiss ectionf irstt akes ac loser look att hat
formal structure of the EUa griculturalp olicynetwork and then analyses
the observed (more informal) relationshipsb etweeni nterestgroups and
institutions withr eference tos pecific policyprocesses. The analysiso f
these informal relationshipsi sb asedo n1 7f ace-to-face interviews
conducted during autumn 2004whereas the analysiso fthe formal
interrelations is done byinvestigating EUd ocuments.
4.2.1 Formaln etwork:(co-)membershipinAdvisory Groupsofthe
Directorate-GeneralAgriculture
We havea lreadydescribedi nc hapter 1.2t hat117 interestgroups are
registereda tt he EUf or participatingi no ne or moreo fthe total of 31
consultativeb odies on agricultural policy.I thas been shownthatCOPA
is byfar the bestrepresented interestgroupi nthese committees, but
some environmental and consumers’groups are also found in an umber
of differentAdvisoryGroups.
Ouri nterestnowlies in the interactionb etweeni nterestgroups.W e
considerc o-membership in one or more consultativeb odiesa sa
possibility of meeting and exchanging information and opinions and an
actor participatingi nd ifferentAdvisoryGroups is able totransmit
information betweeng roups and between the differentgroupm embers.
Fromthis perspective, informationc an flowfrom one actor toa nother
even though theyaren otmeetingd irectlyin an AdvisoryGroup–athird45
actor can playt he role of an information broker. The networka nalytical
conceptof betweenness centrality provides atool tom easure the degree
towhich particular interestgroups playt his role. The resultsf or the most
centrala ctorsa re showni nT able 4-5.
Overall, about 22%o fthe interestgroups are linked byparticipating in at
leastonec ommonAdvisoryGroup. Centralizationo fthe co-membership
networko fi s25%, i.e. ac entre can be discerned.
The importantrole of COPAis highlighted byitsh igh betweenness
centrality score, which is because itis the onlyorganizationwhich is a
member of all AdvisoryGroups (excludingthe “Green Groupo fEight”).
The EEB and the WWF,the representation of consumers( BEUC)a nd
trade unions (EFFAT) haves omep otentialf or beingi nformation
brokers.
Table4 -5: Betweenness centralityofi nterest groupsinthe co-membership
networko fEUa griculturalAdvisoryGroups
Interest group Betweenness centrality (normalized;%)
COPA 25.5
EEB 8.8
WWF 7.8
BEUC 6.2
EFFAT 6.1
BIRDLIFE 4.5
CIAA 2.8
CPE 2.7
CEJA 2.6
CEIBOIS 1.6
COCERAL 1.6
EFNCP 1.6
EUROCOMM 1.3
Otherinterest groups <1
Source: ownd ata( EU-level actorinterviews,a utumn 2004);based on
UCINETresults
ComparingT able 4-5 withFigure 1-1 showsthatt he number of Advisory
Groups atw hich an organization is presentis nott he onlyw ayt oa ssess
itsi mportance.From an etwork perspective, the potential tob roker
information is meaningful. This potential is the higher the more other
organizations an actor meetsa nd thusc an exchangei nformation with.
This number increasese itherb yattending ah igh number of different
AdvisoryGroups or bymeeting manydifferentactorsi nas maller
number of AdvisoryGroups.S ome of the wellr epresented organizations
(as based on number of AdvisoryGroups attended) haveal imited scope
of activity;their interestis focussed on as pecificp olicyissue.46
The network perspectivei sh ighlighted here, because in ad ecision-
making process itis importantfor policyactors toh avethe possibility of
meeting each other and exchangingo pinions, discussing strategies or
seeking political support.Discussion of the AdvisoryGroup’sp articular
issuei sn otof exclusivei mportance, but keeping in contactw itho ther
policymakers and creatinga lliances for al ong-term strategyare
incentives for interestgroups toa ttend the consultativeb odies. This
hypothesis was confirmed byt he interestgroups interviewed for our
survey.T heyagreed thatt he overall significance of the AdvisoryGroups
is notso much toh aved irectinfluenceo nthe policyoutcome. Itw as
even mentioned thatt he EuropeanCommission uses theseb odies more
toi nformi nterestgroups about ongoing political discussion than tos eek
their advice. The interest-groupr epresentatives found itmuch more
importantt hatt heymetw ithe ach other att he AdvisoryGroups essions
ando btained first-handi nformation about currentpolicies. In the next
section,wewillthereforee xaminethe informaln etworkb ased on
contactsthatactorsm aintainwithe ach other.
4.2.2Informalcontactnetworko factors involvedinEUorganicfarming
policy
Then etworks presented in the followings hould be seen as an extractof
the completea griculturalp olicynetwork; organic farming is perceived as
as ub-domain of agriculture att he whole. The large number of interest
groups activei na gricultural policyatt he EUm ade itnecessaryt o
concentrateo ns elected actors and thena ttemptt od erivec onclusions for
the overall situation of organic farmingp olicy.T he actors interviewed are
presented in more detail before moving tothe resultso fthe analyses of
the networks established betweenthem.
EUnetworkactors
Asd escribed in chapter 2.4, wea imeda tincluding the mostimportant
policyactorso fo rganic farming policy,a swella sthose actorswho are
said tob ei nfluential for general agricultural policy.From the EU
institutions, DG AGRI,DG ENVI, the European Economic and Social
Committee (ECOSOC)a nd the Commissionf or agriculture of the
European Parliament(EP-AGRI) weres elected for interviewsa nd four
permanentrepresentations of member states were included: Austria and
Denmark as theyhavep layed an importantrole in the developmentof an
organic farming policy;f urthermore Germanyand France as
representatives of the large member countries. Organizations
interviewed were farmers’interestgroups represented byCOPAand the
European Council for Young Farmers( CEJA), the EUl evel organic
farming organizationI FOAMEU, the environmental groups BIRDLIFE,
EEBand Friends of the EarthEurope( FOEE), the consumerg roups
BEUCand the EuropeanCommunity of ConsumerCooperatives
(EUROCOOP) and,f inally,the representationo ftrade unions, EFFAT.
Though alla re involved in organicf arming policyt os omee xtent,the
policyactorsvaryin the amountof resources theydedicatetothatpolicy47
issue. OnlyIFOAMEUi nvestsa ll of itstime resources in organic
farming, which reflectsthe organization’sr ole as the umbrella
organization for organic food and farming in Europe. However,there are
currentlyonly1.5 persons (full-time equivalent)working att he Brussels
office so thatt he total time spenton lobbyingf or organic farming
remains limited. All other policyactors spend far less time on organic
farming policy,f roma bout 10%o ftotal working staff ton earlyz ero.
There are manyreasons for this. For environmental interestgroups,
consumers’groups and workers’groups,o rganic farming is justas ub-
item of agriculture which, itself, is onlyone amongstah igh numbero f
policyissues theyare engaged in. The relativelyfewresourcesthat
farmers’organizations spend on organicf arming indicatethatt his policy
issuei sn otap riority on their agenda.But here one should alsok eepi n
mind thatfarmers’organizations tacklevariousa griculturalc oncerns. As
tothe EUCommission, the representatives of DG AGRI and DG ENVI
dedicatel essthan5 %o ftheir workingtimetoo rganicf arming.O fthe
member states,the permanentrepresentations of Germanyand Austria
allocates lightlymore resources too rganic farming thand othe
permanentrepresentations of Denmark or France.
Theunderstanding of the situationo fi nterestgroups withr egardtotheir
ability totakep artin the policyprocess is improved byas elf-assessment
of the organizations.T he environmental organizations and IFOAMEU
pointt otheir strongn etwork of expertso nwhich theycanr elyeven
though the staffworkingd irectlyatt he EUl evel is limited.T heyfeel well
supported byt heir national membero rganizations and seea na dvantage
in the reciprocalg ood contactswitha nd between them.T heir main
problemsa re al acko ff inancial or timer esources andm anpower.I n
contrast,l acko fm anpower ando therr esources is notan issuef or most
of the organizationsthathaveb een activea tt he EUl evel for al ongtime
already.COPAstresses itsh igh number of members and claims to
representall (or atleastmostof the) farmers in Europe.H owever, this
strengthi sa lso aweakness for the organization att he same time. The
high diversity of members causes some problems in finding common
political positions thatcanthenb el obbiedf or.
Ourn etwork analysisf ocuses especiallyon the role of the IFOAMEU
Groupa sthe onlyinterest-groupl obbying exclusivelyfor organic farming
att he EUl evel and three environmental interestgroups: FOEE,
BIRDLIFE and EEB.I nthe following the fouro rganizations in question
will be referred toa sthe “core organics”.Expertsa ssess these
organizations as advocatingo rganicf arming and their opinions are
supported byresultsf rom the national level analyses thatoften revealed
af airlyimportantinvolvementof environmental groups in organic
farming policy.W ewill criticallyreviewt his assumption. Anotherr eason
for looking att he role of these organizations in the agricultural network
is thatt heyhaven otbeen considered in previouss tudies (Henning &
Wald 2000). Whilethe roles of interestgroups representing producers
and industries as well as consumersh aveb een analysed thoroughly,
environmental interestgroups had been judged as too marginal tob e
taken intoa ccount.I fwep resume thatt hese groups are working on
organic farming policyissues and wes ee organicf arming as ap artof48
general farming policyt hen itis of interestt oa nalyse howgroups active
in this sub-issuea re linked tothe broader network of the CAP.
EUleveln etworkanalysis
Oura nalysis focuses on twon etworks:a sa ne xample for an organic
farming policynetwork wep resentt he network which was established
during the elaborationo fthe European Action Plan for Organic Food and
Farming. The role of differentagricultural policyactors is analysed and
wea re interested in the connection of the organic farming policynetwork
withthe general CAPn etwork. The roles of the mostimportantCAP
actors in the organicf arming policynetwork are examined and we
discuss whatrole these actorsp layin the CAPn etwork.T os ee how
importantCAPi ssues are for the groupo f“core organics”(see above) we
will analyse their activities in the CAP, in ourc ase represented byt he
policyprocess of the midterm reviewof the Agenda 2000,a nd compare
them withthose for the Organic Action Plan. However, oura im is nott o
analyse in detail which positions were successfullylobbied for in the two
policyprocesses. Oura nalytical focusl ies primarilyon the structure of
the twop olicynetworks.
The networko fthe EUAction PlanforOrganicFoodandFarming
The EUAction Plan for Organic Fooda nd Farming was elaborated over a
period of fiveyears from af irstformulationo fthe ideaa taEuropean
Conferencei nV ienna 1999 (organized byt he Commission and the
Austrian Government)tothe final communicationo fthe Commission in
2004. On the waylayanotherConference,this time hosted byt he Danish
Governmentin 2001, as wella stwoh earings byt he European
Parliament(2003)a nd the Commission( 2004). The CoAMb ecame
engagedi nthe process in 2001wheni trequested the Commission to
drawu pa nActionP lan. In 2002,the CoAMr eceived an interimr eport
and finally,i n2004a ccepted the European ActionP lan for Organic Food
and Farming. The Commission alsos etu pa ne xpertgroupa nd, in 2003,
opened an internetconsultation on the Action Plan( Stolze&L ampkin
2005).
The Vienna Conference can be considered as the starting pointfor the
elaboration of an EuropeanAction Plan and the furthers tepsundertaken
are partof the decision-making phase of thisAction Plan. Asc onferences
and hearingso ffer the opportunity for interestgroups tom eetand
exchangetheir pointso fview,a swell as tod evelopc ommons trategies,
the participation of policyactors is presented in Table4 -6.49
Table4 -6:InvolvementofEUorganicfarmingpolicyactors interviewed inthe
surveyinautumn 2004i nthe policyprocess ofd evelopingthe
EuropeanAction PlanforOrganicFoodandFarming
Eventinthe policyprocess
PolicyActor
Vienna
conference1999
Copenhagen
conference2001
EP
hearing
COMM
hearing
Memberof
expert group
IFOAMEU x x x x x
EEB x x x
FOEE x
BIRDLIFE
BEUC x x x x
EuroCoop x x x
EFFAT x
CEJA x
COPA x x x x
DG-AGRI x x x x x
DG-ENVI x x x x
EP-AGRI x x x
ECOSOC x
Representation of
Austria x x x x
Representation of
Denmark x x x
Representation of
Germany x x x
Representation of
France x x
Source: Attendee listsand conference programmesof the events
The organization thatw as mostinvolved in the elaboration of the
European Action Plan for Organic Fooda nd Farmingi sthe IFOAMEU.
Itattended all conferencesa nd participated in the hearings of the
European Parliamentand the Commission. Furthermore, IFOAMEU
was am ember of an expertgroupa ppointed byDG AGRI (DG Agri
2002). The Vienna conference included onlyaf ewof the policyactorso f
interestherewhilethe Copenhagen conference attracted manymore
interestgroups andi nstitutions. Theh earing organized byt he EPd id not
haveah igh importance for the policyactors, andb esides the institutional
bodies involved, onlyt hree interestgroups (IFOAMEU, BEUC,COPA)
tookp artbymaking presentations( Europäisches Parlament-Ausschuss
fürL andwirtschaftu nd ländliche Entwicklung 2003). In contrast,the
hearing organized byt he Commission assembled nearlyall policyactors50
considered in ouri nvestigation. Onlyt he environmental group
BIRDLIFE and EFFATd id notattend this event.
Overall, three categories of actor involvement(measured byt he number
of eventsi nwhich an actor participated) can be distinguished. First,
highlyinvolved actors (IFOAMEU, BEUC,COPA,Austria, Denmark and
Germany)withI FOAMEUa nd the threeEUm embers tates as initiators
of the process. Second, actorswitham ediumi nvolvement(EEB and
EUROCOOP thatbecame engaged in the Action Plan process in 2001a nd
France attending the Commission’sh earing and the expertgroup). Third,
there are actors thatdid notengage much in the process (EFFAT, FOEE,
BIRDLIFE,CEJA). The European institutions (the twoDGsa nd the
European Parliament)h aveo bviouslybeen involved in the process for
institutional reasons whereas the ECOSOCplayed as ubordinater ole.
The reason for the relativelylowinvolvementof the twoe nvironmental
groups is their differentpolicyfocus. Organic farming is notan
interesting policyissuei ni tself, but onlyam eans for achieving other
targets. Therefore, directlobbying for organic farming is limited. CEJA
became interested in organic farming onlyatt he time of the
Commission’sh earing.
We will nowdiscuss whether the diverging degree of actors’involvement
is reflected in the wayt hatt he interestgroups and institutions interacted
withe ach other. The interaction network –showni nFigure 4-2–is
based on statementsthatactors made in the course of the interviewsi n
autumn 2004a nd mirrors their memoryof the contactsm ade. Asa
consequence, the interaction reported here does notreflectt he whole
policyprocess of the elaboration of the Action Plan as policyactors are
notexpected tor emember all contactstheyhavem ade during af iveyear
time span. The networks howsh owactorsworked together during the
lastdecision-making phase where interestgroups became involved, i.e.
the emphasis is placed on the Commission’sh earing. In particular,
contactsthathad possiblybeen established through ac o-membership in
the expertgroupf or the Action Plan seem toh aveb een neglected byt he
interviewees.
Alink in the network is established if an actor indicated contactw ith
anotherr egardless of whether thisc ontactw as confirmed. Itis thusm ore
likelyt hatal inke xistsb etween twoa ctors thathaveb een interviewed
than betweena ni nterviewee and an actor thatw as notconsidered for
interviews. Still, the network is helpfulf or exploring the relational
structure of the policyprocessc onnected withthe European Action Plan
for Organic Food and Farming. Figure 4-2showsc lose contactbetween
actors withathick line and loose contactw ithathin line. Actors not
connected tothe network are so-called isolates.
About 11% of all possiblel inks between actors are established. Only
considering the actuallyinterviewed actorsa nd theiri nterrelations raises
the density of the networkto20%.51
Figure4 -2:Networko fpolicyactors inthe process ofe laboratingthe European
Action PlanforOrganicFoodandFarming
Source: ownd ata( EU-level actorinterviews,a utumn 2004) based on
UCINETresults;drawnwithN etDraw1.0
The onlyactor without as tated involvementin the Action Plan process is
the French representation.H owever, France had been am ember of the
expertw orking groupa sar epresentativeo fthe StandingCommittee for
Organic Farming (SCO). Therefore, the missingc ontacthere mightbe
duetothe factt hatad ifferentrepresentativef rom France responded to
the interviewsthan was working in the expertgroup. Withr egard tothe
interestgroups’involvement,the network is stronglycentralized around
the IFOAMEUGroup 10 who established directlinks withn earlyt wo-
thirds of all actors involved. 11 Also from ag lobal pointof view,this actor
is central tothe network, which is indicated byah igh score for
betweenness centrality.I na ddition, DG AGRI and BEUCplayac entral
role, although theird egree of activity is clearlylower than thatof
IFOAMEU. Environmental organizations such as FOEE,EEB and
especiallyBIRDLIFE do notplayan importantrole in the Action Plan
network,a nd COPAis ap eripherala ctor in this context as well.12
The prominentrole of IFOAMEUi s, oncea gain, welli llustrated whenwe
look atcliques.I nthe network underc onsiderationthere are 15 cliques
and IFOAMEUi samembero fa ll of them. This is as ignthatIFOAMEU
10The network centralization indexbasedo nb etweennesc entrality is 51.09%
11 IFOAM’sn ormalised degree centrality amountsto6 5.4%
12Normalised betweenness centrality forvariousa ctors: IFOAM5 3.8%, DG-AGRI 26.4%, BEUC23.3%,
FOEE 9.0%, EEB 1.6%, BIRDLIFE 0%, COPA0.6%
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is recognized as ap olicyactor withac lear focuso no rganic farming
whichi sa pproachedwhenworking on an organic-farming- specific issue
such as the Action Plan. No cliqueworkedo nthe Action Plan
independentlyfrom IFOAMEU, which showsthatIFOAMEUwas in a
position tob ring itsp ointso fviewintothe discussion. DG AGRI and
BEUCare also members of several cliques –reflecting their central
positioni nthe network.
Theses ubgroups, however,d on otimplyt hatt heir members share the
same opinion on the Action Plan. Interactionm ayw ello ccure ven when
twoa ctors haved istinctv iewso napolicyissue. However, no important
disagreementswerer eported,a nd mostintervieweess tated thatother
policyactors could easilybe approached. OnlyIFOAMEUm entioned
some difficulties in approaching COPA,which can be explainedb yt heir
competitiver elationshipo ver who should be the main representativeo f
organic farmers. COPA’sc laimtob ethe representativeo fa ll farmers in
the EUi sc hallenged byan organization thatclaims tor epresentt he
wholeo fo rganic agriculture. Nevertheless,there is contactbetween
them, and together withthe twoc onsumers’organizations EUROCOOP
and BEUCtheyare co-members in twos ubgroups.T he environmental
organizations seed ifficulties in gettingi nc ontactw ithCOPA,which they
partlyexplain in terms of highlydiverging opinions about the general
direction of CAPd evelopment.P artlyt heyimagine thatopinions vary
widelyamong COPAmembers, whichm ayhinder finding ac lear COPA
position on as pecific issue. And without ac lear position, theysuggest,
COPAmightfind itdifficultt oc ontactother policyactors.
Compared tothe involvementin the differenteventsa ss howni n
Table 4-6,the highlyinvolved member states Austria, Denmark and
Germanyaren otcentrali nthe contactnetwork, and IFOAMEUd id not
seek contactw iththem duringthe lastphase of the Action Plan
elaboration. The roleo fthe consumers’organizationBEUCis confirmed
byt he networka nalysis result,a si sthe ambiguousr oleo fthe
environmental organizations.
Amore general pointof viewon the importance of actors for organic
farmingp olicyis taken when asking the interviewees ton amethe three
mostimportantorganizations or institutions for this policyfield. The
mostfrequentlymentioned actorsa re listed in Table4 -7 and
reputational power is indicated as the share of intervieweesthatnamed
this actor as one of the three mostimportant.
The highestreputational power is thusa ssigned too ne or more specific
member states or, on am ore abstractlevel, “all members tates”,
represented in the (Agricultural) Council of the EUa sthe most
influentialf or organic farming policymakingi nthe pastt wotothree
years. Germanyand Denmark werem entionedm ostoften in this
context.From all interestgroups,the IFOAMEUGroupe njoysthe
highestreputationwhereas COPAis seen as influentialb yless thano ne
third of the actorsi nterviewed (see Annex7.4).T he Commission as a
whole is importantaccordingtoa bout onethird of the interviewees, with
DG AGRI beingo fp articular importance. Other organizationso r
institutions haveb een mentioned onlybyaf ewinterviewees and, in53
consequence, do notenjoyah igh reputational power for organicf arming
policy.O verall, the reputationalp ower of actors reflectstheir
involvementin the elaboration of the Action Plan as measured byt heir
participation in particular events( see Table 4-6).
Table4 -7:Reputationalp owerfororganicfarmingpolicyofselected actors*
Policyactor Reputationalp ower
MemberStates/COUNCIL 59%
IFOAMEU 47%
Commission 35%
COPA 29%
*indicated as the percentage of interviewees naminga na ctor as oneo fthe three mostimportant
Source:o wnd ata( EU-level actorinterviews,a utumn 2004)
After thise xplorationo fthe organic farming policynetwork, the
following sectiond iscusses the links between this networka nd the
general farming policyfield. Herethe lineo fi nquiryis whethera nd in
whatw aygeneralf arming policyactorsh avea ni nterestin organic
farmingp olicy.
Relationshipbetweenthe organicandgeneralfarmingpolicynetwork
The distribution of reputational power roughlydescribesthe structure of
the general farming policyfield. FromT able 4-8 one can see thatCOPA
and the members tates as awholeo rr epresented byt he Council, enjoy
the highestreputation forg eneral farming policy.T he Commission has a
highi nfluence, as well, but the intergovernmental institutioni sm ore
important.France has ap articulari nfluence in the general farming
policyprocess.T his assessmentis basedo no nlyaf ewstatementsm ade,
but nevertheless reflectsH enning’sf indings thatt he mostimportant
actors in the CAPn etworka re the Commission and the large EUm ember
states,a swell as COPA(Henning &W ald 2000).
Table4 -8: Reputationalp owerforgeneralfarmingpolicyofselected actors*
Policyactor Reputationalp ower
MemberStates/COUNCIL 53%
COPA 53%
Commission 35%
France 35%
IFOAMEU 0%
*i ndicated as the percentage of interviewees naminga na ctor as oneo fthe three mostimportant
Source:o wnd ata( EU-level actorinterviews,a utumn 2004)
Comparingthisr eputationalp ower withthe power of actors for organic
farmingp olicy,a sg iven in Table 4-7, showsthatt he European54
institutionsa re powerfulb othi ng eneral farming policyand in the
particular policyfield of organic farming. The mostinfluential interest
groupd iffers for the differentpolicyfields, withI FOAMEUs tanding for
organic farming and COPAfor the general farming policyfield. COPA
does haves omei nfluence on organic farming directly,b ut IFOAMEUi s
assigned ah igher competence in this sub-field of the CAP.
When looking att he ActionP lan networks howni nFigure 4-2once
again,o ne observes thatmostof the actorsd escribed as “important” in
the CAPn etwork of Henning and Wald (2000), such as the farmers’
unions and permanentrepresentationso fthe large EUm embers tates,
are missing. Of the stronglyinvolved supranationali nterestgroups,
EFFATa nd EUROCOOP are partof the ActionP lann etwork. However,
their activity remains as limited as thatof COPA–clearlyt he strongest
interestgroupi nthe CAPn etwork. Then ational representatives thatare
classified as importantbyHenninga nd Wald (2000), France and
Germany,a re also situated in the peripheryof the ActionP lan network.
In contrast,the consumers’interestgroupBEUC,which is fairlycentral
in thatnetwork,i sc lassified as less involved in the CAPn etwork.
EUROCOMM,a sthe fifthi nterestgroupthatis partof boththe CAPa nd
the ActionP lan network, is onlyw eaklyinvolved in bothn etworks. In
contrast,the Commission( DG AGRI)p laysac entralr olei nb oth
networks, thusr eflecting itsi nstitutional role. Even though notall CAP
network actors were interviewed on their activities for the Action Plan for
OrganicFood and Farming, the factt hatnone of the actors interviewed
claimed toh avem uch contactw iththemp ointstotheir lowinvolvemen
t in organic farming policy.
We will nowt urn tothe core organic group( see above) and compare
their activity for the European Action Plan for Organic Food and
Farming withtheir involvementin the midterm reviewof the Agenda
2000(MTR)–for an illustrationo fthe networks see Figure 4-3and
Figure 4-4.55
Figure4 -3:Contacts ofthe coreorganics inthe Action Plann etwork
Source: ownd ata( EU-level actorinterviews,a utumn 2004);based on
UCINETresults;drawnwithN etDraw1.0
Figure4 -4: Contacts ofthe coreorganics inthe MTRnetwork
Source: ownd ata( EU-level actorinterviews,a utumn 2004);based on
UCINETresults;drawnwithN etDraw1.0
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Environmental groups are notconsidered in the CAPn etwork analysiso f
Henning and Wald (2000)s oi tis reasonable toe stimatetheir
involvementin CAPi ssues from their activityu sing the example of the
MTR policyprocess. Aquestion concerningthe actors’involvementin
this policyprocess was included in the questionnaire for the EU-level
face-to-face interviews. In this way,i tw as possibletoc onductan analysis
of the relations thatt he core organic actors established witho ther EU
policyactorsd uringthe discussion of the MTR.T hisM TR networki s
compared tothe extracted network of the core organic groupi nthe
Action Plan network. Thatis, for bothp olicynetworka nalyses onlyt he
answersf rom the IFOAMEU, FOEE,BIRDLIFE and EEB are taken into
consideration.
Table 4-9 presentss elected features of the twon etworks thatarep ictured
in Figure 4-3and Figure 4-4.
Table4 -9:Mainfeaturesofthe networksofcoreorganicactors concerningthe
EuropeanAction PlanforOrganicFoodandFarmingandthe MTR
Networkfeature Action PlanNetwork MTR Network
Size 1820
Density 12.4% 20.5%
Centralization 95.6%4.5%
Source: ownd ata( EU-level actorinterviews,a utumn 2004);based on
UCINETresults
The MTR network is slightlylarger than the Action Plan network. Many
morel inksa re established in the MTR network( i.e. the density is
higher), which showsthatoverall, more contactswerem adeb yt he actors
regarding thisg eneralCAPi ssuethanr egarding organic farming. Except
for IFOAMEU, all actorse stablished more links too therm embers of the
network in the MTR policyprocess than in the Action Plan process. The
moststrikingd ifferenceb etweenthe twon etworks is the differentlevel
of centralization( based on the betweenness centrality). The ActionP lan
network resemblesaf ullycentralized star graph tom ore than 95% and
thusi sh ighlycentralized around one central actor,the IFOAMEU. By
contrast,i nthe MTR network, centrality is distributed among the three
actors EEB,FOEE and BIRDLIFE,which resultsi nal owcentralization
of 4.5%.I nthis network, IFOAMEUd oesn otplayac entral or active
role.All environmental organizations showah igha ctivity level in the
MTR network( indicated byt heir betweennessc entrality), but notin the
Action Plan network.
4.2.3Mainfindingson EUleveln etworks
Froman etworkp erspective, environmental and workers’interestgroups
are morec entrali nthe general farming policynetwork than
organizations dealingwiths pecifica griculturalp olicyissues. Theyare
thusi mportantinformation brokers. All the same, COPAremainsthe57
mostimportantpolicyactor from bothp erspectives, i.e. its
representation in AdvisoryGroups and itsc entrality in the co-
membershipn etwork. The strengtho fthis largestinterestgroupo f
European farmersi s, however, challenged byt he high diversity of
opinionse xisting throughout itsn ational member organizations. By
contrast,the environmental and organic farming organizationsa im at
compensating for their lack of resources through internal and external
networking and make use of their role as expertsi ntheir issues of special
interest.
Att he EUl evel, ag roupo fs upporters of organic farming existswhich is
comprised of organic farming organizations, consumer and
environmental interestgroups and some member states, particularlyAT
and DK. Nevertheless, this supporthas notbeen transformed into
continued political activity for organic farming policy.Even
environmental groups thataref ound among the mostsupportivea ctors
haven oty etbecome engagedi na no rganic farming policynetwork.
The role thatparticular member states played in the official stepso fthe
formulationo fthe European Action Plan for Organic Food and Farming
(i.e. preparatoryconferences and hearings) is notreflected in the
network of contactse stablishedd uring the final period of the Action Plan
development.M ember states do notappear as atargetof interaction by
manyotherp olicyactors; moreover IFOAMEUd id notseek ap olicy
strategyt argeted att he inter-governmental level.
4.3Policyinstruments andstrategiesfororganicfarmingpolicyon
EUlevel
So far, weh avei llustrated the politicals tructures of organic farming at
the EUl evel againstt he background of the generale nvironmentfor
organicf armingp olicy.T his sectiontargetsthe contentof policy,
focussing on howpolicymakersa nd actors in policynetworks accept
specific organic farming policystrategies and instruments. The aim is to
contributetothe developmentof af ramework for the future
implementation of organic farming policyinstrumentsa si nitiated in
another partof the EU-CEE-OFPp rojectand documented byZerger et
al. (2005) and Häringe tal. (2006). Whereas theyformulated problem
areas for the developmentof the organic sector and goals toa ddress
them, weh ere aim atproviding ab roader basis for the assessmentof
differentpolicystrategies and instruments. The analysis is again based
on the web-based surveyamong 123 policyactors from the EUa nd the
national level.T heyhaveb eenc haracterized in chapter 4.1.W ea ddress
the question if there are particular groups of policyactors thatfavour
particularp olicystrategies and look for factors determining the
acceptance or rejection of specific policyinstruments.58
4.3.1 Policyinstruments andstrategiess ubmittedforinterviewees
assessment
Policystrategies andi nstrumentsi ncluded in ours urveyw ere chosen on
the basis of problem areas andp olicygoals. These had been defined ata
workshop withr epresentatives fromEUm ember states andEUl evel
experts( Zerger etal. 2005) building on as eries of nationalworkshops
(Häring2005).I nthisway,the following22 policystrategiesa nd
instrumentswere identified ande valuated byt he respondents. The
explanations given should help tounderstandthe single policystrategies
byhighlightingthe argumentsthatparticipantsm entioned in the course
of the workshops. Notallo fthe 20 priority policygoalsthatresulted
from theEUworkshop could be translated intop olicystrategies or
instruments. Someo fthe instrumentsl isted beloware founded on one of
the goals,b ut haven otbeen mentioned as such byt he participants.
Integrationo fo rganicf arming in all policyfields
Thiss trategydescribes ap rocess of “mainstreaming”organic farming, i.e.
aspectso fo rganic farming should be considered in all policyfields that
mighthavea ni nfluence on the European agricultural sector.
Explicitconsideration of bothc onventional and organic farming in all
future CAPr eforms
All future changes of EUa griculturalp olicyshould be tested explicitlyfor
their effectso nthe organic farming sector. Together withthe policy
strategyon integration of organicf arming in all policyfields (see above)
this strategyhad notbeen included in the listof 20 priority policygoals,
but theybothh ad been mentioned during workshops.
Promotion of organic farminga sam odel for as ustainable rural
development
Withaviewt othe reformo fthe EUr ural developmentprogrammes this
strategy,o nthe one hand,i nvites organics takeholders tob ecomem ore
ambitious. On the otherh and itis addressed att he EUp olicymakers to
promoteo rganic farminga sarole model foras ustainabler ural
development.
Settingq uantitativetargetsf or organic farmings hare
Theworkshop participantss awitas as hortcomingo fthe European
ActionP lanf or Organic Food andFarmingthatitdoes notquantifyany
targetso nthe shareo fo rganicallymanaged farmland or on the market
share of organic produce. For ad evelopmentof the organics ector such a
quantificationo fp olicygoals was seena sh elpful.
Promotion of organic farming as ap referred managementoption in
regions of high nature conservation value( without restricting organic
farming tothesea reas)
This strategybuilds on the scientifice vidence thatorganic farming
contributes toc onservation of biodiversity and constitutes af orm of land
managementt hathighlyrespectsthe natural preconditions of an
environment.59
Encouragementof local and regional food sovereignty
The background of this policystrategyis thatlocal marketsa nd as hort
distributionc hain should be encouragede speciallyfor organic produce.
“Regional”and “organic”are seen as promising partner conceptsf or local
food sovereignty.
Promotion of consumera wareness
This strategyw ould cover informingc onsumers about the integrated
benefitso fo rganicf arming, in terms of healtha nd environmental
aspects, and should focuso np ersonal experiences of consumers with
organic farming.
Enhanced traininga nd advice( technical assistance) for actorsa long the
whole organic food chain
Although notincluded in the listof the 20 priority policygoals enhanced
training and advice could contributetothe developmentof the organic
farming sector. Such as trategyshould herebycover all levels along the
food chain.
Capacity building of organics ector actors targeted on political work
Thiss trategyaddresses the perceived lack of ability of organic farming
actors tof orm as trong political partner in the policymaking process.
Capacity building in the EUCommission targeted on organic farming
This strategybases on the assumptionthatorganic farming is notw ell
enough knowntom embers of the EUCommission.
More research and developmentt argeted on organicf ooda nd farming
issues
Workshop participantsf eltt hatt here was an importantneed forf urther
knowledge, in their opinion, on the effectso fo rganic farming,e .g.o n
healtha nd nature.Furthermore,q uality and consumerb ehaviours hould
be an issueo ff urtherr esearch,a swella sr esearch in supportof policy.
Action Plans for OrganicFarming
Action plans for organicf arming are alreadyin place in variousEuropean
countries and att he EUl evel. Still, wewere interested in an assessmentof
such ar elativelyw ell-knownp olicyinstrument.
Harmonization of inspection and certification in the EU
In the common marketof the EU, harmonized inspectiona nd
certificationa re assumedtob el ikelyt os upportt he developmentof
organic farming.W orkshop participantsf eltt here was potentialtom ake
inspectiona nd certificationm ore effective.
Establishing GMO-freezones
The debateo ni ntroducing GMOsi ntoa griculture has as trong
implicationf or organicf arming practice. The problem of co-existence of
organica nd GMO agriculture has not,s of ar,b eens uccessfullysolved by
legislation.O ne possiblewaycould be tod esignzones where GMO are not
allowed.
Area paymentsf or conversiontoo rganic farming and
Areap aymentsf or maintenanceo fo rganic farming
Bothp aymentsf or conversiontoa nd maintenance of organic farming are
currentlygranted too rganic farmers in mostof the EUc ountries. We60
included them in the listin order too btain an assessmentof howt hese
broadlyimplemented instrumentsa re in factaccepted bypolicy
stakeholders.
Investmentsupportfor production of organic food and
Investmentsupportfor processing of organic food
These twoi nstrumentso ns upporting investmentsa re founded in the
policygoal formulated byw orkshop participantsa s“supportappropriate
technologyand productinnovation in business (in the whole food chain).”
Taxes on conventional farm inputs( e.g. pesticides, mineral fertilisers)
and
Reduced valuea dded tax(VAT) for organic products
Taxpolicyw as rated veryhighlybyt he workshop participants, who found
taxes addressing boththe supplyside (of conventional produce) and the
demand side (for organic buyers) important.
Supportof marketing institutions working witho rganic produce and
Supportof marketcooperation, e.g. producer groups
Marketdevelopmentshould be especiallysupported as partof ar ural
developmentprogramme. Networks of producerss hould be encouraged,
according tothe workshop participants.
Use of organicf ood in public procurement
The idea behind this policyinstrumentis thatatype of land management
thatproduces public goods should be supported bypublici nstitutions.
Organic food should be served in public buildings, schools and canteens.
Establishmentof round tables /discussion forums for organic farming
This policyinstrumentis based on the policygoal toi mproved ialogues
between producersa nd consumers. On the other side, such discussion
forums could haveap oliticald imension and thusc ontributetothe
further developmentof organic farming.
4.3.2Overviewofthe acceptanceofdifferentEUpolicyinstruments and
strategies
Policyinstrumentsa nd strategiesc an be evaluated att wol evels. One is
an assessmentof howfar an instrumentis suitable tos olveap olicy
problem,i no urc ase, whetheri tis suitabletoc ontributetothe further
developmentof organic farming. Thes econdl evel is if ap olicy
instrumentis accepted byt he differentpolicystakeholders. Even if a
policyactor is interested in promoting organic farming, the actor might
notbe in favouro fac ertain type of policyinstruments, e.g. some policy
actorsf avourp ush factors, others prefer tos upportt he demand side. To
giver espondentsthe possibility of ad ifferentiated assessmentof the
policyinstrumentsa nd strategies presented, wee xplicitlyaddressed
suitability and acceptance in separateq uestions. Moreover,the
acceptance of policyinstrumentsthataretargeted att he developmentof
organic farming maybe influenced byt he general attitude of the actors
towards organic farminga sap olicygoal. Att he EU, organic farmingi s
often perceived as am eans toa chieveb roader policygoals, such as61
environmental or rurald evelopmentgoals (European Commission
2000b). This means thatan actor’sc hoice is notonlybetween different
policyinstrumentsthataim atpromoting organic farming, but could also
include other non-organic options. This will affecthowpolicyactors view
the acceptability of differentinstruments.
Oura nalysiss howsthatt he perceived suitability of ap olicyinstrument
correlates atam ediumtoh igh level withi tsa cceptance. Itseems thatt he
interviewees did notclearlydistinguish between the twoq uestions, or
thatt heyaccepted ap olicyinstrumentt he moretheyt houghtit
promoted organic farming. Having said that,i tshould be pointed out
thatCOPAonlymade statementso nthe suitability of policyinstruments,
but noton their acceptance (exceptfor the harmonisation instrument
which itstronglyfavours). This actor thusm adeac leard istinction
between the twoa spectswherebyitstressed that,i nCOPA’sp ointof
view,o rganic farmings hould be promoted, but notatt he expense of the
supportof conventional agriculture.I nthe followingwewill concentrate
on the acceptance of policyinstrumentsa si tcan be assumed thatt he
statementso nthe suitability of instrumentsa re influenced byt he
interviewees’attitudes towards these instruments. Figure 4-5 showsthe
differentrates of acceptance of policyinstrumentss ubmitted toEUl evel
policyactors. Atleast50%o fa ll respondentss lightlyor strongly
favoured all policyinstrumentse xceptfor the setting of quantitative
targetsf or organicf arming.
Figure4 -5: Acceptanceofpolicyinstruments andstrategies
Source:o wnd ata( EU-level web-based survey,spring 2005)
Figure 4-5 sortsthe policyinstrumentsa ccordingtothe proportion of
them which ares tronglyfavoured, ando ne can see thatonlyt wo
instrumentsa re highlyaccepted bymorethan half of the policyactors
interviewed, specifically“ promotiono fc onsumer awareness”and
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“enhanced training and advice along the whole organic food chain”.
Nearlyhalf of the respondentswould stronglyfavourapolicystrategyt o
harmonizei nspection and certificationthroughout Europe, more
research and developmentt argeted on organicf armingi ssues,s upportof
organicf armingm arketingi nstitutions and the use of organicf ood in
publicp rocurement.Att he sametime, notmanyrespondentswould
rejectt hese instruments. When wetotal upthe twof avourable ratings of
policyinstrumentswef ind thatnine out of the 24i nstrumentss uggested
in total would be accepted byatleast75% of the respondentswhereas
theyw ould be rejected byonlyaf ew(taking accountof the undecided
and the “don’t know” votes, the rejection ratei sc learlyless than 25%).
“Harmonization of inspectiona nd certification”is the onlypolicy
instrumentw hich was accepted byallr espondents( tod ifferentdegrees)
exceptone who was undecided. Twoi nstrumentswere onlyw eakly
rejected while achievingah igh level of acceptance: “promotion of
consumer awareness”and “actionp lans”.
The mostfrequentlyrejected policyinstrumentsa nd strategies are:
“quantitativetargetsf or organic farmings hare”(rejected byone-thirdo f
the respondents), “encouragementof regional and local food
sovereignty”,“integration of organic farming in all policyfields”,“taxes
on conventional farmi nputs”,“establishmentof GMO-free zones”,
“reducedV ATf or organic products”and “promotiono fo rganic farming
as ar olem odel fors ustainable rural development”.
In addition tom erelydescribing the acceptance or rejectiono fs pecific
policyinstrumentswewerei nterested in the factors thatdetermine the
policyactors’judgements. However, the large number of policy
instrumentsa nd strategies makes as ystematic analysisd ifficult.
Therefore, af actor analysis was effected thatreduced the 24p olicy
instrumentsa nd strategies tof ivef actors.
Factoranalysis
Byclusteringi nstrumentsa nd strategies together thatshowas imilar
patterno fa cceptance, fivef actorswere identified thatexplain7 8% of the
total varianceo fthe actors’choices.
The firstfactor comprises mostlypolicystrategies whichtargetissues
relatingtothe productiona nd marketingo fo rganic produce. Itexplains
nearly46% of the total variance and containsn inei nstruments.
Factor 1: “Marketdevelopment”
$ Supportof marketcooperation, e.g. producer groups
$ Supportof marketing institutions working witho rganic produce
$ Encouragementof locala nd regional food sovereignty
$ Investmentsupportfor processing of organic food
$ Investmentsupportfor production of organic food
$ Use of organicf ood in publicp rocurement63
$ Promotion of organic farming as ar ole modelf or as ustainable
rural development
$ Promotion of organic farming as preferred land managementin
regions of high nature value( without restrictingo rganic farming
tothese areas)
$ Establishing GMO-free zones
Instrumentsi ncluded in factor 1a im, firstly,a tassisting the initiatives of
producerso fo rganic food bysupportingtheir investmentsa nd
marketinge fforts. Secondly,these strategies affectt he environmentin
which organic productsa re marketed. Strategies thathaveab roader
scope and focuso nthe quality of ar egion in which productiontakes
place (be itaGMO-free zoneo raregion of high nature value) are
perceived similarlybyt he respondents.
Asecond factor comprises fours trategies and explains 14% of the total
variance. The strategies comprised aima timplementing organic farming
issues in differentfields of action, so wel abelled it:
Factor 2:“Mainstreaming organic farming”
$ Explicitconsiderationo fb othc onventional and organic farmingi n
all future CAPr eforms
$ Enhanced training and advice (technical assistance) for actors
along the wholef ood chain
$ Promotion of consumera wareness of organic food and farming
$ Integration of organic farming in all policyfields
The strategies includedh ere call for the integrationo fo rganic farming
issues intoa ll policyprocesses, ask for the promotion of consumer
awareness, and demand action within the organic sector itself.
Ratheri no pposition tothe approacho ff actor 2instruments, the third
factor (explaining for 8% of the total variance) assemblesp olicy
instrumentsthatare specificallyt argeted on organic farming and
furthermore mostlyrelated toi tsr egulatoryframework.
Factor 3:“Traditional supply-side policyinstruments”
$ Area paymentsf or maintenance of organic farming
$ Area paymentsf or conversion too rganic farming
$ Harmonization of inspection and certification in the EU
Bothtypeso fa rea paymentsa re groupedi ntothis factor, bearing in mind
thatt hesei nstrumentsa re nothing newt othe European organic farming
policy.T he need for harmonising the inspection and certification of
organicf arming standards in the EUi sa ccepted in as imilar waybyt he
respondents.
Fivep olicystrategiesa re groupedi ntof actor 4, whiche xplains 6% of the
total variance,a nd theyall haveacertain focuso nk nowledgeo rc apacity
building.64
Factor 4: “Knowledge and Organizational Systems”
$ More research and developmentt argeted on organic food and
farming issues
$ Establishmentof round tables /discussion forums for organic
farming issues
$ Action Plans for Organic farming
$ Capacity building in the EUCommission targeted on organic
farming
$ Capacity building of organic sector actors targeted on political
work
We here find instrumentsthatw ould promoteg aining knowledge and
capacity building (botho fthe organica ctorsa nd the memberso fthe EU
Commission), as well as strategies tof oster information exchange
between variousa ctors.
The lastfactor,e xplaining5 %o fthe total variance, is am ixture of tax
related instrumentsa nd as trategyof settingac lear policyt arget.
Factor 5: “Fiscal policyand targets”
$ Reducedvaluea dded tax(VAT) for organic produce
$ Taxes on conventionali nputs( e.g. pesticides, mineral fertilizers)
$ Setting quantitativetargetsf or organic farming share of land area
All in all, these three instrumentsa re onlylittle accepted bymostof the
respondents. For further analysis, this factor is omitted, as itexplains
only5% of the total variance and comprises quitevaryingi nstruments
thatmake itdifficultt od escribe this factor soundly.
4.3.3Analysisofthe factors influencingthe acceptanceofpolicy
instruments andstrategies
After this general overviewof the assessmentof differentpolicy
instrumentsa nd strategies and their groupingi ntof ivef actors, the
following partw ill analyse the reasonsb ehind the differentlevels of
acceptance of instruments. Variousp ossiblei nfluenceso nthe acceptance
or rejectiono fi nstrumentswillb ec onsidereda nd the line of inquiryw ill
be whetherd ifferentt ypes of actorss howdifferentattitudes towards
policyinstruments.
Assumptionsandhypotheses
We explorethe influence of three independentv ariables. First,wewill
examine if the type of actor (e.g. interestgroup, EUb odyetc.)i na nyw ay
influences the preferences for particular policyinstruments. If any
interestgroupwould expectitsm emberstod irectlyprofitfromacertain
instrument,i tw ill probablystronglyv otef or thatparticular instrument
in question. Second,wetestif the policylevel on which the respondents65
work determines their acceptance of policyinstruments. Asthe
implementation of politics causes expenses on differentlevels in a
political system itis reasonable toa ssume thatactors of the different
levels will haved ifferentpreferences. Ourthirda ssumption is based on
the observation thatEuropean agriculturalp olicyhas changed
significantlysince the early1990s( withthe McSharryreform). In the
course of this redirection of policy,an umber of neworganizations
appeared att he EUl evel tol obbyfortheir cases.T he question behind
this hypothesis is thuswhether the newlyarrived policyactorsh avea
significantlydifferentperception of policyinstrumentsa nd strategies
than the older (traditional) ones.
In additiontothose independentv ariables, characteristicsr elatingtothe
actors’politicalb ehaviouro ro pinionsm ayhavea ni nfluence on their
assessmentof the policyinstrumentss uggested. Afactor thatw ill
probablyinfluencethe positiono fp olicyactorstowardsc ertain
instrumentsi stheir attitude towards organic farming. Earlier in this
chapter wep resented the scale of organic farming supporton which the
respondentsh ad been placed. In thiss ection, wewill analyse whether the
level of supportdeterminesthe acceptance of policyinstrumentsf or
organic farming in general, and whether particular groups of
instruments, i.e. the factors resulting from the factor analysis, are more
favoured than others byactors withvarying attitudes. In addition to
testing this hypothesis wewill look att he influence of twoo ther
characteristicso fthe respondents. Onei stheir knowledge of organic and
generalf armingr egulations. The hypothesish ere is thatactorswho do
notknowmuch about the regulationstargeted atorganic farmingwill be
uncertaino fthe policyinstrumentss uggested, sincetheyareunfamiliar
withthe pointof reference. Their assessmentof specific policystrategies
mightfurthermore be influenced byt heir perception of the impactt hat
the introduction of GMOs intoa gricultural practicewill haveo no rganic
farming. We assume thatactors who do notsee organic farming as
jeopardized byGMOs will nothaveaparticulari nterestin declaring
GMO-free zones, for example. However,a ll these hypotheses remainto
be tested.
Results
Itis mostlynominalvariables describing the characteristics of the
respondentstoo urq uestionnaire thatw ea re interested in. For this
reason, cross tabulationo fthe independentv ariablesa nd the factor
values forthe fourp olicyinstrumentfactorsi dentified was done,
accompaniedb yac hi-squaredtest(basedo nthe likelihood ratio). 13
Actor types
Intervieweesh ad been divided intoe ightdifferentt ypeso fo rganizations
comprising non-governmental organizations lobbying for different
13Usually,the Pearson formula is used toc alculatethe chi-squared value. Aso urs ample is fairlysmall,
expected frequencies were smaller than 5i nm ostof the cells. Therefore, the likelihood ratio was applied
forc alculating the chi-squared value. The formula is: Χ 2 =- 2* Σ f o *l n(fe /f o )66
interests( farmers, consumers, agri-industry,e nvironment), permanent
representationso fthe member states and the EUCommission (see Table
4-1). These types of organization,h owever, onlyhad as ignificant
influence on one groupo fp olicyinstruments: the “Traditionals upply-
side policyinstruments”(factor 3). Asignificantinfluence (p =0.014)
could be proved for the types “European Commission”and “organic
farming organization”,whereas no clearp references could be stated for
other types of organizations. The majority (i.e. ah igher share than could
be expected) of the respondentsf rom the EUCommission showed al ow
acceptance of the factor 3policyinstruments. Bycontrast,a ll organic
farmingo rganizations highlyaccepted them.T he high overall acceptance
of the policyinstrumentaiming atharmonisingi nspection and
certification in the EU, and the opposing opinionso nthe factor
“Traditionals upply-side policyinstruments”areb estexplained byt he
differentattitudes towards paymentstoo rganic farmers. This is
understandable fromthe differentperspectives thatt he EUCommission
as the public bodyand the organic farming organizationa sl obbygroup
for organic farmers take in the policyprocess. Whereasthe former is
interested in spendinga sl ittle moneyas possible (ani ssueo fg reat
concerni nthe currentdebatea bout the EUb udget), the latter hasthe
aim of providingi tsc lientelewitha sm uch financials upportas possible.
In addition,the European Commission is notad emocraticallyelected
bodyandtherefored oes notrelyon voter supportfromo rganic farmers.
Workingl evel
Ahighlysignificantlevel (p =0.006) of cross tabulation showed thatt he
factor “Traditionals upply-side policyinstruments”is influencedb yt he
level on which the respondentswork (national or EUl evel). EUl evel
organizationsa ccepted the suggested policyinstrumentsf ar less than
national level organizations. Nationall evel organizationsi nclude some
farmers’organizationsa nd the national representationso fm ember
states,whereasthe lion’ss hareo fEU-level organizationsc onsistso f
unitsi nthe EUCommission.S ome of the variance in the acceptance of
“Traditional supply-side policyinstruments”is explained byt he negative
voteo fthe Commission as discussed above. Areason for the generally
positivevoteo fn ational level organizations maybe the currentscheme of
financing such payments. The member states havetop ayonlyas hare of
the total paymentsg ranted tof armers via agri-environmental schemes
and so the costso fs uch instrumentsa re limited for them.
Durationo fEUl evel activity
The lastindependentv ariable thatw as tested fori tsi nfluence on the
acceptance of policyinstrumentsi sthe yeari nwhich an organization
becamea ctivea tt he EUl evel.H owever,n os ignificantinfluence was
found. This means that,i ng eneral,youngero rganizations are notmore
open top articular policyinstrumentsthanthe organizationsthathave
been working att he EUl evel foralongtimea nd could therefore have
established links too therp olicyactors thatinfluencetheir political
opinions.67
Attitude towards organic farming
Correlation was calculated between the scorethatt he respondent
achieved on the scale of organic farming policyand the actor’svoteo n
the factors (i.e. the respectivef actor values) of policyinstrumentsa nd
strategies.
The attitude of the respondentsc orrelates on al owt om ediuml evel with
their preferences for an umber of the suggested policyinstruments( see
Table 4-10). No significantcorrelation was observed withthose
instrumentstargeting knowledgea nd organizational systems. However,
there is ac onnection between the scoreo nthe scale of organic farming
supportand the acceptance of instrumentsf or production and market,
mainstreamingo rganic farming and specificallyt argeted instruments.
The more positivea na ctor’sa ttitude towards organic farming is, the
more likelyt he actor is tovotef or one of these groups of policy
instruments.
Table4 -10:Correlation oforganicfarmingsupport scoreandacceptanceof
policyinstruments
Policyinstrument
factor
Market
development
Mainstreaming
organicfarming
Traditionalsupply-
sidepolicy
instruments
Knowledge and
organizational
systems
Spearman-Rho 0.590** 0.421*0.418*-0.028
** significantatal evel of p=0.01* significantatal evel of p=0.05
Source:o wnc alculation
The knowledgeo fo rganic farming or general farming legislation( and
policydocuments) had no significantinfluence on the acceptance of
policyinstruments. Thus, the interviewees form their opinion on policy
instrumentsr egardless of howfamiliar theyarewiththe existing
regulatoryframeworko fo rganic farming.
Bycontrast,the ongoing debateo nthe introductiono fGMO into
agricultural practicep roved toi nfluence the respondents’assessmentof
policyinstruments. Cross tabulationi ndicates thatt he assumed effectof
GMO on organic farming significantlyinfluences the acceptanceo ftwo
instrumentfactors. First,a talevel of p=0.038, actorse xpectinga
positivee ffectof GMO on organic farmings howal owt overylow
acceptance of the factor “Mainstreaming organic farming”.H owever, this
is explained byt he negativec orrelation of the attitude towards GMO in
agriculture withthe scoref or organic farmings upport(r =- 0.67a t
p=0.01).I fa na ctor sees ap ositivee ffectof GMO on organic farming
this actor is morel ikelyt ob ef ound towards the lower end of the scale for
organic farmings upport.Asthis scorec orrelates withthe acceptance of
the “Mainstreaming organic farming”factor, itis notsurprising tof ind
thatt he GMO has as imilare ffect.
Thes amee xplanation could be truef or the connection between the
perceived influence of GMO and the acceptance of the “Market
development” factor.O ne instrumentincluded in this factor is the
establishing of GMO-free zones. So itis interesting toi nvestigate68
whether the acceptance of this particulari nstrumentis determined by
the actor’sa ttitude in the GMO debate. Cross tabulation of these two
variables leads toh ighlysignificantresults( p=0.01).Arelativelyhigher
number of actors thatv iewGMO as having ap ositiveo rn oe ffecton
organic farming are reluctantt oe stablish GMO-free zones, whereas most
of the actors thatsee GMO as havingan egativei nfluence on organic
farming votef or such an instrument.
4.3.4GroupingofEUorganicfarmingpolicyactors andd iscussion ofthe
roleofthe most importantactors
The EUp olicyactors includedi no urs urveyhaves of ar been
characterized byt heir attitude towards organic farming, as indicated by
their positiono nthe scale of organic farmings upport,a nd (partly)b y
their membership in the advisorycommitteeso fDG AGRI.W ewill now
presentanother grouping according tothe respondents’acceptance of
policyinstruments.
Acluster analysis (applyingthe Ward algorithm),taking intoa ccount
onlyt hose33 responses thatstated an opinion on all of the 24p olicy
instrumentsa nd strategies, identifies twoc learlydistinguishable
clusters.T he firstcluster is fairlylarge (25a ctors) and consists
predominantlyof actorss howingah igh indexof organicf armings upport
(located atpositions Aand Bon the scale of organic farming support). By
contrast,a ctorsl ocated atpositions Cand Dare mostlyfound in the
second cluster.I nf act,weh aveam edium, but highlysignificant
correlation of r=0.682between the scoref or organic farmings upport
anda ssignmentt oo ne of the twoc lusters.
Thep reviousp aragraphs havea lreadyshownthatt he indexof organic
farmings upportt hathad been assigned tothe actors in chapter 4.1.2had
some influence on their acceptance of policyinstrumentsa nd strategies.
We will tryhere tovalidatethis indexbyt otallingupthe resultso fthe
policyinstrumentsa nalysis. Therefore, ac alculation is made fore ach
respondentof howmanyinstrumentstheyw ould acceptand towhat
extent.W ethusa rrivea tone valuef or each level of acceptance per
interviewee (see Figure 4-6a nd Figure 4-7).
Onec an observethatt herea re majord ifferences in the number of
instrumentsthatt he policyactorss tronglyaccept.N evertheless, mostof
them statethatt hey“ slightlyfavour”ah ighn umber of instruments. The
exception in thisc ontext is COPA,whicho nlyexpresses strong support
for one policyinstrument,“harmonization of inspectiona nd
certification”,while notmaking ac lears tatementfor the other 23 policy
instruments.69
Figure4 -6:Accepted policyinstruments byactormin. 50%stronglyaccepted
Source: ownd ata( EU-level web-based survey,spring 2005)
Figure4 -7:Accepted policyinstruments byactorless than50%strongly
accepted
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In order toe xplore the assumption thatt he attitude of policyactors
towards organic farming influences their openness top olicyinstruments
designed top romoteo rganic farming, the correlation betweenthe index
of organic farming supportand policyinstrumentsa ccepted att he
differentlevelsi sc alculated.Correlation coefficientsa re showni nT able
4-11.
Table4 -11:Correlation betweenthe organicfarmingsupport indexandthe
summed-upacceptanceofpolicyinstruments thatpromoteorganic
farming
Sumo fi nstruments
thatare... stronglyaccepted slightlyfavoured slightlydisliked stronglydisliked
Spearman-Rho 0.719** 0.113-0.632** -0.690**.
** significantatal evel of p=0.01
Source: ownc alculation
The twom easures correlatea tam ediumtoh igh level, showingthat
those actorsthatw ere classified as “organic farming supporters”(A)a re
likelyt otransformthisp ositivea ttitude intop oliticalb ehaviouri nf avour
of organic farming. Bycontrast,b oththe “hesitant” (C)a nd the “critical”
(D)g roupr emain hesitantw hen itcomes top oliticald ecisionso no rganic
farming. Interestingly,f or the groupo fa ctorsc lassified as “open to
organic farming”(B)n oc lear predictiono ntheir political behaviouri s
possible. Thisg roupc ontainsa ctorsthatfollowapparentlydifferent
strategies towards policyinstrumentsf or organicf arming. Thus, the
scaleo fo rganic farmings upporthas proved itse xplanatorypower for the
assessmentof policyactors.
We wille xplorethe role of individual organizations further. In chapter
4.2w eh avep resented the differentpositions of actors in the network of
agricultural policyatt he EU. From the side of interestgroups the COPA
playsa ni mportantrole,a nd in the studybyHenning and Wald (2000)
this interestgroupwas assigned as imilarlycentral position as the EU
Commission. Itis therefore interesting totake ac loser look att he
attitude of this institution and organization towards organic farming.
All fiveunitso fDG AGRI thatresponded too urs urveycan be found
either in positionBor A.Bycontrast,the twoDG TRADEunitsb elong to
the groupo fa ctorsthatarec ritical too rganic farming. Asr egards the
acceptance of policyinstruments, DG AGRI is split.W hereasthe units
dealingwithh orizontal aspectso fr ural development(AGRI.F)s trongly
favourm ore thanh alfo fthe instrumentss uggested, the otherunits
(International affairs, Economics of agricultural marketsa nd
Agricultural legislation) are much more hesitant(see Figure 4-6a nd
Figure 4-7).AGRI.H (Agriculturall egislation), especially,c laimed to
stronglydislike ar elativelyhigh number of instruments. Withthis
attitude itis close tothe DG TRADEunits, which do notshowstrong
supportform anypolicyinstrumentsthatcould promoteo rganic
farming. Reasons behindthe actors’decision were notasked fori nthe
surveyso thatclear conclusions ared ifficultt od raw.W ec onclude that71
DG AGRI unitsa re in general more open too rganic farmingthanDG
TRADEones, but thatt here is no agreementon political activity to
operationalizethe open attitude within DG AGRI.
The attitude of COPAcould be veryinfluential on the options that
organic farming has att he EU. Asthe mostimportantorganizationo f
European farmers, COPAis hesitantin positioning itself towards organic
farming. Thus, wewere unable toc alculatea nyindexof organic farming
supportfor COPA,a nd this is reflected byt he ambiguousp osition itt akes
when itcomes toa ccepting or rejecting particular policyinstruments.
COPAwould clearlyfavourah armonization of inspection and
certification in the EU, but does notstatei tsp osition towards anyother
policyinstrument.O ne reason for this can be found in the internal
structure of the organization: itis accountable to25m ember
organizations coming from differentnational backgrounds, and must
find ac ompromiseviewacceptabletoa ll these organizations. Therefore,
the Brussels’office mightfind itdifficultt oa ssess the acceptance of
particular policyinstrumentsb yt he wholeo rganization. Their basic
position is that“ organic farming should be promoted, but notatt he
expense of conventional farming”as commented in the questionnaire. In
consequence, COPAdoes notfeel thatinstrumentsthatare veryt argeted
on organic farmers would promoteo rganicf armingi nthe EU. For them,
instrumentss uch as area paymentsf or conversion too rganic farming or
taxes on conventional farm inputswould notbe suitable for the
promotion of organic farming. While agreeing thatsome policystrategies
could promoteo rganic farming in the EUtheyare notlikelyt op ro-
activelysupportt hem. All in all, theyare veryambiguousa bout organic
farming.
4.3.5Mainfindingson the acceptanceofEUorganicfarmingpolicy
instruments andstrategies
Aconsiderable shareo fp olicyactors acceptt he variousp olicy
instrumentsa nd strategiess uggested toc ontributetothe developmentof
organic farming. However,the smalls hare of actors that strongly favour
ap olicyinstrumentreflectsageneralc onservativea ttitude towards the
use of political instrumentstop romoteas pecial type of land
management.
In the case of the groupo fp olicyinstrumentsc omprising traditional
supplyside instruments( area paymentsf or conversion toa nd
maintenance of organic farming) this viewpointcan be differentiated.
The EUCommission disfavours such instruments, witha ne yeo nthe
potential consequences for the EUb udget.Bycontrast,o rganic farming
organizationss tronglyacceptt hem as am eanstos upportt heir clientele’s
interests. For actors acting att he national level these supplysupport
instrumentsa re of interestas theyarec o-financed byt he Commission
and thusc ause less costsf or their national budgets.
The scale of “organic farming support” which weh aved eveloped has
proved itse xplanatorypower, and actorswithah igh score on this scale72
are more likelyt otransform this positivea ttitude intop olitical behaviour
in favouro fo rganicf arming.
Fromthe perspectiveo ff urtherd evelopmentof organic farmingp olicy
wec onclude that,a tt he EUl evel, organizations lobbyingf or organic
farming are confronted withap owerfulg eneralf arming organization
thatis ambiguoustowards organic farming and withEUi nstitutions that
are open too rganic farming, but notv eryactivei nthis policyfield.73
5Conclusions
Integration ofthe three-levelsofpolicyanalysis
Fromap olicyanalysis perspective, policynetworks aream eso-level
concept,a sd istinctfromamacro-level andm icro-level concept(Marsh
1998).M arsha rgues that“ [the mesol evel] haslittle utility asan
explanatory conceptu nless itisintegrated withm acro-level and micro-
level analysis ”(Marsh 1998, p.15). Other authors (as, for example,
Jansen 2003)s ee networks as the link between the microtothe macro
level. In consequence, if wewantt od rawconclusionsf or the future
developmentof organic farming policyfrom the networks analysed, we
havetotake the related macro and micro level intoa ccount.Figure 5-1
illustrates howsuch an integration of the threel evelsc an be
conceptualized.
Figure5 -1:Integration ofmeso-levelp olicynetworkswiththe macroandthe
microl evel
Source: ownrepresentationb ased on Marsh( 1998)
Att he micro level,i ndividual actionsa nd decisions of networka ctors will
havea ni mpacton howan etwork develops. Att he same time,the
networks tructure willo penupo ptions for actors or constraintheir
activities. Att he macro level,a sa lreadydiscussed in chapter 2building
on Thatcher( 1998)a nd Kenis &S chneider( 1991),the broaderp olitical
and economic structure in ac ountryinfluencesthe developmentof policy
networks.Again, these networks are likelyt of eedbackthism acro level
context.Following the integration argumentw ea ssume thatnotonlyt he
meso level networks will influence policyoutcome, but thatboththe
micro and the macro level factorswilla ffectpolicyoutcome.
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In the network analytical context in which wed iscuss organic farming
policy,the micro level signifies the single actors who are member of the
network, bearingi nm ind thatitis irrelevantw hether an actor represents
the stateo rthe privates ector. The interrelations between the actors,
together withthe resultingp ower structure, constitutethe meso-level of
oura nalysis, thatis the network. Anetwork as wep erceivei tis an on-
hierarchical system of interrelationsb etween bothp ublic and private
actors. The macro-level of analysis is the broader context in which
organic farming policy(networks) is embedded.
We will subsequentlyt ake the (meso-level) network perspective, the
macro-level perspectivea nd the micro-level perspectivef or boththe EU
and the national level and discuss whatt heycan contributetothe
understanding of the structure of the policyfieldo fo rganic farming. We
then focuso nthe consequences of this political structure for an organic
farming organization withr egard top ossible strategies for promoting
organic farming development.
Networkp erspective
The extentt owhich an etwork has an influence on policyoutcome
depends on itsl evel of development.T his level of developmentis
indicated byt he number of relevantactors of ap olicyfield involved in
the network and the degree towhich theyare interlinked. Furthermore,
the direction of an etwork’si nfluence will be determined byt he most
powerfula ctor in the network.
TheEUl evel networko fo rganic farmingp olicyis currentlynothighly
developed. The IFOAMEUGroup, the onlyorganicf armingo rganization
att his level, is recognized broadlyas the representativef or organic
farming andthe networki ss tronglycentralized around thisa ctor
although the networka sawhole is stillr elativelyloose. Fromthe
national-level analyseswec an see thatorganic farming policynetworks
are notw elld evelopedwhere this policydomain is comparatively
“young”:l arge and/or dense networks are found in old members tates
and Switzerland whereas in newmember states theyare smaller and
relativelyloose.
Organicf arming organizations are in differentpositions in their
national-level organic farming policynetworks (seeFigure 3-3). The
networks alsod ifferi ntermso fwhethero rn ott he central position is
takenb yone actor alone or shared witho thera ctors. Basedo nthe
centrality of organicf arming organizations and the question whethera
central positioni sm onopolized or not,ar ank ordero fc ountriesi s
identified withr egard tothe potential of organicf arming organizations
toi nfluence policyoutcome.O rganicf arming organizations havethe
highest“ political”potential in CH, CZa nd DKwhere theyhold the
central position in the network as am onopoly–although the Czech
network on the wholei sl essd evelopedthan the othertwo. This groupi s
followed byDE,I T, ATa nd ENGwhere the organic farming organization
shares the network centre witha nothera ctor. The organic farming
organizations’potential for influencing policyoutcomes is limited in HU,
SI, EE and PL, as theydo notplayac entral role in these networks.75
Macro-levelp erspective
From am acro-level perspective, the attitude towards organic farming
and the openness of ap olitical system towards newactorswishingto
engage in ap olicyprocess determinethe opportunities of an organic
farmingp olicynetwork. AlreadyMichelsen etal. (2001) haves tated the
importance of interrelationships between organic and generalf arming
institutions for organic farmingg rowth. Ouri nterestnowlies in the
preconditions for such interrelations. In accordance withZ anoli etal.
(2000)who concluded thatt he degree of acceptance and the general
political climatewill determineo rganic farming’sf uture in Europe, we
explore the attitudes of general farmingo rganizationstowards organic
farming.
Att he EUl evel, policyactorsc ould be grouped according totheir attitude
towards organic farming policyinto“supporters”,“actorso pen too rganic
farming”,“actorsh esitantabout organic farming”and “actorsc ritical
towards organic farming”.T hisa ttitude was reflected in their stated
acceptance of variousp olicyinstrumentstop romoteo rganic farming.
However,n oneo fthe “supporters”playan importantrole in the general
agricultural policynetwork. Moreover, wes howed thatenvironmental
and consumer interestgroups (though positivetowards organic farming)
haveadifferentpolicyfocus, and organicf arming is am inor
considerationf or them. The Commission doesn othaveac ommon
position towards organicf arming. In general, DG AGRI is moreo pen
towards organic farmingwhile DG TRADEis fairlyreluctant.M oreover,
the mostcentrali nterestgroupi nthe general agriculturaln etworka tt he
EUl evel is COPA.T hiso rganization has an ambiguousp osition
regarding organic farming. COPAdid notgivea nyclear statementsa bout
itsp ositiontowards organic farming or about itsp references for
particularp olicyinstruments.
Att he national level, in mostof the countries, organic farming
organizationsh avear elativelyw eak positioni ng enerala gricultural
policy.T heyenjoyah igh reputationf or organic farmingp olicy,b ut not
for generalf armingp olicy.H owever,therei sadifferenceb etweeno ld
andn ewmember states: in mostof the old members tates and CH,
organicf arming organizations are more involved in general farming
policyt han in the newEUm ember states.W ithr egard tothe interestof
general agricultural policyactors in organic farming policy,wec an state
ad ifference between countries withadensea nd those withaloose
organic farming policynetwork. In some of the dense-networkc ountries
(ATa nd DK), differentblocks of opinion towards organic farming are
observed, but interaction between the twob locks is low.T here is some
interestin organic farming, but this interestis limited in the case of the
“non-organic”policyactors. In countries withal oose network( i.e. EE,
HU, PL and SI) no opinionb locks are identified, so wec an conclude that
here wef ind as ituation of indifferencetowards organic farming.
In addition, the differentnationalp olitical and socio-economic
conditions determine the developmentof an organic farming policy
network. Although this aspectw as notexploredi nd etail,wewills umup
some general points. In the newEUm ember states, important
institutional changestook place in the course of the transitionf rom a76
socialistt oac apitalistsystem and the EUa ccession process. Such a
major change, in general, opens upo pportunities for newactors (e.g.
organic farming policyactors) toe nter the political debate( Kingdon
1984). Moreover, in all newEUm ember states, the adoptiono fthe EU
acquiscommunautaire, and alongwiththis, of Regulation( EEC)N o
1257/99 on rural development(including agri-environmental
programmes) layt he basis for (financial) supportof organic farming.
Moreover, stateb odies became engaged in organic farming policy
(Moschitz etal. 2004). To summarize, the changing political
environmentin the newEUm ember states could potentiallybe an
opportunity for organic farming policyactors tob ecome engagedi n
policymaking.
Micro-levelp erspective
The microl evel of EUo rganic farmingp olicymeans, firstand foremost,
IFOAMEU. Fromo ura nalysis wec an conclude thatitis in ad elicate
situation.O nthe one hand, itsc ompetencies regarding organic farming
regulationa re broadlyaccepted byall EUa griculturalp olicyactorsa nd it
is represented in the official political structure.O ther interestgroups
delegatethe responsibility for organicf armingi ssues toI FOAMEU. Yet
ithas limited resources andthereforethere is ad anger thatitmaynotbe
able tod eliver the expected advocacyfor organic farming. On the other
hand, itw ould be desirable as an organic farminga dvocatetob ee ngaged
in the general farming policydebate. But here too, the options of IFOAM
EUa re limited. Besides the lack of resources alreadystated, the organic
farming interestgrouph as difficulties in creatinga lliances witho ther
actors. Although supporting organic farmingi ng eneral, consumer and
environmental interestgroups havead ifferentpolicyfocusa nd
sometimes also divergentpolitical opinionso na gricultural policy.T he
ambiguousr ole of COPAtowards organic farmingi nhibitsc loser
collaborationwithI FOAMEU. To conclude, withr egard toaf urther
developmentof EUo rganic farming policy,I FOAMEUs hould continue
tob uild upn etwork structures( in particular withviewt og eneral
agricultural policyissues)b ut is constrainedb ylimited resources.
Anotherc hallenge for EUo rganic farming policyidentifiedb your
research is the role of the Commission. Although an Action Plan for
Organic Food and Farming exists, and thusaposition towards organic
farming is formulated (Lampkin &S tolze2006), the Commission is far
from holding ac ommon view.I fo rganicf arming policyw as tob ef urther
developed,the Commission would needtounifyitsp osition amonga ll
unitso fDG AGRI.M oreover, this position concerned witho rganic
farmings hould be adopted byother Directorates-General.
For all old EUm ember states and Switzerland, Moschitz etal. (2004)
observed ap olitical recognitiono fo rganic farming. Organic farming
organizations area tleastt os omee xtentpoliticallyactive. Such
recognitioni sl acking in mostof the newEUm ember states. Onlyin CZ
was the organic farming organizationa bletotakethe opportunity of
policychange tob ecomean ewnetwork actor and tog ain political
recognition.77
Att he micro-level,wec an conclude thatan asymmetricd istributiono f
reputation and power in twor elated policydomainsc hallenges an
organization’so pportunity toi nfluence ap olicyprocess in which both
domains playan importantrole. Furthermore, itis essential for the
actors involved toh avec lear positions in order top articipatea ctivelyin a
policyprocess.Finally,ap re-requisitef or anyparticipationi nthe policy
process is political recognitiona nd mutual respectof an actor –af inding
thatconfirms the conclusionso fM ichelsen etal. (2001).
Strategiesforpolicyactors
The politicals ituation of organic farming in Europe varies att he macro
level,a nd organic farming organizations faced ifferentchallenges. The
further developmentof organic farmingp olicyis restricted in general by
the limited interestof general farmingp olicyactors and the lack of
resources of organic farming organizations. However, oura nalysis
showed thatorganic farming policyactors haved iffering potential to
overcome thisl imitation.
Network analysis offers as tructured approach for simultaneously
analysing avariety of aspectswhich influence an actor’so ptions for
engaging in ap olicyprocess.I np articular,the network measures of size,
density and betweenness centrality cans upportself-assessmentand help
an actor tog ain ad ifferentiated insightintothe framework conditions for
itsp olitical work. On this basis, ap olicyactor can drawu pas trategyand
seek suitable partners in ap olicyprocess. Three aspectsa re identified
which are relevantin this context:
i) the centrality of the potential partner, i.e. itsr eputation and
positioni nthe network
ii)the potential partner’si nterestin the policyissueunder debate
iii) the extentt owhich this actor has formulated ac lear position
towards the issue
Firstly,a na ctor will be all the more interested in ap otential coalition
partner, the more powerfulthe partner is in the policynetwork in
question. This power is determined, on the one hand, byitsr ole as an
information broker (betweenness centrality). If an actor lies in or close to
the centre of an etwork, itcan easilyreach ah igh number of other actors.
Thus, lobbyings uch ac entrala ctor has awidespread effectbeyond the
primaryt arget.O nthe other side, the impactan actor has on ap olicyis
also affected byitsr eputation. The more other actors believethatan
actor is of particular importance in ap olicyfield, the more this actor can
makei tsp ointhearda nd thush as the power toi nfluence the policy
outcome. From this pointof view,f or al obbyinga ctor itis reasonable to
seek toi nfluence the mostpowerfula ctor(s) in an etworki no rder to
achievethe largestpossible effectw ithl imited resources.
Apartfrom the structure of relations between actors (i.e. the network),
the quality of these interrelations is of particulari nterest.M ichelsen et
al. (2001) stipulated “creativec onflict” as an ecessarybasis of
institutional interrelationships in order tof urtherthe developmentof
organic farming. Such ac reativec onflictis defined as an78
interrelationship between organic and general agriculture institutions
builton mutual respect.Contactbetween them is continuous, withc o-
operationo ns ome issues and competitiono no thers.Botho rganic and
general agriculture institutionsh aveaj ointperception of an umber of
common interests. Thistype of interrelationshipb etween the twop olicy
fields presupposesthe existence of (a) distinctorganic farming
organization(s). Onlyw hen these conditions are given,M ichelsen etal.
(2001) argue, can organic farming persistw iththe agenda of the societal
domainso fa griculture while the integrity of organic farming is
maintained. From this pointof view,c reativec onflictw ithg eneral
farming institutionsi sas trategyt hatorganic farming organizations
should followif theyare interested in promoting organic farming.
Finally,afruitfuld ebatei so nlypossiblei fp ositions arec lear. If theyare
not,ac reativee xchange of opinions will notbe possible.
Transferred too urf ocuso fa nalysis–t he opportunities of organic
farming organizations–t his means that,a tt he EUl evel, itcould be
interesting for an organization such as IFOAMEUtog etand stayin close
contactw iththe interestgroupthatis the mostcentral policyactor in
agriculturalp olicy:COPA.Bycontrast,i nanumber of EUm ember
states, statei nstitutions playac entralr ole and thusf orm an interesting
lobbying target.O thern etwork actors,e .g. environmental organizations,
do notplayac entral role in the organic farming policynetwork, neither
att he EUl evel nor att he national levels. Hence, from the pointof viewof
political power, theyare notfirst-choice coalition partners for an organic
farming organization aiminga tinfluencing organicf arming policy.
Withr egard tothe call for ac reativec onflict,a ctors are needed who have
an interestin the policyissuea tstake. Referringtoo urEUl evel example,
COPAis an interesting coalition partnerf rom this perspective. Although
this is notitsm ain field of interest,COPAhas ah igh level of knowledge
on organic farmingl egislation and can be considered as interested in the
topic, atleastt os ome extent.T he interestof statei nstitutions and
general farmingo rganizationsi sr elativelylowin an umber of newEU
members tates thatw ere analysed, excluding CZ. Often,an ational
organic farming regulation has onlybeen implemented in order tom eet
the requirementso fEUa ccession. In consequence,s tatea ctors appear a
difficultlobbying targetin these countries. Asr egards environmental
organizations, their interestin organic farming policydepends on the
topicality of the issue. To them, itis as ub-issueo fa griculture which itself
is onlyone of manyissues theyare concerned with. Hence, continuous
lobbying withthese organizations will be difficult.
Lastly,wea rgued thataf ruitfuld ebatei so nlypossiblei fp ositions are
clear. In oure xample att he EUl evel,i tis att his pointt hatac hallenge
arises for the organic farming organization. COPAwas unable tod efine a
clear position towards organic farming and this makes itdifficultt oe nter
in af ruitfulp olitical discussion. Asimilar situation is reported for the
newEUm ember statei nstitutions where al ack of interestin organic
farming is combined withunclear positions on this policyissue.
Conversely,e nvironmental organizations stated clear opinions on
organic farming policyissues atboththe EUa nd the national level. This79
makes itpossiblef or an organic farming organization toe nter intoa
debatewiththem about the furtherd evelopmentof organic farming.
We can conclude that,a lthough oura nalysis has ad ifferentfocus, there
are some parallels tothe Michelsene tal. (2001) ‘patho fs uccessful
organic farming growth’.O urp erspectivei sthe effectpoliticals tructures
havef or the potentialo fa ctorstoi nfluence organic farmingp olicyw hile
Michelsen etal. (2001) focuses on the growtha nd disseminationo f
organic farmingi nEurope. However, from bothviewpointsi tis argued
thatitis necessaryt of ormulatec lear positionso nthe issuea nd seek
political recognitiono fthe organic sector.O nlyon thisb asis can a
creativec onflictbetween policyactorsd evelop,which is necessaryin
order tob uildupe ffectiven etworks andp romoteo rganic farming in the
long run.80
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7Annex
7.1 Questionnaire:NetworkAnalysisatt he nationall evel
1.1I nyouro pinion,which factors( e.g. institutionalc hanges,s tate
initiatives,i nitiatives of the privates ector,...) would stimulatethe
developmentof an organicf arming policyin yourc ountry?
1.2In youro pinion, which factors (e.g. institutionalc hanges,s tate
initiatives,i nitiatives of the privates ector,...) would stimulatethe
developmentof an organicf arming policyin the EU?
1.3Howw ould youclassifyy ouro rganization/institution?
2.1 In youro pinion, which of the organizations and institutions listed
here havea ni mportantinfluence on general agriculturalp olicyin your
country?
2.2Are there anyfurthero rganizations or institutions youfindi mportant
in thisc ontext?
2.3Whicho fthe designated actors would youclaim the 1st,2nd, 3rd, 4th
and5 thm ostimportantfor general agricultural policyin yourc ountry?
2.4 In youro pinion,which of the organizations and institutions listed
hereh avea ni mportantinfluence on organic farmingp olicyin your
country?
2.5 Are therea nyfurther organizationso ri nstitutions youfindi mportant
in this context?
2.6 Which of the designated actorswould youclaim the 1st,2nd, 3rd, 4th
and 5thm ostimportantfor organic farming policyin yourc ountry?
2.7 Could youplease indicatethose actorso no url istw ithwhom youare
working together or withwhom youstayin regularc ontactin order to
exchange yourviewso no rganic farming policy?I tdoes notnecessarily
havetob ea na ctor withwhom yousharethe sameo pinions.
2.8 Are therea ctorswithwhom youw ould like towork together more
closelyw ithr egardtoo rganic farming policy?I fyes, who are theyand
whatarethe obstacles tod oings o?
2.9 For policymaking itis importantt ob ewell informed. Using the list
of organizations and institutions, could youindicatethose actors to
whom youregularlygivei nformationo no rganic farmingp olicyissues?
2.10From which of the actorsl isted do youregularlyreceivei nformation
on organicf arming policyissues?
2.11Could yout ell uswhich of the actorsl isted sharem ainlyt he same
position as youro rganization/institution towards the main issues
concerning the developmentof organic farming?
2.12Withwhich actorsd oyoumostlydisagree on main decisions
regarding the developmentof organic farming?86
3.1 Howfar do EU-level decisions on agriculturalp olicydetermine your
organization’sf ields of activity?
3.2Does youro rganization regularlyengage in directlobbyinga t
European institutions?
3.3Does youro rganization havea ccess toi tso wno ffice in Brussels?
3.4 a. Are there anyEuropean umbrella organization(s) thaty our
organization is member of? Doyoufeel well represented byit(them)
withr egard too rganic farming policy?
3.5 Which European institutionsthatare importantfor agricultural
policydo youcontactregularly?
3.6 Which organizationsa tt he EUl evel do yousee as the mostrelevant
for general agricultural policyin Europe?
3.7 Which organizationsa tt he EUl evel do yousee as the mostrelevant
for the developmentof organic farming policyin Europe?87
7.2OrganicfarmingpolicynetworksinelevenEuropeancountries
Keyt othe figuresdepictingthe countries networks
1. The shape of the nodei llustrates the actor type:
2.T he colouro fthe actor nodei ndicates itsc lassification byt he experts:
" black: predominantlyorganic farming oriented
# white: predominantlymainstream farmingo riented
" grey:b alanced or undefined
3.Ana rrowgoes from actor atoa ctor bi fa ctor as tates thatitinteracts
witha ctor b. Itis reversedi fa ctor ba lso states thatitinteractswitha ctor
a:
4. Actorsa re arranged on concentricc ircles accordingtotheir scoreo f
betweenness centrality.T he higher an actor’sb etweenness centrality,the
closer itis tothe centre of the network.
oror:privateorganisation
oror:statei nstitution
oror:otherorganisation orinstitution (oftenp arastatal)
actorainteracts withactorb88
Figure7-1:OrganicfarmingpolicynetworkinAustria
Source: ownd ata( nationala ctorinterviews,winter2 003/04);created
withV isone
Abbreviations
4PfotenOrganization fort he prevention ofcruelty toanimals
ABGA ustriancontrol bodyfororganicproduce
AGENAssociation fort he promotion ofGMO-free food
AGESAustrianagencyforhealthandfoodsecurity
AGRIVETAgriculturalandveterinary auditingandc ertification agency
AMAA ustrianagriculturalm arketingagency
ARGE Organicfarmingorganization
BBOEA ustrianfarmers union
BMGF Ministry forgenerationsandwomen
BMLFUWMinistry foragriculture,forestry,environmentandwater
BOKUU niversity ofNaturalResourcesandAppliedLife Sciences
BWKAustrianFederalEconomicChamber
DEMETERAustrianbranchofthe demeterorganization
ERNTEOrganicfarmingorganization
FPOEA ustrianLiberalParty
GLOB2000 Environmentalo rganization (Global2000)
GRUENEA ustrianGreenParty
LBIOrganicfarmingresearchi nstitute
LEHExpert on foodretailers inAustria
OEBVAssociation ofmountainfarmers
OEIGOrganicfarmingorganization
OEVPAustrianConservativeParty
PRAEKOP residentsconferenceofthe Austrianchambers ofagriculture
RWAA ustrianAssociation ofcooperatives
SPOEA ustrianSocialDemocraticParty
VNOEA ustriano rganicretailers association89
Table7-1:DifferentmeasuresofpolicynetworksinAustria
reputationalp ower
fororganicfarming
policy*
reputationalp ower
forgeneralfarming
policy*
betweenness
centrality
statei nstitutions
BMGF 19% 8% 2%
BMLFUW 100%1 00%25%
BWK 4% 8% 0%
p olitical p arties
FPOE 0% 4% 2%
GRUENE 15%4%2%
OEVP 4% 19% 1%
SPOE 0%0%0%
p arastatalinstitutions
AGES 4%8%5%
AMA 19% 65% 3%
PRAEKO 58%9 2%5%
or g anicfarmin g or g anizations
ARGEBLB 85%8%3%
DEMETER 4% 0% 1%
ERNTE 88%8%1 9%
OEIG 65% 4% 8%
g eneralfarmin g or g anizations
BBOE 23% 92% 4%
environmentalo r g anizations
4PFOTEN 0% 0% 0%
GLOB2000 0%4%1 %
others
ABG 12%0%2%
AGEN 0% 4% 2%
AGRIVET 0%0%0%
BOKU 4% 8% 1%
LBI 12%0%4%
LEH 42% 23% 0%
OEBV 0%0%0%
RWA 4% 19% 0%
VNOE 0%0%0%
*i ndicated as the percentage of interviewees naming the specific actor as oneo fthe fivem ostimportant
actors for organic /general farming policy
Source: ownd ata( national actorinterviews,winter2 003/04)90
Figure7-2:Organicfarmingpolicynetworkinthe CzechRepublic
Source: ownd ata( nationala ctorinterviews,winter2 003/04);created
withV isone
Abbreviations
AKCZRCzechAgrarianChamber
ASZAssociation ofprivatef armers
COLIFE CzechbranchofCountryLifeLtd.awholef oodretailer
EPOS Czechassociation ofadvisors fororganicfarming
GREMAOrganicproducts marketingcompany
KEZCzechi nspection bodyfororganicfarming
LIBERAOrganicfarmingorganization
MZECZRM inistry ofAgricultureofthe CzechRepublic
MZPCZRM inistry ofEnvironmentofthe CzechRepublic
PKCZRFederation off oodandd rink industries
PROBIOO rganicfarmingorganization
VUZEPR ResearchInstituteofAgriculturalEconomicsinPrague
ZSCZRCzechf armers union91
Table7-2:Differentmeasuresofpolicynetworksinthe CzechRepublic
reputationalp ower
fororganicfarming
policy*
reputationalp ower
forgeneralfarming
policy*
betweenness
centrality
statei nstitutions
MZECZR 100% 100% 4%
MZPCZR 85%1 5%0%
organicfarmingorganizations
PROBIO 100%0%1 5%
LIBERA 8% 0% 0%
generalfarmingorganizations
AKCZR 0% 100% 0%
ZSCZR 0%62%0%
others
ASZ 0%46%0%
COLIFE 8% 0% 0%
EPOS 8%0%0%
GREMA 0% 0% 1%
KEZ 92%0%6%
PKCZR 0% 38% 0%
VUZEPR 38%69% 0%
*i ndicated as the percentage of interviewees naming the specific actor as oneo fthe fivem ostimportant
actors for organic /general farming policy
Source: ownd ata( national actorinterviews,winter2 003/04)92
Figure7-3:OrganicfarmingpolicynetworkinDenmark
Source: ownd ata( national actorinterviews,winter2 003/04);created
withV isone
Abbreviations
ARLAA rlaFoodsLtd.
COOPCoopDenmark
DARCOFD anishResearchCentref orOrganicFarming
DFFE Directoratef orFood, FisheriesandAgribusiness undert he Ministry ofFood, Agricultureand
Fisheries
DLDanishf armersu nion
DLODanishf armers union,organicsection
DNDanishsociety fornatureconservation
DODanishorganicfarmingorganization
FBJSociety forbiodynamicagriculture
FBRDanishConsumerCouncil
FOFF oundation fororganicfarming
FUDStandingCommittee on Food, AgricultureandFisheriesinthe DanishParliament
FVMDD anishMinistry ofFood, FisheriesandAgribusiness; departmentincharge oforganicfarming
HOFHouseofOrganicFarming
LBRP DanishAgriculturalCouncil
LRDanishagriculturaladvisory service;organicsection
OFC OrganicFoodCouncil
PDIRDanishPlantDirectorateundert he Ministry ofFood, AgricultureandFisheries
SIDG eneralworkers union93
Table7-3:DifferentmeasuresofpolicynetworksinDenmark
reputationalp ower
fororganicfarming
policy*
reputationalp ower
forgeneralfarming
policy*
betweenness
centrality
statei nstitutions
OFC 53% 0% 8%
DFFE 35%6%7%
FUD 82% 82% 1%
FVMD 47%53%0%
FVM 1 76% 100% -
PDIR 6%6%1 %
organicfarmingorganizations
DLO 12%0%1 %
DO 88% 6% 11%
HOF 35%1 2%1 6%
generalfarmingorganizations
DL 35%65%1 %
environmentalo rganizations
DN 0%1 2%0%
retailers andtheirorganizations
ARLA 12%1 2%0%
COOP 6% 6% 0%
LR 0%0%1 %
others
DARCOF 12%0%0%
FBJ 0% 0% 0%
FBR 24%24%5%
FOF 0% 6% 0%
LBRP 35%88%4%
SID 0% 0% 0%
*i ndicated as the percentage of interviewees naming the specific actor as oneo fthe fivem ostimportant
actors for organic /general farming policy
1n otinterviewed, therefore no betweenness scorec an be calculated
Source: ownd ata( nationala ctorinterviews,winter2 003/04)94
Figure7-4: OrganicfarmingpolicynetworkinEngland
Source: ownd ata( national actorinterviews,winter2 003/04);created
withV isone
Abbreviations
BRCB ritishRetailConsortium
CA CountrysideAgency
CITYUCity University London,DepartmentofHealthManagementandFoodPolicy
CLAC ountry LandandBusiness Association
CURRYCPolicycommission on the futureoff utureoff armingandfood
DEFRAD epartmentforEnvironment,FoodandRuralAffairs
EA EnvironmentAgency
ECOS Eco-StopesConsultancy
EFRCE lm FarmResearchCentre
ENATUREE nglishNature
FDF FoodandDrink Federation
NATRUST NationalTrust House
NFUN ationalfarmers union
RSPBThe RoyalSociety fort he Protection ofBirds
SAOrganicfarmingorganization
SAINS JSainsbury plc.
SDC SustainableDevelopmentCommission
SUSTAINAlliancef orBetterFoodandFarming
UKROFSU nitedKingdom RegisterofOrganicFoodStandards
UWAUniversity ofWales,InstituteofRuralSciences95
Table7-4: DifferentmeasuresofpolicynetworksinEngland
reputationalp ower
fororganicfarming
policy*
reputationalp ower
forgeneralfarming
policy*
betweenness
centrality
statei nstitutions
CURRYC 20% 65% 3%
CA 0%5%1 %
DEFRA 95% 95% 30%
ENATURE 15%5%1 %
EA 0% 15% 0%
SDC 0%5%2%
organicfarmingorganizations
SA 95%5%1 2%
generalfarmingorganizations
CLA 5%1 5%0%
NFU 25% 70% 5%
environmentalo rganizations
NATRUST 0% 5% 0%
RSPB 25%30%2%
retailers andretailo rganizations
BRC 10%1 5%1 %
FDF 0% 0% 1%
SAINS 15%0%1 %
others
CITYU 0%0%0%
ESC 0% 0% 1%
EFRC 20%0%4%
SUSTAIN 25% 0% 1%
UKROFS 25%0%1 %
UWA 15% 0% 0%
*i ndicated as the percentage of interviewees naming the specific actor as oneo fthe fivem ostimportant
actors for organic /generalf arming policy
Source: ownd ata( nationala ctorinterviews,winter2 003/04)96
Figure7-5: OrganicfarmingpolicynetworkinEstonia
Source: ownd ata( nationala ctorinterviews,winter2 003/04);created
withV isone
Abbreviations
EALEstonianHorticulturalAssociation
EBUEE stonianBiodynamicAssociation
ELFE stonianFundforNature
ELVSEstonianbeefbreedersassociation
EMLEstoniano rganicmeatassociation
EMSAE stoniano rganicfarmingf oundation
EOUEE stoniano rnithologicalsociety
EPKK Estonianchamberofagricultureandc ommerce
EPMUEA griculturalUniversity
EPTKEstonianagriculturalp roducerscentralunion
ERLEstonianGreenMovement
ETKL Estonianfarmers union
OETKCentref orEcologicalEngineering
PM Ministry ofAgriculture
TTIPlantproduction directorate
VTAVeterinary andfoodb oard97
Table7-5: DifferentmeasuresofpolicynetworksinEstonia
reputationalp ower
fororganicfarming
policy*
reputationalp ower
forgeneralfarming
policy*
betweenness
centrality
statei nstitutions
PM 93% 93% 0%
TTI 47%20%6%
VTA 0% 27% 0%
EAL 7%0%0%
organicfarmingorganizations
EBUE 47%0%0%
EMSA 87% 0% 0%
generalfarmingorganizations
EPTK 7% 67% 0%
ETKL 7%73%0%
ELVS 7% 0% 0%
environmentalo rganizations
ELF 33% 7% 0%
ERL 13%0%0%
others
EML 0%0%2%
EOUE 7% 0% 0%
EPKK 13%73%0%
EPMUE 0% 7% 0%
OETK 80%0%0%
*i ndicated as the percentage of interviewees naming the specific actor as oneo fthe fivem ostimportant
actors for organic /general farming policy
Source: ownd ata( national actorinterviews,winter2 003/04)98
Figure7-6:OrganicfarmingpolicynetworkinGermany
Source: ownd ata( nationala ctorinterviews,winter2 003/04);created
withV isone
Abbreviations
ABLGermanSmall farmersorganization
AOELAssociation oforganicfoodproducers
BFNGermanFederalAgencyforNatureConservation
BIOLANDOrganicfarmingorganization
BIOPARKOrganicfarmingorganization
BLL GermanFederation ofFoodLawandFoodScience
BMVELOEG ermanFederalm inistry ofconsumerprotection,foodandagriculture;departmentorganicagriculture
BOELWAssociation ofthe organicfoodindustry
BUNDG ermanbranchofFriendsofthe Earth
CDUCSU Faction ofconservativepartiesinthe GermanBundestag
DBVGermanfarmers union
FALFederalAgriculturalResearchCentre
FIBLResearchInstituteofOrganicAgriculture
GREENP GermanbranchofGreenpeace
GRUENEG ermanGreenParty
IFOAMGermanbranchofthe InternationalFederation ofOrganicAgriculturalMovements
NABUGermanbranchofBirdlife International
NATLANDOrganicfarmingorganization
SOELFoundation fororganicfarming
SPDG ermanSocialDemocraticParty
VZBVFederation ofconsumerorganizations
WISSBEIScientificadvisory councilforagriculture,sustainablelanduseandd evelopmentofruralareas
ZSLFoundation foragriculturalfuture99
Table7-6:DifferentmeasuresofpolicynetworksinGermany
reputationalp ower
fororganicfarming
policy*
reputationalp ower
forgeneralfarming
policy*
betweenness
centrality
statei nstitutions
BMVEL 1 93% 96% -
BMVELOE 14%0%20%
BFN 4% 4% 2%
LAENDER 1 46%64%-
politicalp arties
CDU-CSU 25%54%0%
GRUENE 64% 75% 5%
SPD 32%64%5%
organicfarmingorganizations
BIOLAND 54%1 1% 18%
BIOPARK 11% 0% 0%
BOELW 82%4%23%
IFOAM 4% 0% 0%
NATLAND 11% 4%0%
SOEL 0% 0% 0%
environmentalo rganizations
BUND 32% 36% 2%
GREENPEACE 25%25%1 %
NABU 32% 29% 3%
generalfarmingorganizations
DBV 36% 100% 9%
others
ABL 7% 14% 1%
AOEL 4%0%1 %
BLL 4% 14% 0%
FAL 4%4%0%
FIBL 4% 0% 3%
VZBV 14%1 8%6%
WISSBEI 0% 0% 0%
ZSL 0%0%5%
*i ndicated as the percentage of interviewees naming the specific actor as oneo fthe fivem ostimportant
actors foro rganic /generalf arming policy
1 notinterviewed,therefore no betweenness score can be calculated
Source: ownd ata( national actorinterviews,winter2 003/04)100
Figure7-7:OrganicfarmingpolicynetworkinHungary
Source: ownd ata( nationala ctorinterviews,winter2 003/04);created
withV isone
Abbreviations
AMCHungarianCollectiveAgriculturalMarketingCentreatt he Ministry ofAgricultureandRegional
Development
BIOKERHungariano rganictradersassociation
BIOKONTR Organicc ontrol company
BIOKULTO rganicumbrellaorganization
BKMAGKAMAgriculturalChamberfort he Bacs-Kiskuncounty
DABIOKULTR egionalbranchofBIOKULTURA:southg reatplains
EMBIOKULTR egionalbranchofBIOKULTURA:northHungary
FVMAGRM inistry ofAgricultureandRuralDevelopment,DepartmentforAgri-Environment
FVMVIDF Ministry ofAgricultureandRuralDevelopment,DepartmentforRuralDevelopment
KDBIOKULTR egionalbranchofBIOKULTURA:middleTransdanubia
KISHANT KishantosRuralDevelopmentCentre
MAGGOSZHungarianfarmers union
MOSZOrganicfarmingorganization
MSZOSZHungarianfarmers union
OKOGARO rganicinspection andc ertifyingbody
OKOTARS HungarianEnvironmentalPartnershipFoundation
OKTATOKUT OrganicFarmingTraining,ResearchandAdvisory Association101
Table7-7:DifferentmeasuresofpolicynetworksinHungary
reputationalp ower
fororganicfarming
policy*
reputationalp ower
forgeneralfarming
policy*
betweenness
centrality
statei nstitutions
AMC 12% 0% 3%
BKMAGKAM 0%0%0%
FVM 1 59% 82% -
FVMAGR 41% 12%8%
FVMVIDF 6% 0% 0%
organicfarmingorganizations
BIOKULT 82% 12% 0%
DABIOKULT 12%0%3%
EMBIOKULT 12% 0% 0%
KDBIOKULT 12%0%1 %
MOOSZ 29% 0% 0%
generalfarmingorganizations
MAGGOSZ 6% 53% 1%
MSZOSZ 6%59% 3%
environmentalo rganizations
OKOTARS 6%0%0%
others
BIOKER 6%0%0%
BIOKONTR 59% 6% 5%
KISHANT 12%0%0%
OKOGAR 12% 0% 0%
OKTATOKUT 0%0%0%
*i ndicated as the percentage of interviewees naming the specific actor as oneo fthe fivem ostimportant
actors for organic /general farming policy
1n otinterviewed, therefore no betweenness scorec an be calculated
Source: ownd ata( nationala ctorinterviews,winter2 003/04)102
Figure7-8: OrganicfarmingpolicynetworkinItaly
Source: ownd ata( nationala ctorinterviews,winter2 003/04);created
withV isone
Abbreviations
ACUN ationalconsumersorganization
AIAB Organicfarmingorganization
AMAB MediterraneanAssociation ofOrganicAgriculture
ANN ationalAllianceParty
CIANationalfarmersu nion
COAGRICNationalfarmersu nion
CODICON ationalconsumers organization
COLDIRENationalfarmersu nion
CONAPAB NationalCommittee fororganicagriculture;advisory committee ofMIPAF
COPAGRINationalfarmers union
FEDERCON ationalconsumers organization
FIAOO rganicfarmingorganization
GREENP ItalianbranchofGreenpeace
IAMM editerraneanAgronomicInstituteofBari
MIPAF ItalianMinistry ofAgricultureandForestry
VERDII talianGreenParty103
Table7-8: DifferentmeasuresofpolicynetworksinItaly
reputationalp ower
fororganicfarming
policy*
reputationalp ower
forgeneralfarming
policy*
betweenness
centrality
statei nstitutions
CONAPAB 31% 0% 0%
MIPAF 56%69% 12%
politicalp arties
AN 6%1 9% 1%
VERDI 13% 0% 20%
organicfarmingorganizations
AIAB 56% 0% 0%
AMAB 31% 0%1 9%
FIAO 63% 0% 7%
environmentalo rganizations
LEGAMB 0% 6% 1%
generalfarmingorganizations
CIA 19% 81% 2%
COLDIRE 50%1 00%1 1%
COAGRIC 19% 94% 2%
others
ACU 0% 6% 0%
CODICO 6%6%0%
COPAGRI 6% 6% 0%
FEDERCO 6%6%4%
IAM 0% 0% 17%
*i ndicated as the percentage of interviewees naming the specific actor as oneo fthe fivem ostimportant
actors for organic /general farming policy
Source: ownd ata( national actorinterviews,winter2 003/04)104
Figure7-9:OrganicfarmingpolicynetworkinPoland
Source: ownd ata( national actorinterviews,winter2 003/04);created
withV isone
Abbreviations
ARIMR AgencyforRestructuringandModernization ofAgriculture
EKOGALOrganicfarmingorganization inthe Subcarpathianregion
EKOLANDOrganicfarmingorganization
IJHARS AgricultureandFoodQuality Inspection
INERInstitutef orSustainableDevelopment
KNRRREC oalition fort he OrganicFarmingDevelopment
KRIRN ationalCouncilo fAgriculturalChambers
KZRKIOR Polishf armersu nion
MRIRWMinistry ofAgricultureandRuralDevelopment,DepartmentofPlantBreedingandProtection,
OrganicFarmingUnit
MS Ministry ofEnvironment
PKEPolishEcologicalClub
PO CivicPlatform
PSLPolishPeoples Party
PZPolishGreenParty
SEKRIRWAgricultureandRuralDevelopmentCommittee ofthe PolishSenate
SKRIRWAgricultureandRuralDevelopmentCommittee ofthe PolishParliament
SLDD emocraticLeftAllianceParty105
Table7-9:DifferentmeasuresofpolicynetworksinPoland
reputationalp ower
fororganicfarming
policy*
reputationalp ower
forgeneralfarming
policy*
betweenness
centrality
statei nstitutions
MRIRW 1 94% 94% 5%
MS 29% 12%0%
ARIMR 41% 59% 1%
SEKRIRW 18%29% 3%
SKRIRW 41% 53% 7%
IJHARS 41% 35%0%
politicalp arties
PO 12%1 8%0%
PSL 18% 29% 0%
PZ 6%6%0%
SLD 18% 29% 0%
organicfarmingorganizations
EKOGAL 6% 6% 0%
EKOLAND 47%1 2%0%
KNRRRE 41% 12% 0%
generalfarmingorganizations
KRIR 18% 18% 13%
KZRKIOR 6%24%0%
environmentalo rganizations
PKE 12%24%0%
others
INER 6%6%1 2%
*i ndicated as the percentage of interviewees naming the specific actor as oneo fthe fivem ostimportant
actors for organic /generalf arming policy
1the reputationalp ower for organic farming policyrelates tothe Organic Farming Unitatt he MRIRW,
the reputational power for general farming policyrelates tothe MRIRW as awhole
Source: ownd ata( national actorinterviews,winter2 003/04)106
Figure7-10:OrganicfarmingpolicynetworkinSlovenia
Source: ownd ata( nationala ctorinterviews,winter2 003/04);created
withV isone
Abbreviations
BIOFACB iotechnicalFaculty,DepartmentofZootechnology
KGZSChamberofAgriculture
KONTR Organicfarmingi nspection andc ertification body
LDSS lovenianLiberalDemocrats Party,ecologicalforum
MKGPM inistry ofAgriculture,Forestry andFood, DepartmentforSustainableAgriculture
MOPEMinistry ofEnvironment,SpatialPlanningandEnergy
MZMinistry ofHealth
NSINewSloveniaParty,c ommittee foragriculture
SDSS lovenianSocialDemocraticParty,movementforr uraldevelopment
SKSS lovenianfarmersu nion
SMS SlovenianYouthParty
SPOKCommittee forAgricultureatt he SlovenianParliament
TNP TriglavNationalPark
UMANOT Foundation forSustainableDevelopment
URSVPO fficef orconsumers protection
USOFA Umbrellaorganization oforganicfarming
ZLSDSlovenianSocialDemocrats Party107
Table7-10:DifferentmeasuresofpolicynetworksinSlovenia
reputational
powerfororganic
farmingpolicy*
reputational
powerforgeneral
farmingpolicy*
betweenness
centrality
statei nstitutions
MKGP 76% 88% 25%
MOPE 18%35%7%
MZ 12% 0% 0%
URSVP 0%0%0%
politicalp artiesandparliament
LDS 0%0%4%
NSI 0% 6% 0%
SDS 0%6%0%
SMS 0% 6% 0%
SPOK 6%35%5%
ZLSD 0% 6% 0%
organicfarmingorganizations
USOFA (ZZEKS) 94% 6% 1%
generalfarmingorganizations
SKS 6% 41% 7%
environmentalo rganizations
UMANOT 12% 0% 5%
others
BIOFAC 18% 29% 0%
KONTR 41% 0%7%
KGZS 71% 82% 22%
TNP 12%0%0%
*i ndicated as the percentage of interviewees naming the specific actor as oneo fthe fivem ostimportant
actors for organic /generalf arming policy
Source: ownd ata( nationala ctorinterviews,winter2 003/04)108
Figure7-11:OrganicfarmingpolicynetworkinSwitzerland
Source: ownd ata( national actorinterviews,winter2 003/04);created
withV isone
Abbreviations
AGORAF armers union inthe French-speakingpart ofSwitzerland
BIOSUISSESwiss organicfarmers association
BLWSwiss FederalOfficef orAgriculture
CoopOneofthe mainretailers inSwitzerland
CVPS wiss ConservativeParty
ECOS Swiss umbrellaorganization ofthe economy
ETH-IAWInstituteofAgriculturalandFoodEconomicsatt he ETH(Swiss FederalInstituteofTechnologyZurich)
FDPS wiss LiberalParty
FIBLResearchInstituteofOrganicAgriculture
GPS Swiss GreenParty
IPSUISSESwiss organization forintegratedagriculture
LDKConferenceofagriculturaldirectors ofthe cantons
MigrosOneofthe mainretailers inSwitzerland
PRONATEnvironmentalo rganization
SBVSwiss Farmers union
SKSS wiss association forconsumerprotection
SMP Swiss association ofmilk producers
SPS Swiss SocialDemocraticParty
STS Swiss organization fort he prevention ofcruelty toanimals
SVPS wiss peoples party
VKMBA ssociation ofsmall andmediumsizedfarmers
WWFSwiss branchofthe WorldWideFundforNature109
Table7-11:DifferentmeasuresofpolicynetworksinSwitzerland
reputationalp ower
fororganicfarming
policy*
reputationalp ower
forgeneralfarming
policy*
betweenness
centrality
statei nstitutions
BLW 73% 95% 1%
LDK 0%0%0%
politicalp arties
CVP 0%5%0%
FDP 0% 5% 0%
GPS 9% 5%1 %
SPS 14% 9% 0%
SVP 0%1 4%0%
organicfarmingorganizations
BIOS UISSE 95%1 4%1 5%
generalfarmingorganizations
SBV 23%9 5%3%
AGORA 0% 9% 0%
environmentalo rganizations
PRONAT 14% 9% 0%
STS 5%1 8%0%
WWF 23% 9% 1%
IPS UISSE 0%5%0%
retailers
COOP 73%64%0%
MIGROS 41% 59% 0%
others
ECOS 0% 41% 0%
ETH-IAW 0%27%0%
FIBL 59% 5% 5%
SKS 27%27%0%
SMP 0% 41% 0%
VKMB 9% 27%3%
*i ndicated as the percentage of interviewees naming the specific actor as oneo fthe fivem ostimportant
actors for organic /general farming policy
Source: ownd ata( national actorinterviews,winter2 003/04)110
7.3List ofactors interviewedd uringthe EUlevelinterviews urvey
Organization/
Institution
Person interviewed
DG AGRI.F.4H.vanBoxem
DG ENVIB.Berger
ECOSOCS.Calamandarei
EPGreenFaction F.W.Gräfe zuBaringdorf
PR AustriaM.Fladl
PR GermanyW.Trunk
PR DenmarkL.BreumLarsen
PR FranceD.Gomel
BEUCB .Kettlitz
BirdlifeInternationalF.Schöne
CEJAH.Christensen
COPAE .Corral
EEBA .Berkhuysen
EFFATA.Spahn
EurocoopL.Ousted-Olson
FoEE M.Konecny
IFOAMEUGroupM.Schlüter111
7.4Reputationalp owerofEUlevelactors fororganicandgeneral
farmingpolicy
Table7-12:Reputation ofactors fororganicfarmingpolicyatt he EUlevel
Policyactor Reputationalp ower*
MemberStates/COUNCIL 59%
IFOAMEU 47%
Commission 35%
COPA 29%
DE 24%
NAT-OFORG 24%
DK 18%
DG-AGRI 18%
EP 18%
AT 12%
SCO 12%
IT 6%
ES 6%
DG-ENVI 6%
DG-SANCO 6%
DG-TRADE 6%
DG-RTD 6%
ABL 6%
IEEP 6%
ELO 6%
EOFF 6%
BEUC 6%
COOP 6%
DEMETERInternational 6%
"The marketingeneral" 6%
*i ndicated as the percentage of interviewees naming thisa ctor as one of the three mostimportant
Source:o wnd ata( EU-level actorinterviews,a utumn 2004)112
Table7-13:Reputation ofactors forgeneralfarmingpolicyatt he EUlevel
Policyactor reputationalp ower*
MemberStates/ COUNCIL 53%
COPA 53%
FR 35%
COMM 35%
WTO 29%
DE 24%
DG-AGRI 18%
CoAM 18%
EP 18%
ES 12%
CoFM 12%
Tradeunions 12%
IT 6%
GR 6%
IT 6%
UK 6%
NewEUmembers tates 6%
BEUC 6%
ABL 6%
Environmentalandc onsumersNGOs 6%
*i ndicated as the percentage of interviewees naming this actor as one of the three most
important
Source: ownd ata( EU-level actorinterviews,a utumn 2004)